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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to examine and explore the professionalisation initiatives of the UK 
public sector counter fraud specialists (fraud investigators), with a focus upon the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), National Health Service (NHS) and Local 
Authority (LA). The conceptual framework used to underpin the study was functionalist / 
“traits” theory of a profession and professionalisation. The main research question for the 
thesis concerns the issue of whether counter fraud specialism is a profession or not. Thus 
the question here is:  “Is counter fraud specialism a profession or not?”. Additionally, the 
thesis seeks to answer the question on how to develop a profession of counter fraud 
specialists. Thus, the question here is “If we want to develop a profession of counter fraud 
specialists (CFS), how do we do it?”.  Fraud is a growing problem in UK which affects the 
government, businesses, individuals and society as a whole, and much more than would be 
assumed by anyone suggesting it to be a victimless crime. Despite this, the reputation of 
UK public sector fraud investigators had in the past gained negative images resulting from 
the use of questionable investigative practices, together with the lack of appropriate 
mechanism for evaluating the training of fraud investigators, and the ease of defrauding the 
welfare system. This became a great concern for UK politicians/parliamentarians since the 
1970’s, resulting in the introduction of government initiatives, which emphasised the need 
to professionalise and introduce professionalism into anti-fraud work.  
 
The professionalisation initiatives led to the creation of a new breed of fraud investigators, 
otherwise known as “Counter Fraud Specialists” charged with the responsibilities of 
protecting the public purse and safeguarding it against fraud. In spite of the introduction of 
those initiatives and the positive contribution by Counter Fraud Specialists in protecting 
the public purse coupled with the ongoing austerity measures in the UK public sector, there 
has not been any major academic study assessing those initiatives. The study is important 
to the researcher because findings from the study will help inform the debate on 
professionalisation agenda for the UK public sector counter fraud specialists. Additionally, 
it will contribute to the academic research on the subject, given that, the literature on fraud 
and professionalisation on Counter Fraud Specialists has failed to address this.  The study 
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was undertaken by applying mixed-methods approaches involving the use of survey 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with a selected number of counter fraud 
practitioners in the UK public sector. In addition, documentary analysis was also 
undertaken.  
 
Generally, the study revealed developments enhancing the status of UK public sector 
counter fraud specialists as a result of the professionalisation initiatives/agenda. 
Nonetheless, the strength of the quality of developments remained arguable given 
identified weaknesses in the “pillars of institution” such as normative, regulative and 
cultural-cognitive symbols that, together with associated activities and resources provide 
the bedrock for institutional transformation and professionalising occupations.  The study 
provides recommendations on areas of improvement and future research.  Therefore, my 
contribution to knowledge in this study is that, I have attempted to show how to develop a 
profession for counter fraud specialists in the UK public sector, mainly, the DWP, NHS 
and LA. In addition, the study has failed to find evidence that counter fraud meets what the 
literature says is a hallmark of a profession. The literatures on fraud and professionalisation 
of counter fraud specialists have failed to address this and this is my contribution to 
knowledge.  
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Chapter 1 Introducing the Study 
 1.0. Introduction 
The main aim of this study is to examine and explore the professionalisation of counter 
fraud specialists (fraud investigators) in the UK public sector, with a focus upon the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), National Health Service (NHS) and Local 
Authority (LA).  While the researcher acknowledges the existence of a wide range of 
agencies out there involved in counter fraud activities in the UK, there are time and 
resource limitations for the project thereby making it impossible for the researcher to focus 
the study on all the agencies involved in countering fraud in the UK. Therefore, this study 
focuses specifically on the three main UK public sector counter fraud agencies identified 
earlier. The study answers two research questions with the main question relating to 
whether counter fraud specialism is considered a profession or not, while the subsequent 
question considers how to develop a profession of counter fraud specialists.  The study 
employs a more interpretivist approach together with mixed methods and functionalists 
/’traits’ theory of a profession to explore the professionalisation of counter fraud specialists 
within the three major UK public sector organisations specified above.  This introductory 
chapter aims to provide a general overview to the study. The chapter is divided into six 
parts. The first two parts (Section 1.1 and Section 1.2) provide rationale for the study 
together with the relevant background information together.  Following this is part three 
(Section 1.3), which provides a brief overview of how the study is going to be undertaken 
in terms of methodological issues, aims and objectives as well as research questions, while 
the fourth part (Section 1.4) outlines  the importance of the study and contribution to 
knowledge in the field of counter fraud. Part five (Section 1.5) provides an overview 
structure of the thesis, while part six (Section 1.6) provides a summary for the chapter.  
  
1.1. Rationale for the Study 
As indicated in the previous section, this section provides the rationale for the study 
together with the relevant background information as described below. 
 
The Fraud Problem, Complexity and Significance  
There is much written and debated about the concept of fraud (see Doig, 2006; Levi, 1987; 
Fraud Review, 2006). Nonetheless, fraud is a crime which covers a wide range of activities 
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and broadly involves “some form of misrepresentation in order to gain some financial or 
other material advantage” (Newburn, 2007, p.378).  Until the introduction of the Fraud Act 
2006 (affected in January 2007), there was no general offence for fraud or even the 
existence of legal definition for fraud in English Law (NERA Report, 2000). Prior to that, 
fraud investigators dealt with fraud using various statutory fraud ‘deception offences’ 
(such as obtaining money, property and services by deception) and numerous Theft Acts 
from 1968 to 1996.  
 
The passage of the Fraud Act 2006, however made a difference by replacing the old 
statutory ‘deception offences’ with dishonesty, thereby creating a more general offence for 
fraud in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The purpose of introducing the Fraud Act 
2006 was to make it easier, quicker and less expensive to secure conviction, given the 
complexity and difficulty involved using the old statutory deception acts (Smith et al, 
2011). In addition, the old Act failed to keep up with developments in the use of 
technology to commit fraud including the way businesses conducted their affairs. 
Nonetheless, the passage of The Fraud Act 2006 abolished the ‘deception offences’ and 
replaced them with three main offences enabling counter fraud specialists to hold a person 
to account for committing fraud. Those offences involved fraud committed by: 
 
• Means of false representation,  
• Dishonestly failing to disclose information and  
• Abusing a position of trust.  
 
Despite the Act creating a number of specific offences including possession or supplying 
articles for use in fraud (HMSO, 2006),  it however retained specific legislation relating to 
special areas of fraud in the form of social security and tax fraud, insider trading, forgery 
and counterfeiting, false accounting and fraud offences relating to misleading market 
practices (Smith et al, 2011).   
 
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in fraud levels in both UK and international level. 
Illustrating the rising levels of fraud internationally is the PWC Global Economic Crime 
Survey (2011) on international comparison of fraud levels. The study revealed that fraud is 
a global problem with high levels of reported fraud in the countries listed in Table 1.0. 
While the study concluded that both developed and developing economies are not immune 
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to fraud, it also recommended the need for countries to take fraud seriously by devising 
response plans and detecting mechanisms to reduce impacts on victims.   
 
Table 1.0: International Comparison of Reported Fraud by Countries 
Countries reporting high 
levels of fraud (40% or more) 
% Respondents 2011 % Respondents 2009 
 
Kenya   66% 57% 
South Africa  60% 62% 
UK   51% 43%  
New Zealand  50% 42% 
Spain  47% 35% 
Australia  47% 40% 
Argentina  46% 39% 
France  46% 29% 
USA   45% 35% 
Malaysia  44% 28% 
Mexico  40% 51% 
Source: PWC Global Economic Crime Survey (2011, p. 17) 
 
Previous studies have also highlighted the rising levels of fraud in various countries. For 
instance, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) report of 2008 estimated 
that out of the $14.196 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the United States of 
America (USA) in 1998, around $994 billion was lost to fraud (ACFE, 2008).  Schoepfer 
and Piquero (2009, p.209) have also pointed out that fraud affects about a third of the USA 
population. Similarly, the estimated cost of fraud in Australia even as at 1997 was between 
$3 and $5 billion per annum (Smith, 1997). 
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), fraud is estimated to cost the public sector a minimum of 
£16 billion a year and a maximum of £72 billion to the private sector (Fraud Review Team, 
2006a).  These costs include £3.75 billion of Excise fraud, £2 billion of benefit fraud, 
almost £2 billion of Value Added Tax (VAT) fraud and £1.5 billion of insurance fraud to 
name some of the largest (Fraud Review Team, 2006a). Recent estimate by the National 
Fraud Authority (NFA) also revealed fraud cost the British economy more than £30 billion 
a year or a yearly average of £765 for every adult in UK (National Fraud Authority, 2011).  
Indeed, the Fraud Review Team Final Report (2006b, p2) stated that harm caused by fraud 
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“may be second only to Class A drug trafficking as a source of harm from crime; and there 
is evidence that fraud funds terrorism, drugs and people trafficking”.  
 
Despite those figures illustrating the cost of fraud in financial terms, there is no reliable 
estimate in measuring the true cost of fraud (NERA, 2000; QC Lord Grabiner, 2000; DSS, 
1998; Fraud Review Team, 2006a; Fraud Review Team 2006b; Smith, 1997; Levi & 
Burrows, 2008). Possible reasons for the lack of more reliable estimates in accounting for 
the extent of fraud include the hidden nature of fraud itself as well as 
 
• Poor reporting - The hidden nature of fraud itself with most fraud cases either 
unreported or unknown to the victims. The Fraud Review Team (2006a) for 
instance revealed that only about a fifth (20%) of fraud cases is brought to the 
attention of the authorities. In some cases, the organisation would only realise that 
fraud had taken place through whistleblowing mechanisms and investigations 
through dedicated in-house anti-fraud teams. 
 
• Poor recording of fraud - a number of police forces are reluctant to record fraud 
cases reported by the public for reasons such as lack of investigative expertise due 
to technical nature of the case or consider them better dealt with through civil 
action (Fraud Review Team, 2006a; Doig & Coles, 1997). 
 
As well as poor reporting and recording issues, resourcing counter fraud work is a further 
problem across law enforcement agencies involved in counter fraud work (Fraud Review 
Team, 2006a; Button et al, 2007a; Frimpong & Baker, 2007; Doig & Coles, 1997; Doig & 
MaCaulay, 2008). The Fraud Review Team (2006a, p.67), for instance, noted that even 
within the police fraud squads and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), manpower and 
resources dedicated to fraud had been dwindling.  Illustrating the declining workforce and 
police resources for fraud are the number of fraud squad officers which stood at 556 as at 
2002 but had fallen to  416 as at 2004 (Fraud Review Team, 2006a), without being 
replaced. In addition, the existing squad often face the problem of being assigned to tasks 
considered “priority” by their management to meet targets. The declining manpower 
resources coupled with management assignment of police fraud squad staff to tackle high 
priority tasks such as money laundering and financial intelligence to meet performance 
targets has led to a culture where police fraud squads are “cherry picking” fraud cases to 
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investigate. The extract below from the Fraud Review Team (2006a, p.69) provides a clear 
demonstration on resourcing for fraud on a £100,000 bank employee fraud reported to the 
police: 
 
The investigation of fraud is extremely expensive in terms of hours spent obtaining 
statements and preparing a prosecution case. The Constabulary is required under 
the Crime and Disorder Act to produce a crime reduction strategy. Our strategy 
identifies priority areas and police resources are directed to those priority areas. 
Fraud is not one of them. In reality the bank is the loser as the result of the actions 
of one of their employees. Fraud investigations tend to be resource intensive and do 
not contribute towards our performance targets but actually remove resources from 
our core business.  
 
Apart from the police, the issue of under resourcing for anti fraud work is also evident in 
other UK public sector bodies involved in countering fraud, despite the effort being made 
by those agents to support the public police in counter fraud activities. For instance, a 
study on counter fraud specialists across the three key departments involved in countering 
UK public sector fraud (DWP, NHS and the Local Authority) revealed that over half 
(52.4%) of all respondents in the survey, felt they did not feel properly resourced to 
undertake counter fraud work (Frimpong and Baker (2007). The study also revealed that 
counter fraud specialists felt under-estimated and under-valued by both the public and 
within their own organisations.  
 
Fraud is also recognised as a greater risk in certain organisational sectors (Information 
Gathering Working Party & Doig, 1999, p.13) causing those sectors to develop a network 
of sharing information to combat it. The risk of fraud to organisations is illustrated by Gee 
et al’s (2009) study on UK plc’s resilience to fraud. The study revealed the assessed 
organisations had a combined turnover of around £455 billion in 2006. This formed around 
a third (by value) of UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the time. Nonetheless, the 
study revealed a wider range of weaknesses in risk measurements and counter fraud 
infrastructure including training for counter fraud staff in those organisations. Similar 
studies measuring the risks of exposure to fraud by the NHS and putting in corrective 
actions through counter fraud activities has produced positive results to counter fraud 
activities. For instance, from 1998 to 2004, the NHS was able to reduce fraud in many 
areas of the organisation to its lowest level by: 
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• Reducing overall losses to patient fraud by 54% from £171 to £78 million 
• Fraudulent claims by professionals working for the NHS fell to just over half (54%) 
after fraud-proofing organisational systems and processes 
• Achieving 96% successful prosecution rate 
• Detecting and stopping of over £170 million worth of fraud and unlawful actions 
• Obtaining financial benefit to the NHS in excess of £600 million (NHS CFSMS, 
2005, cited in Frimpong & Baker, 2007, p. 131).  
 
The author acknowledge that periodic measurement of fraud risks to an organisation and 
strengthening anti-fraud measures contribute to providing evidence to support the 
effectiveness of counter fraud activities as demonstrated by the NHS. However, the overall 
assessment of the effectiveness of counter fraud activities to the UK public sector as a 
result of the professionalisation agenda is beyond the scope of this research project. This 
has been recommended as part of the areas for future study in Chapter 6.  
 
Linked to the issues of resourcing, reporting, recording and measuring the growing fraud 
problems is the nature of investigation itself, which is often complex. The investigation of 
crime including fraud is often intrusive, sensitive by nature and required the investigator to 
follow due process of law. Failure to do so when the case results in criminal prosecution in 
the Court of Law could lead to potential injustice. The wrongful conviction of “The 
Guildford Four” and “Birmingham Six” by police detectives provide illustrations 
(Newburn, 2007) of those incidents. In the context of fraud, notable examples of wrongful 
conviction/miscarriage of justice in England included the famous trial and conviction of 
Adolf Beck in the early twentieth century for identity fraud, to the recent conviction of 
Patrick Zengeya in 2001. Following the appeal against his conviction on the grounds of 
suppression of  evidence by the police investigators and the trial judge, Mr. Beck 
succeeded and received a compensation of £5000 in 1907, currently worth around £310, 
000 (see Naughton, 2003, para. 6; Taylor, 2009, paras 1-6; Dobson, 1984) for wrongful 
conviction. Regrettably, investigators have not learnt from their past mistakes, given the 
stereotypical images and past negative media publicity of using questionable interrogation 
techniques before the introduction of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984  (Middleton, 
2002; BBC Inside Out, 2005; Livingstone & Hart, 2003). There is also the public 
perception of dispensing “street – corner justice to maintain order without resorting to 
courts ... ”  (Greenwood & Petersilia, 1975, p.5).  
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Similarly, various studies have demonstrated the impact of fraud on victims (see Smith et 
al, 2011; Levi & Burrows, 2008; Fraud Review Team, 2006a). The earlier discussion on 
the growing fraud problem meant that fraud has devastating impact on victims. Examples 
of those victims include the government, businesses, individuals and society as a whole. 
Illustrating some of the impacts of fraud on victims is the  National Fraud Authority 
(2010a) survey, which revealed that 68% of victims felt angry for being defrauded, while 
45% felt their emotional well being had been affected due to financial loss. In addition, 
45% of victims claimed the feeling of stress, while 37% reported a major psychological 
and emotional impact. The Audit Commission (2009) report revealed that in the UK public 
sector, every pound lost through fraud directly affects citizens by increasing national and 
local taxation levels or threatening essential services such as social care, housing and 
education. The impact of fraud on businesses includes serious damage to reputation or 
corporate brands which could lead to loss of market share. For instance, the PWC Global 
Economic Crime Survey (2011) revealed that reputational damage caused by fraud was the 
biggest fear for 40% of the respondents. Similarly, 10 % of victims in the study reported 
the financial loss from the fraud exceeded US$5 million (PWC Global Economic Crime 
Survey, 2011).  
 
 
As well as the impact of fraud on victims, fraud investigators have for a long time 
perceived themselves as under-valued, under-resourced and under-estimated (Frimpong & 
Baker, 2007) for their role as fraud fighters. This has resulted in creating measures to 
promote their image and status particularly, those in the public sector through the 
professionalization agenda (DSS, 1998).  While this was seen as an attempt in the right 
direction to address the growing problem of fraud, resource issues and professionalising 
anti-fraud work as indicated in the DSS (1998) Green Paper entitled “Beating Fraud is 
Everyone’s Business”, there has not been any major academic study to assess the extent of 
progress of the anti-fraud professionalization initiatives to reduce the increasing levels of 
fraud in the UK public sector.  Few studies existing in the area such as Frimpong and 
Baker (2007), Button et al (2007a) had different orientations and limitations as those 
studies were not supported by any follow – up interviews with counter fraud specialists.  
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Linked to this is the lack of reliable estimate on the cost of fraud to the UK economy, 
which has attracted debates in the academic community (see Tunley 2011) on the need for 
robust fraud measurement mechanisms in the UK. However, the ability to accurately 
measure fraud involve developing highly skilled anti-fraud professionals with the relevant 
skills to protect the public  purse against fraud and improve public confidence in the 
system. Undoubtedly, there is no better time other than now for the UK government to 
revisit the professionalisation agenda, given the period of austerity measures with public 
money highly vulnerable to fraud, the need for better protection and accountability. In 
addition, the behaviour and activities of fraud investigators has been called into question, 
given the negative images, the increasing levels of fraud and the loss of public confidence 
in fraud fighters (see DSS, 1998). Given the complexity of the nature of fraud and the scale 
of the problem, combating the growing fraud problem and improving public confidence in 
the UK economy as well as those who investigate fraud has prompted the need to revisit 
the UK government anti-fraud initiatives introduced in 1998 for proper training and 
accreditation of anti-fraud staff through professionalisation. 
 
1.1.1. Fraud - Perspectives on Motivations    
 
The need to understand motivations for fraud 
Two main reasons could be provided to justify the need to understand the motivations for 
fraud.  
• Firstly, fraud is a growing problem, given the extent of the problem on the global 
scale and the broader cost involved as discussed earlier. It is a type of crime which 
has negative impact on businesses, the government and society as a whole.   
 
• Secondly, understanding the motivations for fraud could help policy makers and 
criminologists to devise techniques for profiling offenders and various measures 
such as the training and development of fraud investigators to detect, investigate 
and prevent the growing fraud problem. In addition, it helps fraud investigators and 
prosecutors to decide on the type of sanction(s) to apply to fraudsters.  
 
Understanding the motivations for crime including fraud is a very difficult concept and 
complex in nature, given the multiple factors underlying criminal behaviour and 
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motivations for the crime (Rowlingson et al, 1997; Mitton, 2009; Newburn, 2007; ACFE, 
2011; Duffield & Grabosky, 2001). However, in order to gain insights into the motivation 
for crime including fraud, contemporary criminologists have attempted to draw on various 
ideas. Those ideas ranged from the classical to positivists’ theories of crime to help 
understand the drivers for perpetrating fraud. While the earliest classical criminologists 
believed that criminal behaviour was a genetic disease inherited from parents and ancestors 
as illustrated by the work of Lambroso (see Newburn, 2007), contemporary criminologists 
taking the classical approach to the understanding of crime based their arguments on the 
notion of crime as a choice by those individuals who choose to do so – rational choice 
theory.  Rational choice theory suggests that individuals choose to commit crime by 
calculating the benefit (pleasure or gain) derived from the crime against the cost 
(punishment) of committing it.  Rational choice theorists therefore emphasised punishment 
to deter offenders, but the punishment administered must be fair and proportionate to the 
crime committed. Nonetheless, the theory has been criticised for failing to consider 
situations where the “offender is mentally incapacitated or where the behaviour concerned 
seemed to be involuntary” (Newburn, 2007, p118).  
 
By contrast, criminologists subscribing to positivists tradition of understanding the 
motivation for crime emphasised the need for criminologists to look beyond ‘rational 
choice’ theory as the only motivation for crime. Rather, they should look beyond factors 
outside the individual’s immediate control such as psychological, sociological and 
environmental aspects of the person (Newburn, 2007) as illustrated below.   
 
Psychological perspectives and the ‘fraud triangle’ 
Social learning is about observing individuals and learning from them. The theory was 
applied in the work of Skinner in 1953 regarding the operant learning conditioning of 
animals. Skinner concluded that positive reinforcement of a particular behaviour produces 
positive consequences or rewards, whereas those resulting in undesirable outcomes tends 
to be negatively rewarded or punished (Newburn, 2007).  The relevance of psychology to 
understanding offending behaviour is illustrated by social learning theories. Social learning 
theorists argue that individuals learn from their peers or peer groups through interaction 
and communication. Differential association theory is a kind of social learning theory 
which was applied by Edwin Sutherland to study criminal conduct. Sutherland concluded 
10 | P a g e  
 
that “individuals learn criminal behaviour through their interaction and communication 
with others including peer groups” (Newburn, 2007, p.193). Areas where Sutherland 
believed the learning occurred involved how criminals learnt the skills and techniques to 
commit the respective crimes, the attitudes and drivers towards the crime as well as 
rationalisations for perpetrating the crime (ACFE, 2010).   
 
Similarly, contemporary criminologists such as Donald Cressey and Steve Albrecht have 
adapted the work of Sutherland to study the motivation for occupational fraud and abuse 
(see ACFE, 2010). Their study revealed three key factors motivating individuals to commit 
fraud (the fraud triangle) as: 
Perceived (non-shareable) financial pressures  
The pressure to commit fraud exists in various forms such as perceived (‘non 
shareable’) financial pressure to meet sales targets as happened in Enron. The KPMG 
(2011) report also identified greed and work pressures to enhance either bonuses or 
protect one’s employment position as factors putting pressure on employees to commit 
fraud. Other factors also include the need to meet expectations from family members 
and friends, extra marital affairs, paying off excessive debts resulting from excessive 
gambling (ACFE, 2011).  
 
Perceived opportunity 
The element of the opportunity exists in the form of failure to discipline fraud 
perpetrators or lack of internal controls to detect and prevent fraud as happened in the 
case of Nick Leeson and the collapse of Barings Bank. The problem of weak internal 
controls creating an opportunity for fraud is exemplified by the KPMG (2011) survey, 
which revealed increasing cases regarding the exploitation of weak internal controls by 
fraudsters from 49% in 2007 to 74% in 2011.   
 
Rationalization/neutralisation 
Rationalisation / neutralisation are the techniques used by perpetrators of fraud to 
justify their motives for the deviant act(s). Basically, fraudsters use the rationalisation 
techniques to make their illicit act appear acceptable, so as to project an image of a 
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trustworthy person (ACFE, 2011).  Smith et al (2011) for instance highlighted some of 
those techniques used by fraudsters to justify their motives to involve the ‘borrowing’, 
‘due me/dissatisfaction’ and the ‘challenge’ syndromes. The ‘borrowing’ syndrome, 
the perpetrator rationalise his/her behaviour with the pretext of ‘borrowing the money’ 
and paying it back later. The ‘due me /dissatisfaction syndrome ‘ is used by employees 
to express dissatisfaction with pay levels or retaliation for denial of promotion 
opportunities.   The ‘challenge syndrome’ on the other hand involves employees using 
their skills or intellect to find weaknesses in management systems, with the hope of 
being recognised for their achievements. An example of the ‘challenge syndrome’ is 
the use of social engineering techniques by hackers and insiders to attack corporate 
systems to embarrass management.  
 
While the ‘fraud triangle’ (pressure, opportunity and rationalization) provides greater 
insights for anti-fraud professionals to understand the drivers for fraud, the model has been 
criticised for being inadequate as a tool for countering fraud. The reason being that, the 
model “lacks the objective criteria for identifying pressure and rationalisation” (ACFE, 
2011, p.18). In addition, the model over simplifies the motivation for fraud, despite the 
complex nature of fraud. The inadequacy has led to the development of alternative models 
such as the ‘fraud diamond’. The ‘fraud diamond’ unlike the ‘fraud triangle’ (see ACFE, 
2011), argues that four elements needed to be present for an individual to commit fraud, 
especially when the financial value of the fraud is greater and the offence extends for a 
considerable period of time involved the fraudster or perpetrator: 
• occupying a position of trust or authoritative function within the organisation 
• having the capacity, knowledge of systems weaknesses and control and taking 
advantage by virtue of his/her position of trust to perpetrate and hide the offence 
• having the confidence (ego) of getting away with the fraud and where caught, he 
/she would have an excuse of defending himself/herself 
• having the capability to deal with the aftermath of the perpetrated fraud and related 
consequences such as stress caused by the fraud (ACFE, 2011) 
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Sociological and environmental perspectives 
Sociological theorists take different views to the understanding of criminal behaviour, by 
placing emphasis on the actions and behaviours causing the individual to act against norms 
and rules of society. Analysis of such perspectives for fraud crime draws on the 
sociological theories of anomie (Merton’s anomie theory) and Hirschi and Gottfredson’s 
theory of self – control. For Merton, the essence of anomie is that individuals commit 
crime not by choice. Rather, they find themselves in an environment of economic and 
social deprivation, which act as barriers to achieving those desirable goals of society or the 
“American Dream” (Newburn, 2007). Examples of those involve materialism, prestige and 
status. Inability to reconcile the ‘American Dream’, with the legitimate means of 
attainment put pressure on individuals. This drives the individual to engage in deviant acts 
by disregarding existing controls and norms (see Choo & Tan, 2007).   
 
By contrast, Hirschi and Gottfredson’s self-control theory argues that the motivation for 
committing crime is based on a “combination of criminal opportunities and low-self 
control” (Newburn, 2007, p.235). Newburn described the low-self control to involve 
tendency to act impulsively, desire for risk seeking and self-centredness as well as inability 
to resist temptations of criminal opportunity. He suggested that parents should instil self-
control in the early life of children.  In terms of the criminal opportunity, contemporary 
criminologists such as Felson and Cohen argue that criminals take advantage of 
opportunities and suggested the application of ‘routine activity’ theory to manage the 
situation. The theory basically suggests that most of the criminological theories discussed 
earlier have concentrated more on the offender as opposed to the “situation in which 
offending takes place” (Cohen & Felson, 1979, cited in Newburn, 2007, p.286).  
 
Managing the situation involved development of crime management strategies capable of 
‘protecting’ the ‘suitable target’. In the context of fraud, the ‘suitable target’ is public 
money, while counter fraud specialists (fraud investigators) are the people capable of 
‘protecting’ public money. Where an alleged fraud is suspected, it is investigated using a 
wide range of strategies and related legal tools. Those strategies and tools are discussed in 
sections 1.1.4.3 and 1.1.4.4 in this chapter. While none of the theoretical concepts on fraud 
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described earlier provided conclusive answers to the causes of crime, they are relevant in 
terms of providing various perspectives in the understanding of criminal behaviour. For 
instance, research into the motivation for benefit fraud attributed drivers for the fraud to 
economic circumstances such as poverty, hardship and frustration from depending on 
welfare benefits (Cook, 1989, cited by Minkes & Minkes, 2010, p. 87).  Similar research 
by Rowlingson et al (1997) found that, multiple factors underpinned the behaviour and 
motivations for welfare fraud. Examples of those multiple factors included the need for the 
money to survive, despite the perpetrators knowledge the act as unlawful, they did not 
perceive it as something criminal. Mitton (2009) study found similar results and concluded 
that motivations for fraud are complex and people are diverse in their fraudulent behaviour 
as summarised below:   
 
People exhibit much diversity in their behaviour, and they are motivated by a 
variety of factors. There are individuals who always cheat and those who always 
comply, some who maximize expected utility, others who overweight low 
probabilities, …some who are at times cooperative and at other times free-riders, 
and many who are guided in some way by social norms.  (Mitton, 2009, p.35)  
 
The complex nature of fraud, the scale of the problem and devastating impact on victims as 
well as the multiple factors explaining the drivers for fraud, provide a clear illustration on 
the need for proper training and development of crime fighters involved in anti-fraud 
related activities. Doing so will ensure that the anti-fraud officers have the necessary 
investigative skills to be able to stay ahead of fraudsters. 
 
1.1.2. Pressure to Professionalise and Professionalisation 
Initiatives 
As discussed earlier, the growing cost of fraud, the questionable investigative practices and 
the public images of fraud investigators became issues of great concern for politicians (see 
Scampion Report, 2000; Department for Works and Pension, 1998). The identified 
problems resulted in need to introduce government initiatives, which emphasised the need 
to professionalise anti-fraud work. Despite the introduction of those initiatives, there has 
not been any major academic study assessing those initiatives. For the sake of simplicity, 
the professionalisation initiatives are divided into two eras – first and second era (Figure 
1.1).  The pressure to professionalise anti-fraud work in UK is not new, and dates as far 
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back as the 1970s (Smith, 1985). What is new was the approach adopted by the respective 
governments to professionalise anti-fraud work.  Smith (1985) for instance, discussed how 
politicians in the 1970s inundated the press and parliament with alleged examples of 
benefit fraud abuse. However, Parliamentarians at the time did not take the issue of fraud 
abuse seriously, until the conviction of the person Smith (1985, p.112) described as “King 
Fiddler” – Derek Deevay.  Derek Deevay, using forty-one (41) aliases obtained £36,000 in 
benefits, causing the then Labour Secretary of State for Social Services (Stan Orme) to 
admit that fraud was actually a problem and had to be tackled.  
 
Following this, Stan Orme established a co-ordinating committee on fraud abuse in the 
1970s (first era),  which developed ‘six point action plan’ to tackle fraud with a 
commitment to resources, training and facilities, improved investigative procedures, new 
anti-fraud measures, managerial involvement and  greater emphasis on fraud awareness. 
Smith (1985) further argued that following the election victory of the Conservative 
government in 1979 and the appointment of Reg Prentice as Social Security Minister in the 
1980s led to the development of new anti-fraud measures to beef up anti-fraud work. 
Amongst the measures introduced were increasing  anti-fraud staff by over a thousand  so 
as to make a saving of over £50m of tax payers money as well as putting more emphasis on 
claiming back overpayments, and less emphasis on prosecution. Nonetheless, the main 
weakness of the anti-fraud measures introduced in the first era by Orme and Prentice (see 
Figure 1.1) did not include anti-fraud training programme that led to professional 
accreditation status.  
 
Notwithstanding the anti-fraud initiatives introduced in the 1970s and 1980s, social 
security fraud abuse (Grover, 2005) and fraud investigators use of questionable 
investigative tactics (Cook, 1991) yet again, attracted media attention. Cook (1991) and 
Smith (1985), for instance, point to the existence of a culture of using questionable 
investigative tactics involving bullying, intimidation and humiliation of benefit claimants. 
Claimants alleged to be defrauding the system had similar treatments at interviews, 
particularly ‘single mothers’. In addition, fraud investigators at the time ‘cherry – picked’ 
cases to investigate and targeted fraud prone occupations such as taxi drivers. As well as 
‘cherry – picking’ cases, there existed a culture of presenting false allegations and 
evidence. They also avoided investigating cases where the suspect was known to have a 
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history of violence. The culture of using those ‘sharp practices’ predated the introduction 
of Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE 1984) and the disclosure rule (Criminal 
Procedure and Investigatory Act) (CPIA 1996). PACE (1984) refers to guidance for the 
police and fraud investigators to follow in relation to the arrest, treatment, questioning and 
identification of suspects as well as tape recording of interviews (Home Office, 1985).   
 
In terms of training, there existed no minimum structure of training for fraud investigators 
at the time (DSS, 1998; Button et al, 2007a; 2007b; Frimpong & Baker, 2007). As 
discussed, training took place on an ad-hoc and local basis. As well as this, fraud 
investigators had very little experience at the level necessary to develop anti-fraud 
strategies. In addition, there existed a culture where newer recruits, including less 
experienced fraud investigators had to learn from their predecessors. Another important 
issue was the absence of a mechanism for evaluating the skills and knowledge gained on 
the training. The period also witnessed a number of government reports highlighting 
serious failures in systems and controls of administering taxpayer’s money within 
government departments and public bodies (Audit Commission, 1993/1994; Public 
Accounts Committee, 1993/94; Social Security Select Committee, 1995/96). All those 
publications pointed to leakages in the system.  
 
In 1998, the Audit Commission published a further report, based on recommendations 
from the 1993/1994 report. However, the report concluded that more work needed to be 
done in tackling fraud. Following this, fraud became a significant issue in terms of “who 
commits and investigates it, how much it costs and ways of combating it in the future” 
(Doig, 2000, p. 99). A combination of the factors discussed created an atmosphere where 
further measures had to be put in place to address the situation. This was where the 
professionalisation initiatives identified in the second era started (see Figure 1.1 on the 
next page). This led to the emergence of counter fraud specialist’s profession. 
 
As discussed earlier, fraud in the public sector received a number of critical reports in the 
1990s, given the failures in administrative, financial systems and control of public money. 
Those failures in the administration of public money were considered as a departure from 
the standards of public conduct established during the past 140 years (Public Accounts 
16 | P a g e  
 
Committee, 1993/1994, p.5).  
 
Figure 1.1: Initiatives to Professionalise Anti-Fraud Work 
 
 
The situation however changed following the 1997 election victory of the New Labour 
Government.  The New Labour Government decided to introduce a number of policy 
programmes including addressing public concern for fraud and reforming the welfare 
system (Hyde, Dixon & Joyner, 1999).  The government in an attempt to address the 
growing concern for fraud published a consultation paper (White Paper) in 1997.   
1998 
Second   Era:  
1997/1998 
 First Era:  
1979/1980 
2001 
Introduction of Initiatives to Professionalise  
Anti-Fraud Work (Reg Prentice and Stan Orme) 
Publication of Green Paper “Beating Fraud is Everyone’s     
Business”  by Frank Field MP . This was followed by 
Supporting Government Reports  including Scampion Report 
(2000) and Grabiner Report (2000) 
DSS (now DWP) Established Own Training Courses 
(Professionalism in Security – PINS) and Accredited by 
University of Portsmouth 
Development of Accredited Fraud Investigator’s (AFI) 
Training  Package by London Borough of Lambeth (Local 
Authority - LA) in Partnership with Thames Valley Police . 
University of Portsmouth Acted as the Accreditation Body 
(PAB) for the Training 
Integration of DWP, NHS and Local Authority Accreditation 
Board into a Single Body - Counter Fraud Professional 
Accreditation Board (CFPAB) and a Common Training Syllabus 
Leading to Professional Award of “Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialist (ACFS)” 
Creation of the NHS Counter Fraud Service. The NHS 
Established own ‘Foundation Level Training’ also Accredited 
by University of Portsmouth  
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In 1998, this became a Green Paper entitled “Beating Fraud is Everyone’s Business”. 
Amongst the policies was the need to professionalise counter fraud work given the earlier 
critical reports. The Green Paper provided a conservative estimate of social security fraud 
to be around £7bn per year. The professionalisation agenda was further strengthened by the 
publication of two major government reports (QC Lord Grabiner Report, 2000 – The 
Informal Economy and Scampion Report, 2000 – Organised Benefit Fraud). Thus, both 
reports emphasised the growing cost of fraud and the need for professionalism amongst 
investigators.  Figure 1.1 summarised various government initiatives to professionalise 
anti-fraud work since 1979 to 2001, where a single accreditation board (CFPAB) was 
formed.  
 
It is within the 1998 Green Paper that the government attempted to professionalise anti-
fraud work and proposed six key initiatives to professionalise counter fraud work, by 
developing a body of highly skilled anti-fraud specialists capable of tackling fraud in the 
same way other professions have applied their skills (DSS, 1998, pp. 45 – 47). Those 
involved developing: 
• Common skills standards,  
• Common core training for all anti-fraud staff,  
• Training accreditation,  
• Continuous professional development,  
• Common principles of good practice,  
• Common approach in tackling fraud across public sector and private sector in the 
UK 
 
A number of writers (Button et al 2007a; Button et al 2007b; Frimpong & Baker, 2007) 
have pointed to the relevance of the development of Professionalism in Security (PINS), 
which led to the award of the recognised qualification of an Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialists (ACFS). In particular, Button et al (2007b, p.94) traces the origin of the ACFS 
training to the initiatives taken by the London Borough of Lambeth in partnership with 
Thames Valley Police to develop a training package, later on accredited by the University 
of Portsmouth. Participants on completion received the award of an Accredited Financial 
Investigator (AFI) status through the Professional Accreditation Board (see Figure 1.1).   
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Following the success of the training package, Department of Social Security adopted the 
model in 1999 to train fraud investigators in Professionalism in Security (PINS) – an 
integrated programme of training and certification aimed at all DWP investigators in 
aspects of their work including knowledge of the law, legal systems, investigations skills 
and evidence gathering to support a potential prosecution.  In the same year, the NHS 
Counter Fraud Service was established and the decision was made that, all their newly 
recruited Counter Fraud Specialist (CFS) would be trained to the same common standard. 
Working alongside other agencies, they devised a counter-fraud “Foundation Level” 
training package, which drew together all the practical skills and legislative requirements 
that a CFS would need to be effective in the fight against fraud (Frimpong & Baker, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Organisations and Accredited Counter Fraud Course by CFPAB 
Organisation Accredited Training Package Leading to Award of ‘Accredited 
Counter Fraud Specialist’ 
DWP and Sister 
Organisations 
PINS 1, Legislation; PINS 2, Liaison, Intelligence Organisation and 
Planning; PINS 3, Rules of Disclosure and Exhibits; PINS 4, 
Investigative Interviewing; PINS 5, Surveillance; PINS 6, 
Photographic and Video Evidence; and PINS 7, Court Procedures. 
NHS Investigation, Law and Procedures; Investigative Interviewing; either 
Pro-Active Investigation or Pro-Active Evidence Gathering; and 
Principles of Good Practice 
Focus for 
Abbey  
Either: Basic Investigation; or Pro-active Evidence Gathering; and 
Analytical Investigation Methods; Investigative Interviewing; 
Statement Writing, Case Papers and Court Skills  
Focus for Local 
Authorities 
Criminal Investigation Procedures; Foot Surveillance; Investigative 
Interviewing; Statement Writing, Case Papers and Court Skills 
RMH for Local 
Authorities 
RMH 1 Legislation; RMH 2 Liaison, Intelligence, Organisation and 
Planning; RMH 3 Basic Surveillance; RMH 4 Photographic and 
Video Evidence; RMH 5 Investigative Interviewing; RMH 6 Rules of 
Disclosure, Exhibits and Production; RMH 7 Court Procedures 
RNA for 
UKPIS 
Foundation Intelligence Course; Investigative Skills; Investigative 
Interviewing Skills; Courtroom and Evidence Skills 
 Source: Button et al (2007b, p.96) 
 
 
In addition, a partnership was formed with the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies (ICJS) 
at the ”Foundation Level” training led to the award of the initial professional qualification 
of “Accredited Counter Fraud Officer” (ACFO). However, the award of ACFO was 
discontinued in 2001 following the integration of the respective accreditation boards 
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(National Counter Fraud Accreditation Board and the NHS National Professional 
Accreditation Board) to form an overarching accreditation board in 2001. The new board 
formed out of the merger was the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
(CFPAB). Delegates completing the “Foundation Level” training following the merger 
received the award of an “Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist – ACFS”. Hence, the term 
“Counter Fraud Specialist” emerged from the 1998 Green Paper initiatives entitled 
“Beating Fraud is Everyone’s Business”. 
 
 
The board (CFPAB) has representatives from a number of public and private sector 
organisations interested in countering fraud. Figure 1.2 illustrates the accredited courses 
with the respective member organisations and respective training providers. The creation 
of the board has given counter fraud professional qualification an identity or one of the 
symbolic elements of professionalisation.  The Fraud Review Team (2006b, p. 153) 
outlined the CFPAB role across the UK as follows: 
 
• To establish and maintain professional standards in the delivery of a portfolio of 
professional training courses in the field of counter fraud work, encompassing a 
'Foundation Level' syllabus and qualification 
 
• To recognise formally, the successful completion of a portfolio of professional 
training courses in the field of counter fraud work. These encompass the 
'Foundation Level' syllabus and qualification. 
 
• To oversee the delivery of the training courses taking into account the quality and 
effectiveness of the courses. 
 
• To ensure that individual courses, and the portfolio of courses as a whole, are 
conducted so that Higher Education credits can be awarded, and that in particular a 
recommended credit rating is communicated to the higher education institution(s). 
 
• To establish and maintain professional standards in the delivery of an 'Advanced 
Level' counter fraud qualification based on an agreed common syllabus, to be 
delivered by higher education institutions and resulting in an Award at Certificate 
of Higher Education level. 
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• To recognise formally the successful completion of the 'Advanced Level' counter 
fraud qualification with the award of Certified Counter Fraud Specialist (CCFS) 
status. 
 
• To promote actively professional training for counter fraud specialists. 
Additionally, the CFPAB has to work in partnership with organisations having a 
common interest in the development of professional training and access to relevant 
programmes of Higher Education. 
 
Notwithstanding the role of the accreditation board and the success of awarding several 
thousands of certificates since its establishment including the potential to leverage its 
established infrastructures, there is not yet a national standard of accreditation in the UK 
(Fraud Review Team, 2006b, p. 152). Rather, there exists a variety of anti-fraud training 
from different training providers with each serving a particular sector of the market. Even 
more worrying is that each course has its own syllabus and accreditation, yet there is not an 
overarching body acting as inspectorate or regulatory body for all those courses as found in 
the established professions such as Medicine, Law and Accountancy.  Although, there 
exists a number of achievements following the professionalisation initiatives (see 
Frimpong & Baker, 2007), problems still exist. For instance, there is the lack of a 
comprehensive and recognised professional association for counter fraud specialists. In 
addition, the role of the CFPAB is less clear in relation to its ability to regulate counter 
fraud specialists beyond training, education and accreditation. Despite the existence of 
CFPAB code of conduct for counter fraud specialists,  the extent of enforcing sanctions for 
non-compliance remains questionable, given the lack of any statistical data to support the 
number of disciplined counter fraud specialists. The CFPAB News (2004, p.5) for instance, 
point to the existence of revocation sub-committee with the CFPAB. Yet, it seemed rather 
strange to note the lack of revocation system for CFPAB award holders in spite of the 
sensitive nature of anti- fraud work.  
 
1.1.3. Policing Fraud – The Investigative Architecture 
The discussion on theoretical perspectives underlying the motivations for fraud is 
incomplete, without examining the agents involved in the detection and investigation of 
fraud related activities in UK. As various writers have discussed (see Miller & Luke, 1977; 
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Lidstone et al, 1980; Johnston, 1992; 1993; Button, 2002), there exists a wide range of 
public, private and ‘hybrid’ agents involved in the policing activities in the UK. The public 
agents consist of agencies such as the Public Police (Including the Ministry of Defence 
Police) with Constabulary Powers, whilst the private agents involve private security 
companies and security guards. By contrast, agents involved in ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey’ policing 
are agencies or bodies that occupy ambiguous position in relation to the activities 
undertaken by the public and private agents.  This means that there is now fragmentation in 
the policing process brought about by changes taking place in society and policing 
organisations due to New Public Management policies. Exemplifying those policies 
involved the contracting out some of the policing functions to private sector companies, as 
well as the emergence of self-policing which have made it difficult to identify those 
agencies involved in the policing process (Johnston, 1992; Button, 2002).  
 
Figure 1.3: UK Fraud Investigators Architecture 
 
 
Nonetheless, Button et al (2007a) argued that the activities performed by most of the 
agencies studied (see Miller and Luke, 1977; Lidstone et al, 1980; Johnston, 1992; 1993 & 
Button, 2002), revealed that some of the employees engaged in counter fraud activities or 
‘hybrid-policing’. Those activities were similar to those currently performed by agencies 
FRAUD INVESTIGATORS  
(Overview of Traditional Architectural Framework) 
Ministry of 
Defence Police 
(MoD Fraud) 
Other Public 
Sector 
Agencies 
 ( see Table 1.1 
) 
 
Police  Serious and 
Organised Crime 
Agency 
(Organised fraud 
and Cybercrime) 
Serious Fraud 
Office (Most 
serious 
complex fraud, 
often with 
international 
dimension) 
Police Fraud 
Squads 
Private Sector 
Organisations 
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such as the National Health Service Counter Fraud and Security Management Service, 
Department for Works and Pension, Local Authorities and others.  Doig and Coles (1997) 
research also classified three main agencies involved in the investigation of fraud in UK, 
while the recent Fraud Review interim report (see Fraud Review Team, 2006a) provided 
the latest information on UK fraud investigators architecture. The report identified five 
typologies of agencies involved in the investigation of fraud - Police, Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO), Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), other Public Sector Organisations 
(beyond the Police, the SFO and SOCA)  and the Private Sector (Figure 1.3). 
 
Table 1.0a:       Investigative Fraud Staff 
Type of Staff Background Powers 
Counter Fraud 
Specialists 
Civilian fraud investigators largely 
employed in the public sector, but 
growing in the private sector trained 
according to common packages overseen 
by the CFPAB 
Most have no special 
powers, although some in 
the DWP, NHS and LA 
have special powers to 
secure information 
Civilian Fraud 
Investigators 
Diverse range of fraud investigators 
found in some public sector bodies, but 
largely in-house private bodies and 
private investigators utilizing wide range 
of different training packages 
Generally have no special 
powers, although some 
public bodies may have 
specialist powers to secure 
information 
Police Fraud 
Squad Officers 
Police officers who have undergone 
detective training and specialist fraud 
training 
Powers of constable  
Source:  Smith et al (2011, p.99) 
 
The public police have dedicated ‘Fraud Squads’ or ‘Economic Crime Departments’ aimed 
at investigating fraud. The police fraud squads mostly deal with fraud related to “financial 
intelligence and money laundering as opposed to any fraud” (Fraud Review Team, 2006b, 
p. 60). Similarly, the Ministry of Defence Police have their own dedicated Fraud Squad 
that deal with fraud and corruption against the Ministry of Defence. The reasons for the 
public police reluctance to deal with all types of fraud cases were highlighted earlier in this 
chapter (see Section 1.1).  Nonetheless, the police provide services to law enforcement 
agencies involved in the investigation of fraud such as the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) as 
well as other law enforcement agencies involved in the investigation of fraud. In spite of 
counter fraud specialists performing ‘hybrid-policing’ activities as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, they do not have constabulary powers of arrest (see Table 1.0a below), detention 
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and obtaining search warrants as the police do. Rather, counter fraud specialists undertake 
joint work with the police given to effect those arrangements. 
 
Therefore, they have to rely on the police for those services through collaborative working 
arrangements. However, fraud investigators reliance on the police and other agencies for 
partnership work tends to encounter problems in delivering those services. Exemplifying 
those obstacles involved tensions and unequal power relations between actors engaged in 
the partnership work together with a culture of individual central government organisations 
focussing on meeting their targets before responding to others (Currie et al, 2008; Prowle, 
2010). Similarly, some agencies such as the police would only get involved in partnership 
work if they felt the outcome of involvement would help achieving their targets.   
 
Another investigation agency is the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). Unlike the Police, the 
SFO is a civilian fraud investigation agency who often work in collaboration with the 
Police, particularly, the City of London Police Fraud Squad. The SFO is responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of the most serious and complex fraud cases as well as cross-
border frauds. It has its own criteria for deciding cases to investigate or refer to the Police 
and other agencies. It has caseload limitation to around 70 cases per year (Fraud Review 
Team, 2006a), and extensive powers to investigate offences relating to bribery and 
corruption (SFO, 2010). In addition to SFO, there exists the Serious and Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA).  Although SOCA is an intelligence-led law enforcement agency formed 
in April 2006, and tasked with the responsibility of reducing serious organised crime 
against the UK (Fraud Review Team 2006b), it has additional responsibility of tackling 
technology-enabled crime/fraud, fiscal and non-fiscal fraud as well as identity and 
counterfeiting fraud (SOCA, 2009).  
 
As well as the Police, SFO and SOCA, there exists a number of other public sector 
organisations (government departments and agencies), that investigate certain types of 
fraud (Fraud Review Team 2006b). As pointed out in the Review Team (2006b), the 
reasons for doing so were two fold. Firstly, the agencies involved have had the statutory 
powers and specific legislative tools to investigate specific types of fraud (see Table 1.0; 
Also, Section 1.1.4 on Legislative Tools for Counter Fraud Special).  Examples of the 
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agencies charged with the investigation of a particular type of fraud include the NHS 
(Healthcare fraud and corruption), HMRC (Tax fraud), DWP (Social Security Fraud) and 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA – Agriculture Fraud). 
Secondly, those agencies have investigations as part of their core operations to control 
public expenditure or protect revenue. Examples included the Pensions Regulator and the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Table 1.1 illustrates some of the other public sector 
organisations and the types of fraud investigated.   
 
Table 1.1: Investigators in Other Public Sector Organisations (beyond the Police, the 
SFO and SOCA) 
Other Public Sector Organisations beyond 
the Police, SFO and SOCA 
Type of Fraud 
HMRC  Excise and Tax 
FSA Insider Dealing/Market Abuse,  
Misleading Statements and Practices 
DWP  Benefits 
NHS All Fraud Against the  NHS 
DTI Companies/Insolvency Act Offences 
OFT Cartels 
Pensions Regulator Pension Funds 
Trading Standards Officers Forgery, Counterfeit, Consumer Protection 
DEFRA Grants and Subsidies 
Source: Adapted from Fraud Review Team  (2006a, p. 70) 
 
1.1.3.1. Recent Developments - Coalition Government 
Initiatives 
While the above discussion illustrated existing fraud investigation infrastructure/ 
architecture for counter fraud operations, there is the tendency for the newly formed 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat (Coalition) government to reorganise the investigatory 
infrastructure  to ‘fit-in’ with their policies.  As at the time of writing, there were ongoing 
proposals as documented in the Cabinet Office (2010, p.9) report:   
We take white-collar crime as seriously as other crime, so we will create a single 
agency to take on the work of tackling serious and economic crime that is currently 
done by, among others, the Serious Fraud Office, Financial Services Authority and 
office of Fair Trading.  
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Figure 1.4a: Single Fraud Agency (Serious and Economic Crime)  
 
 
It is unsurprising noting the coalition government attempt to create a single agency to 
tackle serious economic crime, given that Roskill Committee on Fraud Trials 
recommended this in 1986 (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2010). Despite not implementing 
Roskill recommendations, it led to the creation of the Serious Fraud Office. Recently, 
Fisher (2010) policy exchange report on the architecture for the investigation and 
prosecution of serious fraud, corruption and financial market crimes also provided similar 
recommendations. Nonetheless, it seems the coalition government have found a way of 
implementing Roskill and Fisher recommendations as part of the re-organisation of public 
sector counter fraud operations. For instance, the coalition government has proposed to 
create a new single agency - National Crime Agency (Figure 1.4a). The NCA will have an 
Economic Crime Division/Command to tackle the most serious fraud and economic crime 
related activities currently performed by agencies such as SOCA, SFO and parts of OFT as 
well as enforcement division of the FSA (Home Office, 2011; Hansard, 8 June 2011 Col 
232). Similarly, it has proposed measures to reform welfare fraud by introducing the 
Welfare Reform Bill 2011. Once legislated, the Bill aims to create a Single Fraud 
Investigation Service (SFIS) by 2013 as well as introduce Universal Credit (Welfare 
System) suitable for 21st Century Britain (Barr, 2011). In addition, there will be a single 
National Crime 
Agency (NCA) 
Economic Crime     
Command 
Serious and 
Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA) 
Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) 
Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT)  
Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) 
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fraud hotline to report all welfare related fraud and introduction of tougher sanctions for 
benefit fraud.  
 
Figure 1.4b: Single Fraud Investigations Service (SFIS) – Welfare Fraud 
 
 
Traditionally, there is fragmentation in agencies or departments investigating welfare fraud 
(Button, 2011). For instance, the DWP administer and investigate social security benefits, 
while investigators within the local authority deal with council tax and housing benefits 
related offences. The HMRC on the other hand are responsible for investigating tax credits 
fraud. The fragmented nature of administering public money through the welfare system 
has led to problems of fraud across the respective welfare agencies.  Addressing the 
inefficiencies in those agencies and strengthening fraud investigation capacity has led to 
government proposals to create SFIS to form one operational service for welfare fraud in 
2013. This will bring together all anti-fraud specialists working in HMRC, DWP and Local 
Authorities on benefits and tax credit fraud as illustrated in Figure 1.4b.  
 
In order for the SFIS to operate effectively, the Welfare Reform Bill will seek to extend the 
statutory powers of fraud investigators working within the SFIS. This will enable them to 
investigate and prosecute fraud across the HMRC, DWP and local authorities. Similar re-
organisation is also taking place within the NHS, where the Business Services Authority 
Single Fraud 
Investigations Service 
(SFIS) – Welfare Fraud 
Local Authorities 
(Housing and 
Council Tax 
Benefits) 
Her Majesty Revenue 
and Customs 
 (Child Tax Credits) 
Department for Work 
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responsible for protecting the NHS against fraud and corruption (NHS Counter Fraud and 
Security Management Service – NHS CFSMS) was re-organised in  April 2011 to a new 
body called “NHS Protect” (Lewis, 2011, paras 1-7). Although the re-organisation is 
expected to lead to possible redundancies and re-deployment of anti-fraud staff, the 
Coalition government has proposed to recruit an extra 200 new fraud investigators to work 
with the newly formed Single Fraud Investigation Service (Barr, 2011) for Welfare fraud 
(Figure 1.4b).    
 
To this end, the UK fraud investigatory infrastructure is fragmented at the time of growing 
fraud problem and declining police resources together with the police lack of expertise to 
investigate every fraud. This has led to a situation where most public sector organisations 
have taken the responsibility on themselves to police fraud within their own organisations. 
The desire to police fraud within public sector organisations is strengthened by the recent 
coalition government initiative to create an integrated Fraud Investigations Service, with 
the recruitment of an extra 200 new fraud investigators. This will eventually lead to the 
employment of more civilian fraud investigators (Fraud Review Team, 2006a; Barr, 2011), 
who will need professional training and accreditation. In spite of the growing demand for 
counter fraud specialists in the UK public sector, there has not been any major academic 
study exploring the extent to which the counter fraud occupation has been professionalised 
despite the UK government’s attempt to introduce professionalisation agenda in 1998.  The 
next section (Section 1.1.4) discusses counter fraud specialists together with their aims, 
nature of activities, effectiveness and legislative tools available for counter fraud work. 
 
1.1.4. Who are the Counter Fraud Specialists?  
The earlier discussions highlighted the initiatives leading to the professionalisation agenda. 
Linked to this was the fragmentation in the architectural framework for the UK 
investigative activities with fraud investigators classified as one of the agents involved in 
‘hybrid-policing’ (Button et al, 2007a; Button, 2002; Johnston, 1993) work. Counter fraud 
specialists are considered as a new ‘breed’ of civilian fraud investigators largely found in 
the UK public sector organisations (see Figure 1.5). They have wide-ranging 
responsibilities and legislative tools for the detection, investigation and prosecution of 
fraudsters. As well as this, they undertake anti-fraud promotion activities and fraud 
awareness campaigns (Frimpong & Baker, 2007). In addition, they have undertaken the 
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professional training and accredited to the minimum standard of an Accredited Counter 
Fraud Specialist (ACFS). They are distinguished from the traditional fraud investigator 
based on the professional training and accreditation to the minimum standard as well as 
holding the recognised qualification of ACFS status. The symbolic nature of the accredited 
status has led to the growth in demand for counter fraud specialists across most public 
sector organisations. As at 2006, there were more than 8000 Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialists in UK (see Button et al 2007b), with more than half (53.8%) and over a quarter 
(28.7%) employed within DWP and local authority respectively (Figure 1.5).  
 
Figure 1.5: Accredited Counter Fraud Specialists by Sector 
 
 
Aims of Counter Fraud 
In the context of this study, the aim of counter fraud is to provide a holistic approach to 
tackling the growing fraud problem in the UK public sector, with a conservative estimate 
of £2 - £7 billion a year  for Social Security fraud alone as at 1998 (See DSS, 1998). In the 
past, attempts in tackling public sector fraud had mainly focussed on investigative and 
reactive policing styles as opposed to proactive policing approaches (detecting and 
preventing fraud before occurrence). This resulted in public sector agencies such as the 
local authorities and Benefit agencies involved in anti-fraud activities focusing more on 
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achieving Benefit savings from finding fraud, rather than undertaking preventative 
activities given that most of them perceived themselves as ‘investigators’. However, the 
inception of the 1998 professionalisation agenda brought about a cultural and attitudinal 
change for anti-fraud staff to perceive their roles as wider than just investigating to 
minimise financial loss. Rather, they should perceive themselves as ‘specialists’ with wider 
roles involving the overall anti-fraud culture and to help free up resources for the Welfare 
State as well as enhance public confidence by developing a highly – skilled anti-fraud 
profession capable of tackling fraud in the UK public sector (DSS, 1998). Police resource 
limitations and the lack of expertise (see Button et al 2007a; Fraud Review Team 2006a) 
also played additional contributory factors supporting the aims of counter fraud.  
Therefore, the aims of counter fraud are wider than minimising financial loss. While the 
author acknowledges that tackling fraud in the UK public sector is as equally important as 
the private sector, it is neither the focus of this study (see Section 1.1.5) to discuss private 
sector approaches to countering fraud nor provide comparative study on fraud resourcing 
between the DWP nor HMRC. Therefore, they are considered as an area for future research 
as recommended in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.  
 
 Nature of Counter Fraud Activity and Fraud Prevention  
Counter fraud specialists perform wide-ranging activities. The literature on investigators  
including those who investigate fraud (see Gill & Hart, 1997; Prenzler, 2006; U. S. 
Department of Labour, 2009) pointed out a number of activities generally involving: 
• Gathering of facts and evidence about suspected fraud claims, conducting 
interviews with suspects and witnesses,  
• Examination of records, tracing of assets and undertaking due diligence activities 
such as pre-employment screening and anti-fraud work.  
• Undertaking surveillance of suspects where necessary, as well as participating in 
fraud arrests and raids. In addition, they work on cases until conviction or the case 
is dropped based on reasons such as insufficient evidence, poor trial management, 
lack of investigatory resources and witnesses or humanitarian reasons (Fraud 
Advisory Panel, 2006; SPARKS Research Report, 2004), case complexity and 
inexperienced judges including poor jury understanding (Levi, 1987; Wright, 2006; 
Fraud Review, 2006a; 2006b).  
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Documentary analysis comparing job advertisements on counter fraud specialists across 
the NHS CFSMS, Local Authority and DWP (Table 1.2) revealed similarities and 
differences relating to terms and conditions of employment of counter fraud specialists 
together with the nature of activities performed by counter fraud specialists across the 
sector.  In terms of similarities, three areas emerged. The first related to the hostile working 
condition/environments that all prospective counter fraud specialists across the sector 
(NHS CFSMS, DWP and Local Authority) were to be prepared to work in. Those usually 
involved spending some time at the office to undertake desk-based research on suspected 
cases.  
 
Linked to this is the occasional overnight stay outside the office and travelling to other 
parts of the country, something more common with specialist involved in NHS fraud. 
Button et al (2007a) in their study on counter fraud specialists found evidence of 
experience relating to violence (verbal abuse, threats and assaults) on counter fraud 
specialists. While the frequency of violence was generally rare, it was more frequent 
within the local authorities and DWP compared to the NHS. For instance, within the local 
authority 13.1% of respondents in the study reported experience of assault compared to 
DWP (11.5%) and NHS CFSMS (5.4%). Similarly, while only 3.2% of respondents within 
the NHS CFSMS reported experience of verbal abuse on a monthly basis, this was just 
over a quarter within the DWP (26.2%) and nearly a third within the local authority (32%). 
The differences are attributable to the nature of the job and the types of clients encountered 
in course of their activities. For instance, while the NHS CFSMS counter fraud specialists 
dealt with professionals such as Nurses and Medical Doctors, their counterparts within the 
local authorities and DWP dealt with people relying on Social Security and Welfare 
support.  
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Table 1.2.   Comparison of Job Advertisements for Counter Fraud Specialists across 
the Sector (NHS CFSMS, Local Authority and DWP) 
Employers NHS CFSMS  Local Authority (LA)  DWP 
Entry requirement Accredited to LCFS, CFS 
or PINS standard; 
2-5 years practical 
investigation experience 
 
Experience of delivering 
presentations  and 
Knowledge of NHS 
Accredited to ACFS 
(PINS); 
Experience of benefits 
system or relevant 
investigative environment 
 
PINS qualification 
not a requisite but 
expected to be 
undertaken on the 
job.   Knowledge of 
DWP benefits 
 
Must be DWP 
employee1  
Education Educated to ‘A’ Level  or 
Higher 
Educated to either ‘GCSE’ 
or ‘A’ Level standard with 
Maths and English at grade 
‘C’ or above 
 
5 GCSE passes (A 
to C) or educated to 
‘A’ Level standard 
Standard working 
hours per week  
37 Hours 37 Hours 37 Hours 
Work  environment Potential hazardous  and 
hostile situations 
Potential hazardous and 
hostile situations  
Potential hazardous 
and hostile 
situations 
Main types of fraud 
dealt with 
All types of fraud  and 
corruption against the 
NHS including Suppliers, 
Contractors, Patients and 
Staff 
Housing Benefit, Council 
Tax Benefit , Social 
Housing /Tenancy fraud  
and all kinds of financial 
irregularities against the 
Council 
Investigate 
organised fraud and 
serious attacks to 
the UK Benefits 
System 
Future prospects 
and opportunities 
Progression to CFS, 
Counter Fraud Manager 
or move across to Policy 
and Operations within the 
NHS CFSMS 
Progression to Senior Fraud 
Investigator, Audit Manager 
and even Head of Finance 
dependant on experience 
and further qualifications 
 
Summary of main 
duties 
Fraud investigation, court 
attendance and preparing 
witness reports,  
Reviewing fraud risks and 
compliance policy.  
Preparation and revision 
of annual   work plans to 
cover the 7 generic areas 
of counter fraud work;  
 
Preparation work delivery 
reports  and presentation 
to line and client 
management;   
Participation in National 
Proactive Exercise and 
fraud awareness campaign 
Administrative support , 
fraud investigation, court 
attendance 
 
Participation in proactive 
exercise and development 
of fraud awareness course 
 
Evidence gathering 
preparing reports, witness 
statements and court 
attendance 
Liaison and 
administrative and 
support  roles for 
fraud investigations 
, court attendance,  
 
 
                                                            
1
 For the DWP, fraud jobs are usually advertised internally either as promotion exercises 
from being a Clerk (CO) to an Executive Officer (EO) or Supervisor.  
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Secondly, the nature of activities undertaken by counter fraud specialists ranged from 
undertaking proactive activities such as fraud awareness campaign to fraud investigation, 
court attendance and administrative support. Thirdly, while most counter fraud specialists 
worked standard 37 hours per week, the nature of counter fraud activities involved a 
culture of flexible working as they may be required to work outside the normal office 
hours (9am – 5pm) to undertake occasional surveillance or visit clients. Nonetheless, 
Button et al (2007a) studies revealed that whilst regular evenings work occurred rarely 
within the DWP (16%) and local authority (14%), it was more common within the NHS 
CFSMS (29%). Button et al (2007a) study however failed to explain why this was so.  
 
In spite of the similarities on the nature of counter fraud activities in preventing fraud, the 
documentary analysis revealed areas where the activities performed differed across the 
NHS CFSMS, DWP and the LA. Firstly, the types of fraud dealt with by counter fraud 
specialists varied across the sector. For instance, while the NHS counter fraud specialists 
dealt with broad range of fraud such as NHS contractors, suppliers, staff and patients, their 
counter parts within the Local Authority and DWP dealt with very narrow and limited type 
of fraud (Welfare fraud).  The second area where the nature of counter fraud activities 
differed related to the preparation and revision of annual work plan covering the seven 
generic areas (creating anti-fraud culture, deterrence, prevention, detection, investigations, 
sanctions and redress) of counter fraud work. Linked to this was the preparation and 
presentation of detailed reports by NHS counter fraud specialists on all counter fraud work 
undertaken to senior management and the NHS client management. By comparison, 
undertaking those activities were non-existent within the Local Authority and DWP. This 
is probably due to the fact that the Local Authorities investigate fraud on behalf of DWP. 
Therefore, they do not compete for counter fraud contracts, compared to their counterparts 
within the NHS CFSMS who are in competition with private sector companies such as 
Bentley Jennison and others  supplying counter fraud services to the NHS. 
 
Thirdly was the existence of a clear career structure and promotion opportunities for 
counter fraud work within both the NHS and the Local Authority, but less so within the 
DWP. For example, within the NHS, Local Counter Fraud Specialists/Counter Fraud 
Specialists have the opportunity to progress to Counter Fraud Manager or even move into 
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Policy and Operations within the NHS CFSMS. Similarly, within the Local Authority, 
junior Counter Fraud Specialists could progress to Senior Counter Fraud Specialist (Senior 
Fraud Investigator), and then to Audit Manager. Lastly were variations in terms of the 
entry requirements. Chapter 1, Table 1.2 illustrated that within the NHS, this was slightly 
higher requiring a minimum of two to five years practical working experience in an 
investigative environment. In addition, the applicant must be accredited to LCFS, CFS or 
PINS standard, with experience of delivering presentations and educated to ‘A’ Level or 
Higher.  The DWP and Local Authority compared to the NHS had a similar accreditation 
for entry (PINS) but required applicants with less academic qualification (either ‘GCSE’ or 
‘A’ Level).  
 
Legislative Tools for Counter Fraud Specialists 
As noted in the earlier discussions in Section 1.1, counter fraud specialists have available 
various legislative tools and strategies for detection and investigation of fraud. Unlike the 
Constabulary Police or HM Customs and Excise Officers, counter fraud specialists “do not 
possess police [Constables] powers of search and arrest (DoH, 1999, p.9). While the lack 
of constabulary powers is one of the key features distinguishing counter fraud specialists 
from the constabulary police, anecdotal evidence suggest that counter fraud specialists, 
particularly those working in the London Boroughs desire to have such powers given the 
problems involved in securing the help of the police in joint-working or multi-agency 
work.  Critics however pointed to the dangers involved with this approach given the 
custody, safety and detention issues involved in keeping such suspects within the 
Borough’s/Council’s premises. In some London Boroughs for instance, the problem of 
securing the help of police has developed into a syndrome of   ‘renting a cop’ or 
secondment of Police Officers from the Metropolitan Police Service to support fraud teams 
(Enfield Council, 2010) across the London Boroughs. Having a seconded Police Officer in 
the Housing Benefit Investigation Team has the advantages of extending the investigatory 
remit with the ability to arrest fraudsters, search the properties involved in fraud and 
confiscate assets fraudulently obtained.  In spite of counter fraud specialists not having 
available constabulary powers in relation to police officers, there exist wide ranging 
legislative tools and instruments conferred on counter fraud specialists / officers by the 
state authorities to aid the detection, investigation and prosecution of fraud. Outlined below 
are examples of those legislative tools: 
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 The Welfare Reform Act (WRA) 2007 – This act came into force in 2008 and 
extended the powers of local authority fraud officers to investigate and prosecute fraud 
offences relating to social security and welfare benefits, where there is also fraud against 
local benefits such as housing and council tax. The Act also gave powers for joint working 
and intelligence sharing between DWP and local authorities when investigating fraud 
(House of Commons Research Paper, 2006).  
 
 “Authorised Officer” Power and Secretary of State Directives - Counter fraud 
specialists working for the DWP and its agencies have authorisation under the “Authorised 
Officer” power to investigate fraud on behalf of DWP. This “Authorised Officer Power” is 
a directive granted by the Secretary of State for DWP (DWP, 2008). For the Local 
Authority and DWP counter fraud officers, the powers from the State authorising them to 
investigate fraud is enshrined within Section 110A of the Social Security Administration 
Act  (SSAA) 1992 (Now amended to Social Security Fraud Act 2001). In addition, Local 
Authority Chief Executives and Directors of Finance may authorise their own officers 
under Section 110A of the SSAA 1992. Authorised officers may therefore exercise any of 
the powers granted in relation to the investigation of Housing and Council Tax Benefit by 
issuing a written notice to request information from certain people and even organisations 
under Section 109B of the Act. Alternatively, they could also visit the premises under 
Section 109C powers. It is however an offence for any person to intentionally delay or 
obstruct authorised officers in exercising their powers  under the Act  and  they may be 
liable for prosecution under Section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 
(DWP, 2002; 2008).  By contrast, counter fraud specialists working to protect fraud against 
the NHS have their powers enshrined within the Health Service Act 1977 and the Secretary 
of State for Health directives. The former (Heath Service Act 1977) came into effect in 
December 1999 and have subsequently had various sections replaced with a new set of 
Directions since 2004 (DoH, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007).  
 
 Money Laundering Legislations and Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 - Money 
laundering is the “process of transforming the proceeds of illegal activities into legitimate 
finances to give the funds a legitimate appearance” (ACFE, 2010, p.2.540). Organised 
criminals and fraudsters use money laundering to cover up their activities. However, the 
introduction of legislations related to money laundering offences has enabled fraud 
investigators to investigate and prosecute those offences. Two key tools used by counter 
fraud specialists to tackle offences on money laundering involve Money Laundering 
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Regulations 2007 and the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002. The combinations of those 
two investigative tools give fraud investigators the power to confiscate property, money or 
assets fraudulently acquired. 
 
 
 Other Legislative Tools - In addition to the tool described above, counter fraud 
specialists have other legislative tools enabling them to investigate and prosecute fraud 
with key examples involving the: 
• Police and Criminal Evidence Act  (PACE) 1984 – powers to issue cautions to 
suspects and their rights when conducting interviews 
• Criminal Procedure and Investigatory Act  (CPIA) 1996 – powers to record, retain 
and reveal information when needed (Disclosure rule), 
• Human Rights Acts (HRA) 1998 – powers to ensure that the investigation is 
conducted in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights Act such 
as  the right to fair trial (Article 6) and respecting privacy and family life (Section 
8)   
• Powers to prosecute where the case is considered to be in the public interest. In 
addition, they have the powers to issue disciplinary and civil sanctions or criminal 
prosecution that may result in imprisonment, community penalty, fine, confiscation 
or compensation order. 
• Data Protection Act  (DPA) 1998 , Section 29(3)  - powers to request and use 
information from other organisations for the investigation and detection of crime 
including fraud 
• Regulation and Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 – powers to undertake 
surveillance to observe or follow a person covertly where suspected to have been 
involved in or committing fraud offences 
• Serious Crime Act 2007, Section 68 to 72 – powers for data sharing between public 
and private sector organisations for the prevention and detection of fraud  (see 
Home Office, 2008; Bromsgrove District Council , 2009; DCA, 2006; NHS CFS, 
2006). In the past, the public sector has been reluctant to exchange information 
with the private sector because of the absence of specific statutory legal gateway 
that will prevent them from disclosing sensitive information. The introduction of 
Section 68 however, provided a wide framework for the lawful exchange of 
information between public authorities and private sector organisations to prevent 
fraud.   
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Fraud Intelligence and Investigative Strategy  
As well as counter fraud specialists having in their armoury various legislative tools and 
instruments, their potential to investigate or reduce the growing fraud problem is minimal 
without having intelligence mechanisms in place. Linked to this is the lack of reliable 
estimates to measure the cost of fraud and provide the right anti-fraud response, given that 
most frauds are either undetected or reported. In addition, developing highly trained anti-
fraud professionals to combat the growing fraud problem require fraud intelligence.  
Therefore, intelligence plays an important role in counter fraud activities. Reliance on 
intelligence to combat crime has increased, because the traditional reactive policing 
strategy has failed to reduce growth in serious and organised crime (Ratcliffe, 2003). 
Additional reasons involved the growth of new public management as well as increasing 
use of information technology to commit transnational crime. As a result, there is 
increasing demand for ‘intelligence – led policing’. The latter is based on a business 
model, which collects “information from different sources to produce ‘intelligence’, used 
to direct activities of enforcement agencies to enable them to tackle crime” (Newburn & 
Neyroud, 2008, p. 146). The National Intelligence Model (NIM) acts as a framework and 
central repository for the gathering, analysis and dissemination of intelligence. NIM also 
provides opportunities for sharing intelligence on crime –related activities across the UK 
police forces and their international counterparts since 2005 (Centrex, 2005).   
 
Over the last decade, there had been series of studies (DSS, 1998; Scampion Report, 2000; 
Grabiner Report, 2000) recommending the need for intelligence-led investigations within 
anti-fraud work. This involved developing a more cohesive anti-fraud strategy and use of 
intelligence- sharing to tackle fraud. As Scampion (2000, p.22) emphasised:  
 
There is a need for an immediate investment in an investigators intelligence 
resource which crosses units and enables investigators to feed into and derive 
information from a network of which is technologically and not manually based.   
 
Indeed, while the concepts of intelligence – led investigations and the use of National 
Intelligence Model have gained popularity across the UK police forces (Newburn & 
Neyroud, 2008; Lane, 2011), they appear to be evolving within law enforcement agencies 
such as the DWP, with its own Operational Fraud Intelligence Units (Lane, 2011). 
Although some form of information sharing partnership network exists through 
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membership of National Anti Fraud Network (NAFN), the arrangement is payment by 
subscription. This means that it is not every local authority that participates in cross 
boundary information sharing, despite the increasing threat from criminals operating across 
local authority boundaries (NAFN, 2010; National Fraud Authority, n.d.). Lane for 
instance found that within the local authority, the adoption of NIM as a “Standard 
Operating Model” was lacking because Local Councillors made final decisions on counter 
fraud related issues. Similarly, studies on fraud intelligence found evidence of poor 
intelligence sharing across-government and public/private sector organisations (Fraud 
Review Team, 2006a; 2006b). The studies attributed the reasons for this to uncertainty 
about legal position and reluctance to share. Private sector organisations for instance, were 
“concerned that sharing information with government agencies could lead to wider 
publication through the Freedom of Information Act” (Fraud Review Team, 2006a, p. 
124). As indicated earlier, the introduction of the Serious Crime and Organised Crime Act 
2007, Section 68 has opened lawful avenues for public/private sector partnership for the 
exchange of information to detection and prevention of fraud.  
 
Similarly, the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 has also outlined the requirements for the 
lawful processing and retention of personal information, yet National Fraud Authority 
(2010b) point to the slow uptake of opportunity, partly because of lack of awareness, 
resistance to share information and loss of trust given recent history of public sector data 
losses. Notwithstanding the impediments, the partnership/”joined up” approach seems to 
be developing following the National Fraud Authority (NFA) recent establishment of the 
National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) also known as “Action Fraud” or the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureaux (NFIB). The centre has adopted the NIM to create a central 
repository for businesses and individuals to report. It will analyse reported fraud, identify 
patterns and trends and provide police and relevant law enforcement agencies with 
intelligence to target investigations (Fraud Review Team, 2006b; NFIB, 2010) as 
illustrated in Figure 1.6. However, there is still more work to be done following the 
publication of 2011 Conservative led coalition government Cabinet report on wide ranging 
measures to eliminate public sector fraud. Examples of proposed measures involved 
emphasis on prevention and detection of fraud using real-time data analytics and 
behavioural science approaches. The report also emphasised developing a framework to 
share intelligence between the NFIB, HMRC, DWP, Local Authorities and other 
departments (Cabinet Report, 2011).  
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Figure 1.6 – Sources of Fraud Intelligence and Dissemination  
 
 
This system does not replace the existing fraud reporting mechanisms available to agencies 
such as NHS, DWP and local authorities. Rather, it provides information on identifying 
criminal networks as well as most large scale and organised fraud cases that go unreported. 
Using intelligence-led approach and sharing of fraud intelligence between public and 
private sector organisations have strategic, tactical and operational benefits while creating 
a professional approach to anti-fraud work. However, in order for counter fraud specialists 
to detect, prevent or investigate fraud, they need to rely on intelligence. The sources of 
fraud intelligence vary but they rely generally on internal and external sources. The 
internal sources involve reliance on information available to the organisation and 
combining data analytics to detect anomalies as part of internal auditing process.  
 
The external sources on the other hand involve relying on information already available in 
the public domain and tip-offs from the public and anonymous employees. Research on 
occupational fraud and abuse shows that by far, the most common method of detecting 
fraud is tip-offs from the public (40.2%). This compares to internal sources such as 
management review (15.4%) and Internal Audit (13.9%) (ACFE, 2010). Furthermore, the 
Victims of Fraud – Public and 
Private Businesses including Public 
Sector Organisations 
Data Providers – Eg, Finance & Insurance 
Institutions, Credit Reference Agencies, 
Industry Trade Bodies, Telecommunications,  
National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureaux (NFIB) 
Police and Other Law Enforcement 
Agencies 
Source: Adapted from NFIB (2010, p.5) 
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report mentioned that around 8.3% of fraud is detected by accident. Studies by Albrecht et 
al (2006) and NAO (2007) also reported tip – offs as the most common method of 
detecting fraud. Clearly, the findings illustrate that,  unless other means of detecting fraud 
are used, auditors have less chance of detecting fraud because they believed that business 
intelligence tools are effective (Burnaby et al, 2011).  
 
Most frauds against the public sector when detected are investigated by counter fraud 
specialists who adopt various strategies and the application of the relevant legislative tool 
or instruments discussed earlier. Traditionally, these have been done using paper and pen, 
sending fraud investigators to patrol in fraud prone areas (Smith, 1985) or wait for 
someone to complain. Albrecht et al (2009) also point to watching out for symptoms such 
as extravagant lifestyles and unusual behaviour which could provide clues for fraud. 
However, the emergence of modern technologies has provided new opportunities for 
counter fraud specialists to detect and investigate fraud. Examples of those involve 
emerging technologies such as Voice Risk Analysis (VRA) and Forensics Technologies 
including DNA to supplement the traditional methods. Voice Risk Analysis (Lie detector) 
Technology is used by the insurance industry to detect high-risk fraud, but the DWP is 
currently evaluating the potential for identifying social security and welfare fraud risks, 
where claimants made claims over the telephone (NAO, 2007). While DNA is rarely used 
in current fraud investigations, there is the future potential for adoption to fight insurance 
fraud (Kakis, 1992), as well as linking known suspects on Police National Computer 
Database in large scale complex and organised fraud cases (Mennell & Shaw, 2006). 
Examples of the techniques and strategies currently used for the detection and investigation 
of fraud (Smith et al, 2011; Shawyer & Walsh, 2007; Comer, 2003; Westphal & Blaxton, 
1998) included: 
• Surveillance to gain intelligence about suspected fraudsters and location using 
powers granted under RIPA 2000. This method is increasingly used due to the 
covert nature of the operation and ability to deliver speedy results, the growth of 
organised crime as well as the increasing public reluctance to giving evidence 
(Taylor, 2003 cited by Clark, 2007, p.428) 
 
• Data matching – this involve using data analytics to combine two or more records 
relating to an individual to detect anomalies. For instance, the Audit Commission 
establishment of the National Fraud Initiative over the last twelve years to 
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undertake data matching for the UK public sector has detected more that £300 
million fraud and overpayments. This amount could have been lost to fraudsters 
had it not been the Audit Commission’s effort to introduce data matching. 
 
• Undertaking searches in tracing assets and rubbish bins to gain evidence. Public 
records held by the land registry may be searched to find out purchased assets or 
HM Revenue and Customs for tax affairs; online databases such as the electoral 
roll, serving production order on credit reference agencies, insurance companies 
and financial institutions to access suspects financial records or even approach 
Utility companies (Telephone, Gas and Electricity) to ascertain suspects residence. 
Sifting through rubbish bins for discarded receipts, fake certificates and other 
information provide invaluable incriminating evidence.  
 
 
• Investigative interviewing techniques using PEACE (Planning and preparation; 
Engage and Explain; Account; Challenge; Evaluation) model and following PACE 
1984 recommended guidelines. The PEACE model of interviewing is one of the 
most ethical and fair system of interviewing to avoid injustices. Although the 
model was developed in the 1990’s for police officers, the UK public sector fraud 
counter fraud specialists have now adopted it as the standard for interviewing fraud 
suspects (Shawyer & Walsh, 2007). 
 
• Forensic examination of digital devices involving computer hard drives, printers, 
and mobile phones. In addition, forensic examination may be undertaken on 
portable devices to identify fraudulent activities and behaviour patterns that may 
yield further evidence or prompt for further enquiry.  
While the intelligence – led approach and investigative strategies demonstrate some of the 
systems and processes in place for the detection and investigation of fraud, their 
effectiveness rely on better resourcing together with professional training and accreditation 
of counter fraud specialists relying on the systems as part of their investigative activities. 
Without this, there may be the potential problem “of connecting the dots ... and missed 
opportunities” (Lerhe, 2009, p. 1) to detect fraud, which could escalate the growing fraud 
problem.  
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1.1.5. Scope – Why Particular Public Sector Focus? 
There have been major developments in the UK public sector over the last decade. 
Illustrating those developments were the establishment of the National Audit Office 
(NAO); the Audit Commission and the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) 
policies with emphasis on accountability, spending public money wisely and safeguarding 
it against fraud (see Pickett, 2010; Treasury Report, 2012; Prowle, 2010; Currie, Finn & 
Martin, 2008). In addition, the current climate of austerity measures in the UK public 
sector exposes public money to higher vulnerability of fraud resulting from the increasing 
financial pressure on individuals to meet commitments. Protecting public money by means 
of safeguarding it against fraud and improving public confidence in the system required the 
need to examine those initiatives developed specifically to provide the relevant skills for 
public sector counter fraud specialists. However, given the breadth and complex nature of 
the UK public sector organisations, it was impossible for the researcher to examine the 
whole of the UK public sector organisations involved in anti-fraud activities for the 
purpose of this study.  
 
Therefore, this study focussed on three major UK public sector organisations (the DWP, 
NHS and Local Authority) that are involved in countering public sector fraud. 
Consequently, the study could not be generalised because it did not cover all the UK public 
sector organisations involved in countering fraud. The reasons for focussing on those three 
major organisations involved: 
• Resource limitations for the study in terms of time and financial cost involved   in 
the collection and analysis of survey data from all the public sector counter fraud 
specialists in the UK. In addition, the researcher acknowledged the existence of a 
wide range of knowledgeable and experienced people out there involved in counter 
fraud activities in the UK public sector, but time and resource limitations made it 
impossible to involve everyone.  
 
• Bureaucratic problems encountered by the researcher in getting consensus from all 
the organisations signatory to the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
(CFPAB) on the use of the Board’s database to circulate survey questionnaire to all 
42 | P a g e  
 
UK public sector counter fraud specialists. The CFPAB holds a comprehensive 
database with detailed information on all trained and accredited counter fraud 
specialists in the UK. Using that database would have had the potential for the 
researcher to reach more counter fraud specialists in other public sector 
organisations. However, this was impossible given the problems encountered from 
the Board. As a result, the researcher had to resort to alternative approach to gain 
data for the study from respondents in Chapter 3. Table 3.1. This produced a wide 
range of responses from various agencies. However, given the small number of 
responses from other agencies, the researcher felt it inappropriate to undertake 
detailed comparisons between those counter fraud organisations with small number 
of responses, but to focus the study on the NHS, DWP and Local Authority with 
bigger number of responses (Chapter 4, Table 4.1).  
 
• Availability and access to gatekeepers to anti-fraud professionals within those three 
public sector organisations (the DWP, NHS and LA). Fisher (2007) discusses 
factors to consider when choosing a research topic which included accessibility. 
The researcher had established contacts with anti-fraud specialists within the three 
respective agencies (DWP, NHS and LA), given that, the researcher had in the past 
undertaken similar studies on those organisations (see Button et al, 2007a).  
Nonetheless, the study excluded counter fraud specialists working for the UK 
private sector companies, despite the Fraud Review Team (2006a) estimating the 
existence of more than 2500 specialist in-house fraud investigators working for the 
six UK largest Banks alone. The reason for excluding private sector counter fraud 
specialists from this study was due to the researcher’s limited access to anti-fraud 
specialists and gatekeepers in the UK private sector counter fraud community as at 
the time of starting this project. Therefore, research on professionalising counter 
fraud specialists in the UK private sector has been left as part of the 
recommendations for future research (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4).  
 
• In addition, the author acknowledges that tackling fraud in the UK public sector is 
as equally important as the private sector. It is also acknowledged that the HMRC 
has a number of counter fraud specialists (see Button et al, 2007a) in spite of the 
high levels of tax evasion, while the earlier discussions highlighted the general 
resourcing issue for counter fraud work across the UK law enforcement agencies. 
Given those factors, time and resource constraints as well as the focus of this thesis, 
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consideration of the low propensity in the private sector to counter fraud or 
comparing fraud resourcing between the DWP and HMRC are beyond the scope of 
the thesis. As a result, those areas have been left as part of consideration for future 
research in Chapter 6, Section 6.4. 
 
Given the scope of this project, the findings from the study could not be generalised. 
Nonetheless, the survey results is the best obtained given the time and resource constraints 
because it generates insights, provides areas for future research and policy implications on 
developing counter fraud specialists profession.    It is also worth noting that this research 
study started in 2007. However, given that the Coalition Government has re-organised the 
NHS Counter Fraud and Security Management Service (NHS CFSMS) since April 2011 
and renamed it “NHS Protect” (see Lewis, 2011), all references relating to the NHS is 
attributed to “NHS/ NHSCFSMS” as opposed to the “NHS Protect”. The rationale behind 
this is to ensure consistency and relate the study to the situation at the time. 
 
1.2. Extra Rationale - Classical Literature and Professionalisation 
 
The classical literature review on professions and professionalisation provided four broader 
groups on the classification of professions on the basis of the period of professionalisation.  
Those four broader groups consisted of the ancient professions in the form of Medicine, 
Law, Clergy and University Teaching; Mediaeval trade occupations (Surgery, Dentistry 
and Architecture); The Industrial era professions such as Engineering and the Twentieth 
century professions such as Social Work, Accountants and Personnel Management (Lester, 
2010).  
 
Table 1.3:  Classical Literature and Professionalisation 
                       Classification Examples 
Ancient Professions  
Pre-Industrial 
Professions 
Law, Medicine, Clergy, University 
Teaching 
Mediaeval Trade 
Occupations 
Engineering, Dentistry, Architecture 
Industrial Era Industrial Era 
Professions 
Engineering 
Twentieth Century 
Professions 
Post-Industrial Era Social Workers, Accountants, 
Personnel Managers 
Source: Adapted from Lester (2010);   Carr-Saunders & Wilson (1964) 
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A similar classification is also provided by Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964) using three 
broader groups in the form of Pre-industrial professions (ancient professions and 
mediaeval trade occupations); Industrial era professions and those relating to the Post-
industrial era (Twentieth century professions). Table 1.3 summarises the broader 
classifications together with the period of emergence. 
 
 
The complex nature of the classical literature on professions and professionalisation has 
been noted by a number of writers and commentators (see Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1964; 
Millerson, 1964; Parry & Parry, 1976; Roslender, 1992). In spite of this complexity, the 
sociological literature provides various perspectives on professions and professionalisation 
(Chapter 2), but the functionalists or ‘traits’ perspective is  unique, given that it is the only 
approach that provides the elements that could be used to distinguish or classify 
occupations into professions. In addition, it has a focus on the function professions perform 
to benefit society as a whole (Lester, 2010). The functionalists approach has essential role 
in the study of professions and professionalisation. A careful examination of the 
sociological literature revealed how classical theorists (see Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1964; 
Lester, 2010; Millerson, 1964; Freidson, 1975; Parry & Parry, 1976; Roslender, 1992; 
Goode, 1960) have employed the ideological perspectives relating to functionalists / ‘traits’ 
approach to study how occupations develop into professions. Classic examples of those 
occupations involved traditional or ancient professions such as Medicine, Law and the 
Clergy (Table 1.3).  While critics have questioned the biased nature of –traits’ or 
functionalists approach to professions and professionalisation (see Chapter 2, also 
Freidson, 1975; Millerson, 1964), the approach has become the prototypical model used by 
professionalising occupations aspiring to the status of a profession to compare the degree 
to which they mimicked more or less of those ’traits’ characterising the ancient professions 
(Freidson, 1975; Millerson, 1964).  Those ‘traits’ are discussed in chapter 2, together with 
criticisms.  
 
 Previous Studies Exploring Professionalisation  
The author acknowledges the existence of a number of research studies framing 
professionalisation and professions from classical theory perspectives, with examples 
including the stages of professionalisation (Wilensky, 1964), caring professions such as 
Nursing, Social Work (see Greenwood, 1957; Etzioni, 1969) and Fostering (Kirton, 2007; 
Delona Martin, 2006) . However, given the time limitation and resource constraints on the 
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study, the author decided to limit himself to previous studies involving the police and 
security management as elaborated below.  
 The Police 
Police modernisation and professionalisation has gained increased attention in the 
sociology of profession and criminological thinking with a number of studies from both 
UK and Australia illustrating the need for professionalisation (see Loveday, 2006; Tong & 
Bowling, 2006; Wood & Tong, 2008; Trofymowych, 2007;  Neyroud, 2008). While the 
classical literature on professionalisation outlined the key ‘traits’ of a profession (see Carr-
Saunders & Wilson, 1964; Lester, 2010; Millerson, 1964; Freidson, 1975; Parry & Parry, 
1976; Roslender, 1992; Goode, 1960), research study by Kleinig (1996) which compared 
the police service against the ‘traits’ of a profession revealed that policing lacked many of 
the key elements of  a profession  (Kleinig, 1996, cited in Neyroud, 2008, p.674).  
Similarly, Lumb (1994) study to measure the extent of professionalising the American 
police service using the ‘traits’ elements found that in spite of the existence of diversity 
and variety of police organisations in America, the general perception was that the 
American police occupation has not reached the status of a full profession. Rather, it falls 
into those lesser occupations considered as a semi-profession given limitations in existing 
arrangements.  
 
Generally, there are various factors that have necessitated police professionalisation in the 
UK, with the key reason involving the changing nature of detective work. Traditionally, 
the notion of detective work has been described as a ‘craft’ learnt on the job in a manner 
suitable for detectives and often involved detectives using their instinct feelings and 
hunches including the manipulation of suspects and victims for the detection and 
investigation of crime (Tong & Bowling, 2006). Linked to this was the route taken by 
aspirants entering the police service which involved “joining the force and undertaking a 
two year probationary training period” (Bryant & Bryant, 2012, p.121). In addition, 
Neyroud (2008) have also pointed out that the UK police service lacked non-graduate entry 
requirement, life-long learning and re-accreditation as well as a code of conduct.   
 
The advancement in modern technology such as the use of DNA and forensics also posed 
increasing challenge to the service as it has been changing the traditional ‘craft’ based 
approach of investigative work towards a more ‘scientific’ perspective involving the need 
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for robust training of detectives in classrooms and workplaces to acquire the necessary 
investigative knowledge and skills in line with recognised professions (Tong, & Bowling, 
2006). Furthermore, the integrity and conduct of police officers have become questionable 
given failures in high profile cases such as the death of Stephen Lawrence and Victoria 
Climbie. Research studies on the police have also revealed critical elements of the police 
occupational cultures involving cynicism, suspiciousness and prejudice which fall short of 
the police mission (Chan, 1997; Skolnick, 1975). Given this background, the UK police 
service has been making the effort to improve the image of the service by embarking on 
professionalisation with the intention of bringing the service more fully in line with other 
recognised professions (see Neyroud Review, 2011) described earlier in the classical 
literature of professions and professionalisation. The National Policing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) has also started professionalisation programme to carry out training, 
registration accreditation and monitoring for financial investigators in UK and this 
included police officers involved in financial investigation activities (see NPIA, 2010).  
 
 Security Management  
The background to professionalising security is seen in the context of past security 
personnel learning their skills through on-the-job training with minimal attention to 
professional certification and regulation (see Fischer, Halibozek & Green, 2008; Johnston, 
1992; Button et al, 2007a). The event of September 11 in America, the increasing levels of 
crime, the need for businesses to protect their assets and terrorism threats as well as 
dwindling police resources while contracting out some of the policing functions to the 
private sector have increased the demand for private security personnel in crime 
management activities. Those factors have contributed to raising the issue of 
professionalisation of private security personnel with more emphasis on security education, 
training, accreditation and regulation (Fischer, Halibozek & Green, 2008; Borodzicz & 
Gibson, 2006).   
  
Reviewing the literature in the area of professionalising security provided various studies 
framing professionalisation from the classical literature on professions. Simonsen (1998) 
for instance, highlighted the need to professionalise the American private security sector 
using the ‘traits’ approach. Simonsen (1998) argued that the use of ‘traits’ approach would 
contribute to replacing the unqualified security personnel with a more qualified personnel 
that have acquired the necessary training, accreditation and regulated to create a more 
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professional image comparable to more recognised professions in modern society. The 
question of whether the security industry has attained those ‘traits’ of a profession is 
debatable. Illustrating those debates were research studies with opposing views from 
different sides of the Atlantic. While Simonsen (1998) study in America regarded security 
management as a profession, Horrocks (2001) study in UK found otherwise. Horrocks 
argued that with the exception of few Universities providing higher education courses in 
security, the security industry is more oriented towards vocational qualifications. The 
heavy orientation towards vocational qualifications has had negative implications on 
developing the knowledgebase which is considered one of the key traits of 
professionalisation (see Millerson, 1964; Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1964). Similar study on 
security directors by Manunta (1996) concluded that security management fell below the 
required conditions of a profession.  
 
 
1.3. Overview of the Structure   
This section provides a brief outline of how the study is going to be undertaken in terms of 
aims of the study, research questions, philosophical and methodological issues including 
expected contribution to knowledge.  As has been discussed, fraud by its nature is very 
complex including the motivations for perpetrating it. Linked to the complexity and 
motivations are the associated impact on businesses, individuals, the government and 
society as a whole.  Tackling the rising problems of fraud in the UK public sector 
involve the need for proper training, accreditation and regulation of the people involved in 
fraud investigative process to avoid issues of miscarriages of justice and associated 
problems as illustrated in the cases of Adolf Beck and Patrick Zengeya in 1907 and 2001 
respectively. The initiatives to professionalise counter fraud specialists in the UK begun in 
the late 1990s. Despite the contribution of counter fraud specialists in protecting the public 
purse and improving public confidence in the system (DSS, 1998), there has not been any 
major academic study assessing the extent of professionalisation since initiating the 
professionalisation agenda.   
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1.3.1. Research Aim and Objectives  
This research aimed to explore the professionalisation of counter fraud specialists in the 
UK Public Sector, with a special focus upon the DWP, NHS and LA as outlined earlier. 
Achieving the above aims involved pursuing the following objectives/methods: 
• To review related literature and identify weaknesses in research knowledge in the 
area. This would firstly help to gain more knowledge and insight into past 
research. In addition, it would contribute to identify weaknesses in knowledge and 
areas for further research. 
 
• To examine initiatives to professionalise counter fraud specialists in the United 
Kingdom as well as rethinking professionalism in relation to counter fraud 
investigations. This would help to identify key documents and attempts to raise the 
profile of counter fraud specialists. Similarly, it would provide insight into counter 
fraud specialist’s professionalism when investigating cases including treatment of 
clients, working colleagues as well as obtaining information from other agencies as 
professionals. 
 
• To apply functionalist/”traits” model of a profession and professionalisation to 
assess the position and perception of counter fraud specialists profession in 
relation to established professions such as Medicine, Law and Accountancy. This 
would provide information on the extent of professionalisation of counter fraud 
specialists’ occupation. In addition, it would act as a benchmark to assessing the 
extent to which counter fraud specialists meet more or less of those elements in 
relation to established professions.  
 
• To demonstrate how counter fraud specialist professionals, fraud managers, 
managing directors and chief executives across the three key government agencies 
(The NHS Counter Fraud and Security Management Services – NHS CFSMS; 
Department for Work and Pensions – DWP and Local Authorities –LA) perceive 
counter fraud specialists profession. The relevance of this information is to gain 
insights into how specialists in key positions across the three sectors view counter 
fraud as a profession including differences in attitude and culture as well as 
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provide recommendations for the future 
 
• To assess how the research outcome contributes to policy making and help 
progress towards achieving a counter fraud profession. Given the lack of a major 
academic study on counter fraud specialists, particularly their profession, it is 
anticipated that findings from this research would help add to research knowledge 
in the area. As well as this, it would help contribute to policy-making and debate 
on reforms on counter fraud specialists profession and professionalism. 
 
1.3.2. Conceptual Framework and Research Questions  
Research of this nature has to be guided by conceptual framework. Fisher (2007) described 
conceptual framework as essentially an idea often drawn on by researchers to illustrate 
processes and interaction of concepts.  Therefore, conceptual framework used to inform the 
study was functionalist / ‘traits’ theory profession and professionalisation (see Chapter 2 – 
Literature Review). The theory was applied to assess the extent of professionalising 
counter fraud specialists for the selected organisations in the study. The previous 
discussion (see Section 1.2) outlined the relevance of the theory and how it has been 
applied to study a number of occupations attempting to professionalise. The research 
aimed to answer two questions below: 
• “Is counter fraud specialism a profession or not?” 
Additionally, the thesis sought to answer the question: 
• “If we want to develop a profession of counter fraud specialists (CFS), how do we 
do it ? ”  Therefore, this sub question for the thesis was about how to develop a 
profession.  
 
1.3.3. Philosophical Assumptions 
There are multiple ways of obtaining knowledge about the nature of social reality 
(Kerlinger, 1986; Baio, 2009). However, the knowledge obtained is underpinned with 
philosophical, methodological, ethical and theoretical frameworks (Grix, 2002; Kerlinger, 
1986; Baio, 2009).  Philosophical assumptions play important roles in research study 
because those assumptions have influence on the overall research design and strategy 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Ontology is the starting point of all research (Grix, 2002).  
Phillimore and Goodson (2004, p.34) cites Denzin and Lincoln (1998) as explaining 
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ontology as the “study of being, and raises questions about the nature of reality while 
referring to the claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes 
about the nature of social reality”. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) described epistemology as a 
branch “of philosophy concerned with the nature and justification of human knowledge” 
(p. 88), while Grix (2002) explained it as a theory centred on “knowledge and possible 
ways of gaining knowledge of social reality” (p.177).   
 
Conceptually, epistemological position of obtaining knowledge of social reality is 
considered as a continuum and ranges from positivism (objectivism) to interpretivism 
(subjectivism) (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The difference in perspective is attributed to 
different social norms, culture and approaches to research followed by the respective 
scholarly traditions to gain knowledge about reality.  Philosophers subscribing to the 
objectivist epistemological philosophy take the position that, methods of the natural 
sciences must be applied to gain knowledge about the social reality and beyond because 
knowledge obtained through the latter could be independently verified and subjected to 
scrutiny (Kerlinger, 1986; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  
 
By contrast, proponents subscribing to ‘interpretivism or interpretivist’ epistemological 
tradition assert the application of social science approach to study the social world and gain 
knowledge on reality. Interpretivists approach to the study of social reality involved the use 
of social actors [human – researchers] who interact with the object of study [research 
participants] and construct meaning about their social world. Researchers using 
interpretive approach to gain knowledge need to have an awareness of the implications of 
the researcher’s interaction with the object of study by providing a reflective account of the 
study.   
 
In this research project, the researcher adopts a more interpretive approach to study counter 
fraud specialists profession. As Erickson and Kovalainen (2008) suggests, researchers 
taking interpretive stance to their study are more “interested in how people, as individuals 
or as a group, interpret and understand social events and settings” (p.19).  Adopting 
interpretive approach to study a social phenomena such as counter fraud specialists 
profession helps the researcher to “understand how people make sense of their social 
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worlds, with human action being conceived as purposive and meaningful rather than 
externally determined by social structures, innate drives, environment .... “ (Gill & 
Johnson, 2010, p.190).   
 
1.3.4. Methodological Assumptions and Ethics 
Broadly, methodological assumptions are oriented to the “most appropriate methods of 
gathering data and approaching the research questions” (Kamla, 2005, p.26). In relation to 
this research project, the study would be undertaken using mixed methods (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1 for detailed discussion on mixed methods research strategy). These would be: 
• To review related literature to gain understating of counter fraud specialists 
profession. 
  
• To send survey questionnaires to counter fraud specialists in selected organisations 
 
• To undertake a follow up survey using semi-structured interviews with key 
individuals in the counter fraud sector such as Counter Fraud Specialists, Fraud 
Managers, Managing Directors including Chief Executives 
 
• To undertake documentary analysis of already established professions (such as 
Medicine, Accountancy and Legal) to assess the elements of professional 
infrastructures.  In addition, documentary analysis would be undertaken to compare 
job advertisement of counter fraud specialists across the NHS CFSMS, DWP and 
LA to examine the terms, conditions and other employment requirements relating 
to their profession.   
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide detailed outcome of using mixed-methods for the study.  
However, in any research, the researcher needs to assess the ethical implications for the 
study. Ethical considerations are the guidelines followed in the collection of data, analysis 
and dissemination of research findings (Denscombe, 2003). The reasons for doing so are 
based on moral and practical grounds. Morally, people or researchers should not pursue 
their interest at the expense of research subjects as happened in Zimbardo’s prison 
experiment. Practical reasons for adopting ethical research approach include legislation to 
protect the public from unscrupulous personal data collection and storage. Of equal 
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important legislation is the Human Rights Act 1998, which calls for researchers to 
safeguard the rights of research participants, risk minimisation, informed consent and 
confidentiality. The research would be conducted in line with research ethics by ensuring 
anonymity, confidentiality and Compliance with Data Protection Act (1998) as well as 
other ethical issues outlined in Robson (2002). The ethical consideration for the study and 
methods of gaining access to research participants are discussed in the methodology 
section (Chapter 3, Section on Accessing Counter Fraud Specialists and Ethical 
Consideration). 
 
1.4. Importance of the Study and Contribution to Knowledge 
This study is important to the researcher as follows. Firstly, while there is a growing body 
of academic literature and research on professionalising occupations such as those 
described earlier in Section 1.2, very little is known about counter fraud specialists and 
their profession.  
 
Additionally, while the role of internal auditors involved having sufficient knowledge on 
fraud risk management, they are “not expected to have the expertise of a person [Counter 
Fraud Specialist] whose primary responsibility is detecting and investigating fraud” 
(Treasury Report, 2012, p. 7).  Therefore, ensuring counter fraud specialists have the 
required expertise to fight the growing fraud problem given the austerity measures in the 
UK public sector has created the greater need for this study.   
 
 
Lastly, the researcher has interest in investigators and gained Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialist (ACFS) status in 2005. One would have thought the accreditation and awarding 
body (CFPAB) would have put in place conditions for remaining accredited and ensuring 
counter fraud specialists had the necessary and updated skills to combat the growing fraud 
to the taxpayer. Despite the professionalisation agenda aiming to develop highly skilled 
anti-fraud professionals (DSS, 1998), it is rather strange for the lack of mechanism for 
assessing or updating counter fraud specialists skills so as to remain accredited. In the 
experience of the researcher, this is non-existent. This means that any accredited counter 
fraud specialist could still call himself or herself a “Counter Fraud Specialist”, despite 
having not had any job-related training following accreditation.  
 
The contributions to knowledge for the study are set out as follows:  
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• To help reduce increasing cost and risk of public sector fraud to the UK 
government by ensuring proper training, development and creating a better 
infrastructure for a counter fraud profession at a time of austerity measures in the 
UK public sector.  
• To help inform policy and debate on professionalisation agenda for the UK Public 
Sector counter fraud specialists.  
  
• To contribute to knowledge and academic research available on counter fraud 
specialists and their profession because the literature on fraud and 
professionalisation on Counter Fraud Specialists have failed to address this. Over 
the last decade, counter fraud specialists have been striving to achieve a 
professional status in relation to established profession. Hence, the outcome of this 
project would be relevant for assessing the extent of progress towards achieving a 
professional status. The study’s contribution to knowledge is discussed in Chapter 
6, Section 6.3. 
  
1.5. The Structure of the Thesis  
Figure 1.7 illustrates an overview of the thesis structure and relationship with each other. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter provides a general overview by discussing 
the rationale and focus of the study and the need for professionalisation. Linked to this was 
a brief discussion on the agents involved in policing fraud in UK and the introduction of 
the concept of a counter fraud specialist together with the nature of their activities and 
classification of counter fraud specialists as part of those agents involved in ‘hybrid-
policing’ activities. Following this an outline of how the study will be conducted in terms 
of methodological and philosophical issues as well as aims of the study and relevant 
conceptual framework informing the study.  Chapter two reviews the literature on 
professions and professionalisation. In addition, it explores the classification of professions 
and professionalisation and recent developments on the theory by institutional theorists. 
The classification forms the basis for examining the extent of professionalising counter 
fraud specialists occupation in the United Kingdom.  Chapter three describes the 
methodology, data collection and analysis. In addition, it discusses the justification for the 
study approach and choice of theory. The chapter further provides a brief profile of survey 
respondents together with a reflective account of the study. Chapter four reveals and 
provide detailed account of results on the survey questionnaire on counter fraud specialists. 
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Chapter four is followed by Chapter five, which discusses the results on the semi-
structured (follow-up) interviews conducted with key players in the field of counter fraud 
together with their perceptions on counter fraud specialist’s profession. Following this is 
the last chapter (Chapter six) which draws together the emerging themes in the study 
together with the findings and their wider implications on professionalising counter fraud 
specialists. As well as this, the Chapter also discusses the study’s contribution to 
knowledge and proposes recommendations for further research.   
 
Figure 1.7: Overview of the Thesis Structure 
 
 
 
Introducing the Study:  
Background and Rationale for the Study,  Policing 
Fraud and Counter Fraud Specialists, Scope of the 
Study, Aim and Objectives, Methodological and 
Philosophical Issues, Contribution to Knowledge 
Chapter 1 
Building the Theoretical Framework and Literatures 
in the Area: Professions and Professionalisation, 
Taxonomy of Professions, Professionalisation and Neo-
Institutionalist Perspectives 
Chapter 2 
Research Methodology, Data Collection  
and Analysis: Study Approach and Justification, Data, 
Questionnaire, Interviews and Document Analysis, 
Ethical Issues and Consideration, Sampling, Response 
Rate and Representativeness, Data Analysis, Reflexivity 
 
Chapter 3 
Data Analysis and Survey Results:  
Counter Fraud Specialists Survey Questionnaire 
 
Discussion, Recommendations and  
 Future Research 
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 Interview Results: 
Semi-Structured Interviews (Follow-Up Survey)  
 
Chapter 6 
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1.6. Summary 
From the twentieth century wrongful conviction of Adolf Beck for identity fraud, and the 
twenty first century wrongful conviction of the “Birmingham Six” and “Guildford four” to 
the recent telephone hacking scandals at the News of the World, investigators culture has 
gained considerable debate and popular media attention. These have come about because 
of questionable investigative practices adopted by investigators including those charged 
with the responsibility for investigating fraud. Added to the questionable fraud 
investigators culture is the growing problem of fraud to the UK economy and concern for 
politicians, following the conviction of “King Fiddler” – Derek Deevay. The latter used 
forty-one (41) fake identities to obtain £36,000 in benefits during the 1970s’ (Smith, 1985). 
Recently, the Fraud Review Team (2006a) estimated fraud cost a minimum of £16 billion 
and £72 billion yearly to the public and private sector respectively.  The initiative to 
professionalise anti-fraud work began in response to the growing fraud problem, 
continuous use of questionable investigative techniques and the need to improve standards 
of investigation.  
 
What has been done in the field involved studies on policing and non-policing agencies 
(Miller & Luke, 1977; Lidstone et al, 1980; Doig & Coles, 1997; Johnston, 1992; Button 
2002), Measuring the Economic Cost of Fraud (NERA Report, 2000; Fraud Review Team 
2006b; Levi & Burrows, 2008), “Beating Fraud is Everyone’s Business” (DSS, 1998) and 
the recent survey on Counter Fraud Specialists (Button et al, 2007a).  Yet, there has not 
been any major academic study undertaken on the professionalisation initiatives following 
the publication of the Green Paper “Beating Fraud is Everyone’s Business” by the DSS in 
1998, given major developments in the UK public sector accountability on the need to 
spend public money wisely and safeguarding it against fraud.   In addition, the UK public 
sector is experiencing a time of austerity measures with public money more vulnerable to 
fraud. As well as this, while the role of internal auditors must involve sufficient knowledge 
on fraud risk management, they are “not expected to have the expertise of a person 
[Counter Fraud Specialist] whose primary responsibility is detecting and investigating 
fraud” (Treasury Report, 2012, p. 7). This project therefore seeks to apply functionalist 
theories of profession and professionalisation to explore the professionalisation of counter 
fraud specialists in the UK public sector.  This chapter has attempted to develop a general 
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introduction to the study and the pressure to professionalise anti-fraud work. It described 
the theoretical perspectives underlying the motivation for fraud, multiple agencies involved 
in the investigatory architecture together with recent proposals from the coalition 
government. In addition, the chapter introduced the concept of a counter fraud specialist, 
links with policing and described counter fraud specialist as one of those agents falling 
under the category of ‘hybrid-policing’ agents. As well as this, the chapter discussed the 
nature of counter fraud activity, working environment and the relevance of intelligence 
led-approach to countering fraud as well as investigative strategies. This was followed by a 
brief outline of the research aim and objectives, conceptual framework and research 
questions together with methodological and philosophical issues including the study’s 
expected contribution to knowledge.   
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Chapter 2:  Building the Theoretical Framework by Review of 
Literatures on Profession and Professionalisation  
 
2.0. Introduction  
The previous chapter provided a general introduction to the study. This chapter aimed to 
build the literature review on professions and professionalisation together with their 
relevance to counter fraud specialists and the potential for Chartered status. The chapter is 
divided into six main sections as follows. The first section begins with an outline on the 
historical developments of professions, theoretical perspectives, State and Socio-Economic 
relationship together with strategies pursued by professions (Section 2.1). The second 
section examines the concepts of professions and professionalisation (Section 2.2).  
Section three examines the classification of profession, professionalisation (Section 2.3) 
and sets out the debate for benchmarking counter fraud specialists’ profession in relation to 
established professions using the medico-legal and accountancy model (Table 2.3). 
Following this is section four, which examines briefly the other typological features of 
professions together with dilemmas of increased professionalisation. Section five discusses 
neo-institutionalist perspectives on professionalisation (Section 2.5). The chapter 
concludes with a summary of discussions (Section 2.6).  
  
2.1. Historical Development of Professions, Theoretical 
Perspectives, Relationships and Strategies   
Professions have history as well as theories, which have attracted wide-ranging comments. 
In addition, professions arose in different settings and took different forms. Esland (1980) 
for example traces the history of profession to the pre-industrial period, where medieval 
Universities trained people to practice professions relating to Clergy, Medicine and Law. 
Given their power and influence, they consequently became models for other occupations 
attempting to achieve similar privileges or professional status to follow (Chapter 1, Section 
1.2). Nonetheless, the change in society resulting from the industrial revolution, corporate 
capitalism, and technological development during the mid-nineteenth century saw large-
scale professionalisation in Britain. Added to this was the pursuit of liberal welfare policies 
and the individual institutions created by the various twentieth – century government 
increased the demand for various professionals. As a result, most people stopped working 
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for the traditional family business or themselves and left to work in various industries and 
institutions.   
 
While professions in Britain or Anglo-American countries developed at the time was 
driven by the respective private practitioners organising themselves to control entry, 
training and accreditation (bottom –up approach) with minimal state interference, it took 
different forms in the Continental European Countries (Brante, 1992). In the Continental 
European Countries, the development of professions was driven by a culture of needs and 
demand of the state (Top-down approach). Thus, the state is “educator, protector (by 
university education and the law) and main employer” (Brante, 1992, p.10). The cultural 
difference in the organisation of professions is explained from the perspective of the 
political history that prevailed in those countries at the time (Burrage et al, 1990, cited in 
Bellis, 1997, p.9). Bellis (1997) argued that historically, the monarchies in France and 
England had enjoyed extensive power and privileges. However, the French Revolution did 
away with the French monarchy and replaced it by central government, who abolished 
corporate institutions and self-regulating professions. This led to the central government / 
state retaining full control of professions. In contrast to England, the French Revolution 
had minimal impact as the monarchy together with medieval structures survived, protected 
liberties, privileges and continued to allow self-regulating professions.  
 
Nonetheless, professions seem to have developed over the years and consideration has to 
be given to theoretical perspectives relating to professions.  Indeed, existing literature on 
the subject has sociological basis. The perspectives on professions had attracted much 
debate from past sociologists. For example, while Freidson (1983, p.19) argued that 
sociologists in the past perceived professions as “providing services for public need using 
their specialised knowledge and complex skills”, critics such as Abbott (1998) expressed 
different views by providing four main approaches to the classification of professions 
together with their perspectives. These were functionalist, structuralist, monopolist and 
cultural school theories as illustrated below in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Theoretical Perspectives on Professions 
Theoretical 
Perspectives 
Key Argument Examples of Key Theorists 
Functionalist Emphasis on expert – client 
relationship and the 
classification of occupations 
into professions 
Carl-Saunders & Wilson (1933); 
Greenwood (1957); Etzioni 
(1969); Simonsen (1998). 
Structuralist 
(Marxism) 
Emphasis on occupational 
control and structure of society 
Caplow (1954), Wilensky 
(1964); Millerson (1964) 
Monopolist  
(Neo-Weberian 
Approach) 
Emphasis on power, authority 
and dominance 
Johnson(1972); 
Larson (1977) 
Cultural School  Emphasis on professions as 
opportunities for markets, 
class, prestige, power and 
status 
Blendstein(1976) 
Ben-David (1963) 
Source: Adapted from Macdonald (1995) and Abbot (1998)  
 
The sociological literature is relevant to the understanding of professions. Webb (2004) for 
example, points to the writings of earlier sociological writers on functionalism such as 
Durkheim, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, who perceived professions as occupying a 
dominant role for industrialised societies. In Durkheim’s view (Durkheim, 1966), the 
growth of industrialisation had led to the loss of collective conscience or consensus on 
norms and values, which kept pre-industrial societies together. Instead, a new form of 
social integration has emerged in the form of division of labour and specialisation, 
interdependencies and the creation of formal professional associations in the workplace. 
Therefore, those individual professional associations have contributed in the social 
integration of individuals into the broader society and state. Weber by contrast, saw 
professions as bureaucratic organisations with “emphasis on control and supervision rather 
than accountability” (Dingwall, 1983, p.7.). Weber’s view on accountability of professions 
is however limited when applied to modern day professions accountable to a number of 
stakeholders such as clients/customers (service quality and litigations), regulatory bodies 
(training, accreditation, licensing and sanctions), employing organisations (performance 
targets) and the wider community. In addition, Freidson (1984, p.2) points out that “most 
professions are self-regulating”.  
 
60 | P a g e  
 
As illustrated earlier in Table 2.1, the main emphasis on functionalism was to focus more 
on the professional – client relationship, by seeking to resolve the imbalance or unequal 
relationship between the expert (professional) and the client. Functionalist ideas dominated 
until the early 1970’s. Following this period, functionalism started attracting criticism 
because of the emergence of Larson’s Model. Larson merged ‘Neo-Marxists and Weberian 
thoughts’ to develop ‘market-control theory/model’ in 1977. In doing so, Webb (2004, 
p.82) suggests that Larson levelled two main criticisms against functionalist theory by 
arguing that “functionalists used professions to gain monopoly control over the markets for 
professions and to restrict competition”. Sciulli (2005) also presented a similar view 
consistent with Webb (2004). For Sciulli, professions are “monopolies in particular areas 
of work in the labour market for expert services” (p.917).   
 
The cultural school theorists (Bledstein,1976; Ben-David, 1963) by contrast saw 
professions as having  power, authority, prestige and status. For cultural school theorists, 
professions provide the means of achieving the ‘American Dream’ because practitioners 
acquired the skills through education from recognised institutions. As a result of the 
education, practitioners gain various titles, credentials and power (both financial and 
intelligence) which give them status and prestige to pursue the ‘American Dream’ 
(Bledstein, 1976). Bledstein, illustrates the concept of cultural school theory with reference 
to how occupations in UK have historically been influenced by the British culture of class 
system, where upper class occupations such as medical physicians and surgeons together 
with barristers are associated with prestige compared to lower class occupations such as 
watchman. Despite the perception of cultural school theorists on professions, critics such 
as Dzuback (1993) had expressed concerns about assigning prestige and authority to 
professions. For Dzuback, not all professions are equal in prestige.  
 
As has been discussed in chapter 2 institutional theories help to provide wider perspectives 
to understand the relationship between professions (institutions) and their environments. 
Institutional theorists suggest that professions do not exist in a vacuum. Rather they exist 
as part of the social institutions that have a relationship with diverse actors, each with it’s 
own logic(s) (see Figure 2.3). The previous discussions in this chapter on the historical 
development of professions in England and Continental European Countries such as 
France provide further illustration of the relationship between key societal institutions such 
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as professions and the actors in the environment (State, Society and Economy). The 
relationship between professions and the wider environment is discussed in the section 
below. 
 
2.1.1. Professions, Environmental Relationship and Strategies 
As has been pointed out earlier (Chapter 1, Section 1.3), institutions including professions 
strive for legitimacy, resources and social responsibility so as to survive in their 
operational environment (Scott, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 1991). Professions use 
strategies such as the provision of services to establish relationship with the State. Through 
this relationship, the State grants monopoly power, license or could even pass legislation in 
favour of those professions (Collins, 1990). Implicit in the granting of the monopoly of 
power is the assumption that the profession would self-regulate / police itself.  Despite the 
State granting monopoly power, it is worth noting that the profession must strive to 
compete in the market against others who could provide similar or complementary services 
or protect their jurisdiction. In certain cases, “failure to establish a good relationship with 
the State could cause the government to become a competitor by regulating the power and 
activities of the profession” (Elliot, 1972, cited in Birkett & Evans, 2005, p. 115). 
 
Similarly, professions provide society with certain specialised services (Holmes, 1982) 
such as medical treatment for diseases, legal and accountancy services. In providing those 
services, professions rely on economic resources within society. Therefore, there exists a 
symbiotic relationship between society and the economy. It is through this symbiotic 
relationship that professions establish ties with society and economy. As Macdonald (1995, 
p.13) briefly summarised it “Occupations seeking the status of a profession use various 
means to gain societal acceptance to achieving their goals”. These involved striving for 
economic resources, status, prestige and even making a case to the State on the grounds of 
serving the public interest and society. Essentially, the strategies pursued by institutions 
including professions to gain societal, economic and State legitimacy to survive in their 
wider environment is a clear illustration of institutional theory and logics.  
 
While the latter may be true to public sector organisation, private sector organisations 
attempting to professionalise could gain the support from the state using Agency theory as 
an economic argument. Often, those arguments tend to be based on protecting shareholders 
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as found within the Actuarial and Insurance professions (Bellis, 2000).  In the context of 
this project, the creation of the counter fraud specialists’ profession was a State 
/Government driven ideology to protect the public purse given the increasing levels of 
fraud to the public sector at the time and impact on the economy (DWP, 1998).  A further 
socio-economic argument is the payment of a membership fee to finance the profession. To 
ensure the continuous survival of members within the profession, there is the need to 
consider the degree of services offered to members. This is to ensure what Sullivan (2000, 
p.673) described as “economic security and hope of collective mobility towards improved 
social and economic status” as exemplified in the medical and legal professions.  
 
Added to professions relationship with the state, society and economy, occupations striving 
to achieve professional status pursue a number of strategies to exert market control and 
protect members’ interest using the “social closure” strategy (Macdonald, 1985, p. 541). 
The “social closure” strategy is relevant to professionalising occupations because it helps 
those occupations to maintain their boundaries. For instance, it is used to decide on which 
people to accept or deny entry into the occupational group because those people may lack 
or possess the necessary training and educational credentials needed for entry. 
Nonetheless, there is the potential disadvantage in using the social closure strategy. For 
instance, Birkett and Evans (2005, p.113) suggest that the use of social closure may cause 
those excluded to “create their own competing exclusionary practices without any intention 
of amalgamation with the occupational group that excluded them”.  
 
Similarly, professionalisation is seen as a process of “institutionalisation and any attempt 
to do so would encounter some form of opposition, conflicts and derisions from the people 
who had worked longer in the occupation” (Goode, 1960, p.904). Those people could act 
as obstacles to the professionalisation process and needs to be managed properly. 
Nonetheless, critics such as Murphy (2001) argued that using exclusionary code is a 
“temporal issue given that gender exclusionary codes are now being contested and 
uprooted by opposing sexes” (p.3).  Notwithstanding these arguments, it is seen in the 
wider context of the sociology of professions that, professions have theoretical 
perspectives. Similarly, there exists a relationship in various forms with professions and 
the state, society and economy. Professions also pursue strategies on legibility criteria 
using the “social closure” approach or what has been described by advocates of 
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institutional theorists (see Section 2.5) as normative, regulative and cultural-cognitive 
symbols (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Scott, 1987; 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
 
 2.2. Professions and Professionalisation 
The previous chapter outlined the conceptual framework for the study. In addition to this, 
institutional theorists (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Scott, 
1987; 2008; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006) also provides a similar perspective on exploring 
the concept of professions and professionalisation in terms of the existence of symbolic 
elements of institutions involving normative, regulative and cultural-cognitive pillars (see 
Section 2.5). One of the key writers on the conceptual framework underpinning the study 
(traits theory) was Wilensky’s (1964), whose study on the stages of professionalisation 
provides insights into the processes of professionalisation. Wilensky (1964) asked the 
question: 
What are the differences between doctors and carpenters, lawyers and autoworkers 
that make us speak of one as professional and deny the label to the other?” (p.138).  
 
Approaching this question involved assessing the journey that occupations pass through to 
become a profession. For an occupation to achieve the status of a profession, it must pass 
through the process of professionalisation. Those processes have been summarised in 
Table 2.2, while the most common characteristics of the processes have been listed as 
bulleted points (Chapter 2, Section 2.3, Page 77), together with CPD, which is the new 
extension of the theory of professions and professionalisation.   Professionalisation is a 
term widely used in a variety of ways by different writers. For instance, Wilensky (1964) 
described it as “the process by which an occupation evolves into a profession “. A further 
perspective on professionalisation was also provided by Goode (1960; 1966) who basically 
argued professionalisation to constitute a process of institutionalisation.   
 
By contrast, Johnson (1972, p.21) defined it as a “more complex process in which an 
occupation comes to exhibit a number of attributes which are ‘essentially’ professional and 
are said to be the core elements of professionalism “ (For more information on the 
professionalism and how it is distinguished from a profession, please see Section 2.2.1.).   
Millerson (1998) also offer additional perspective on professionalisation by defining it as 
“a process by which an occupation undergoes transformation to become a profession” (p. 
10). From Wilensky to Millerson, it is clear that there is a lack of consensus amongst 
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writers on the usage of the term “professionalisation”.  Additionally, the extent to which 
occupations attain a professional status is even arguable given that very “few of the 
thousands of occupations in modern society attained it “ (Wilensky, 1964, p.141). For 
Wilensky, the key reasons why few occupations in modern society attained professional 
status were attributed to the existence of barriers and threats of professionalisation. In 
particular, professionalisation was seen as a threat to organisational autonomy. Wilensky 
(1964, p.146) for instance, provided illustration of some of the areas that threatened 
professionalisation to involve “incompatibility of professional orientation with 
customer/client orientation, bureaucracy due to complex nature of the organisation, 
services ideals and bases of knowledge”. Wilensky (1964) also cited other areas of threats 
and barriers of professionalisation to include managerial controls, power differentials 
between management and professionals as well as divergence in orientations.  Similarly, 
Currie, Finn and Martin  (2009) study on the DoH introduction of  General Practitioner(s) 
with Specialist Interest (GPSI) also highlighted how the development of new roles as part 
of institutional transformation “may threaten existing traditional professional jurisdictions 
and identity” (p.271), and the need for careful renegotiation of boundaries. For Currie, 
Finn and Martin (2009), examples of those traditional professional jurisdictions and 
identities that became vulnerable to the introduction of GPSI initiatives involved specialist 
hospital doctors such as Specialist Geneticists and General Practitioners (GP) at Primary 
Care Trusts.  From a feminist point of view, increased professionalisation such as the 
creation of more ‘semi-professional status’ has also been criticised as “reflecting male 
control over predominantly female occupations and devaluing women’s work” (Witz, 
1992, cited in Kirton, 2007, p.9). It is also criticised for being used as a “means for 
pursuing financial gain or self-regulation to avoid genuine accountability” (Kirton, 2007, 
p.9). Linked to this, had been the various corporate scandals involving failure of 
professionals such as Accountants, Lawyers and Medical Doctors failing to act in the best 
interest of their clients. 
 
 
In spite of the differing perspectives on professionalisation and criticisms, Wilensky (1964) 
suggests that in reality, very few occupations achieved professional status. Given this,  it 
could be argued that the strive towards achieving a “professional” status is necessary good 
because it helps the organisation in question to alter the balance of “power of the relevant 
occupation, income or prestige resulting from the occupations knowledge base, its services 
and collective orientation”  (Goode, 1969, p.913). Secondly, it helps organisations to be 
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mindful of their accountability to the general public, given the introduction of New Public 
Management policies with increasing emphasis on public sector accountability and the 
need to protect the public purse against leakages including fraud (see Prowle, 2010; Dent 
& Whitehead, 2002; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Treasury Report, 2012). Thirdly, is the 
increasing litigation culture pursued by aggrieved clients to compensate for professional 
incompetence and negligence as illustrated by cases of wrongful convictions discussed 
earlier in chapter 1. Fourthly, the introduction of the New Public Management policies 
have led to increased competition in delivering public services through the involvement of 
private sector companies to deliver public services as seen in the NHS Counter Fraud 
Services. This competition has created avenues for new professions to develop thereby 
accelerating strive towards achieving professional status. Lastly, consumers and public 
sector clients are becoming increasingly knowledgeable given the wider information 
available on the internet. 
 
 
Whether occupations undergo a transformation or exhibits a number of key attributes of 
professionalism, it is noteworthy that professionalisation is a process that occupations 
attempting to professionalise need to go through. By so doing, occupations transform 
themselves and gain new identities as happened in the professionalisation agenda for the 
UK public sector counter fraud specialists (DSS, 1998).  One of the early contributors to 
the literature on the sociology of professions and stages of professionalisation was Carr-
Saunders in 1928, Carr-Saunders and Wilson 1933. They provided an historical account of 
the development of professions in England since the 16th Century, and diverse stages in 
which occupations took on the characteristics of professions. In doing so, Carr-Saunders 
writing in 1966 argued that those occupations had to go through a process of 
professionalisation. Professionalisation in his view was defined in relation to “specialised 
skill and training, minimum fees or salaries, formation of professional associations, and 
code of ethics governing professional practice, ... so as to raise the status of the group in 
the larger society” (Carr-Saunders, 1966, p.2).  
 
 
Similarly, large-scale professionalisation did not begin until the end of the 19th Century. 
The medical profession saw rapid evolution during that period.  For instance, the 
enactment of the Pharmacy Act in 1852 secured powers for the Pharmaceutical Society. 
Following this was the introduction of series of legislations including the 1858 Medical 
66 | P a g e  
 
Act to regulate medical profession, Dental Act of 1878 and Veterinary Surgeons Act 1881 
to regulate Dentists and Veterinary surgeons respectively. In addition, the period saw 
emergence of new professions allied to Engineering (Institute of Mechanical Engineers) 
and Businesses (Chartered Institute of Accountants, 1880). Some of the training 
institutions associated with those professions at the time begun to distinguish themselves 
from the others by seeking “Chartered status”. These included The Royal College of 
Veterinary with Chartered status in 1844, Royal Institute of British Architects (1834) and 
the Royal Institute of British Architects (1834).  
 
 
In his writings on the historical developments of professions and professionalisation, Carr-
Saunders (1966, p.4) defined a profession as “an occupation based upon specialised 
intellectual study and training, the purpose of which is to supply a skilled service or advice 
to others for a definite fee or salary”. Added to Carr-Saunders definition had been attempts 
by a number of writers in defining the same concept.  Larson (1977, p.x) for instance, 
defined profession as “occupations with special power and prestige”. Evetts (2003) 
recently defined it as “knowledge-based category of occupations which usually followed a 
period of tertiary education and vocational training and experience” (p.397). Although 
definitions varied, comparisons of those three perspectives revealed emerging concepts of 
a profession as occupations with   “knowledge-based, training and education”.  
 
Various writers have attempted to provide reasons for the problems in defining 
professions. Millerson (1964; 1998) for instance, attributed the lack of consensus on 
definition to three key factors. First was the perception of a profession as a static rather 
than a dynamic process. Illustrating the dynamic nature of professions was the DoH 
introduction of GPSI initiatives, where traditionally, Genetic Services had been provided 
by Specialist Geneticists based in Regional Genetic Centres. However, the shift in 
institutional logics brought about by New Public Management policies  had led to GPs’ 
with interest specialising in those areas (GPSI), and delivering some of the genetic services 
as an additional service in their respective Primary Care Trusts (Currie, Finn & Martin, 
2009).  The second problem relates to semantic differences together with various 
qualifying words such as ‘semi’, ‘auxiliary’, ‘neo’, ‘evolving’ and ‘emerging’ professions 
used by Etzioni in 1969 to classify occupations into  ‘semi’ and ‘non-professions’. In 
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addition, Millerson suggests that, writers on the subject had different academic 
backgrounds and group affiliations leading to bias in the literature.  As he points: 
 
The lawyer emphasises the fiduciary nature of the professional –client relationship, 
the depth of learning, the cordial colleague relationships and a sense of public 
service. The accountant may stress the organised control over competence and 
integrity, the value of practical experience and so on (Millerson, 1998, p.3).  
 
Notwithstanding the debates on defining a profession including the discriminating 
characteristics attached to it, it is worth noting that any attempt would still exclude a 
number of elements “as is true of most social phenomena ... [which] cannot be structured 
in terms of clear cut classes” (Greenwood, 1966, p.11). Illustrating the latter for instance, is 
the Greenwood (1957;1966) studies  which suggested that attributes characterising the 
professional occupations are not exclusively limited to the professions as non-professional 
occupations possess them too, but to a lesser degree. Greenwood (1966, p.11) concluded, 
“We must think of occupations in society as distributing themselves along a continuum”. 
At one end of the scale is a collection of well-recognised and undisputed professions. 
Those are the established professions such as Physician, Attorney and Scientist. Those 
occupations possessed a maximum degree of the key attributes of a profession. At the 
opposite end of the scale is a collection of least skilled and least attractive occupations 
such as Watchman, Farm Labourer and Cleaner. Those occupations possessed a minimum 
degree of the key attributes of a profession. Situated in the middle are the less skilled and 
less prestigious occupations such as Social Work. The occupations in the middle possessed 
a lesser degree of those key professional attributes. In the language of Etzioni (1969), those 
occupations exhibits the ‘traits’ similar to ‘neo-professions’ or what has been described as  
‘emerging or evolving professions’ (Verhoef, Boon & Mutasingwa, 2006; Department of 
Health, 2001; Webb, 2002).  
 
There exists numerous typologies of ‘neo-professions’ in contemporary society, with brief 
examples here including Security (Horrocks, 2001; Crosby, 2002); Naturopathy (Verhoef, 
Boon & Mutasingwa, 2006), Nursing (Goode, 1969; Etzioni, 1969; Thompson, 2009; 
Andrew & Robb, 2010) and Social Work (Department of Health, 2001; Webb, 2002). 
Social Work and Nursing professions in the UK are evolving in the context of changing 
pre-registration requirements from Diploma qualification to a University Degree (NMC, 
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2010; Webb, 2002).  While the new professions developed out of new occupations because 
of employers need for workers to perform tasks never done before, evolving professions by 
contrast, developed out of established occupations that have seen a rapid change in their 
skills set in recent years and required updated information (National Centre for O*NET 
Development, 2006).  In the new professions, workers in existing occupations usually add 
new tasks to their jobs. Sometimes where the task is sufficiently different and becomes the 
primary job of enough workers, the speciality grows to be an occupation in its own right 
(Crosby, 2002). In addition, factors such as changes in the law, business practices, 
technology and even social settings act as drivers for new professions to emerge (National 
Centre for O*NET Development, 2006). Similarly, political ideology on the need for 
workforce modernisation as illustrated by the introduction of GPSI (Currie, Finn & Martin, 
2009) could lead to the emergence of new professions. Although, the sociological literature 
on professions provided a number of key attributes of fully-fledged professions (Table 
2.2), neo-professions and evolving professions tend to possess those attributes in limited 
numbers.  
 
The limitations in those attributes challenged a number of professions to achieving the 
status of a full profession in relation to established professions. There are five reasons 
explaining those challenges. The first challenge is the ability for neo and evolving 
professions to define their boundaries due to the integration of work of specialists from 
many distinct areas. Currie, Finn and Martin (2009) study revealed how the introduction of 
GPSI role resulting from workforce modernisation in the NHS caused some discomfort 
among GPs’ and Specialist Geneticists. Defining jurisdictional boundaries due to 
integration of work of specialists, therefore poses as one of the problems for applying the 
social closure strategy (Macdonald, 1985) to decide on entry admission. Secondly, there is 
the perception that professions beginning with prefixes such as ‘neo’, ‘emerging’ and 
‘evolving’ are professions with a shorter training period, low status and less prestige 
compared to established professions such as Medicine and Law (Etzioni 1969; Goode, 
1969).  Thirdly, Goode (1969); Etzioni (1969) and Thompson (2009) consistently point out 
that emerging and evolving professions had less autonomy and authority. For instance, 
they argued that day-to-day activities of Nurses are tightly regulated as they report to 
senior Nurses and Doctors. Similarly, they enjoyed less autonomy because of regular 
reminder of regulations, licensure and litigations, following standards, performance 
indicators and protocols amongst others. Indeed, Currie and Suhomlinova (2006) study on 
institutional forces within the UK NHS and knowledge sharing found how Nurses enjoyed 
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less autonomy as their role “remained that of ‘handmaidens’ to hospital consultants” ( p.7). 
Another study on healthcare professionals also revealed a similar finding (see Currie, Finn 
& Martin, 2008). The existence of those factors including power differential therefore 
prevents Nurses from using their creativity, which impact on the profession.  
 
 
The fourth and fifth reasons relate to direct competition and poor group cohesion of 
members. The direct competition and overlap relate to services provided by lay 
practitioners and people that have attended unaccredited programs, yet allowed to practice 
due to unregulated nature of the profession. Such practices fall short of the fundamental 
principles of the relationship between professions and the state as argued in Collins (1990). 
In addition, the entry of people with unaccredited qualifications into new and emerging 
professions acts as an obstacle to the professionalisation process (Goode, 1960).   
Similarly, members within neo and emerging professions have poor group cohesion. 
Illustrating the poor cohesion of neo and emerging professions is Verhoef, Boon and 
Mutasingwa (2006) study on Naturopathic Medicine in Canada. The study found evidence 
of the lack of standardisation in training, education and practice standards in the 
Naturopathic Medicine Practitioners ability to guarantee members competence in specific 
areas, calling for the need to increase group cohesion and regulation through social closure.  
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Table 2.2.  Classification of Professions and Professionalisation  
 Caplow 
 (1954) 
Greenwood 
(1957) & 
(1966) 
Barber 
(1963) 
Wilensky 
(1964) & 
(1966) 
Carr-
Saunders  
  (1966) 
Harries-
Jenkins 
(1970) 
Larson 
(1977) 
Simonsen 
(1996) 
Neal  & 
Morgan 
(2000)  
Establishing professional 
association/cultures 
√ √  √ √ √   √ √  √ 
Ethical codes of conduct 
and community sanctions 
√  √ √ √ √   √ √  √ 
Training, education & 
academic  routes to 
qualification 
√   √ √ √ √  √ √  
Body of knowledge and  
specialised skills 
 √  √    √   √ √  
High rewards (monetary 
and honorary) and 
prestige 
  √  √  √ √  √ 
Competency  testing / 
qualifying examinations 
     √   √  √    √ 
Altruism services  
(Service orientation) 
  √  √   √   
Gaining public support  
and state protection  
√    √       √ 
Occupation becoming  
full time  
   √     √  
Apprenticeship/ 
traineeship 
     √   √ 
Changing name  
of occupation 
√         
Authority and autonomy  √      √      
Continuous professional 
development (CPD) 
         √ 
            Source: Adapted from De Lona Martin (2006)  
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In addition to earlier discussion on professions together with ‘neo-professions’,  the work 
of other writers on professions such as (Caplow 1954; Barber 1963 and Carr-Saunders 
1966; De Lona Martin, 2006) provide further examples of the most common ‘traits’ for 
classifying profession. As demonstrated in Table 2.2, a typical model of a ‘profession’ has 
five key attributes. Those involved: 
• A body of knowledge and specialised skills 
• Professional association 
• Ethical codes and community sanctions guiding the conduct of members 
• Training / entry qualifications, education and academic routes for higher 
qualifications 
• Higher monetary or honorary rewards for achievements 
In addition to this, there exists other attributes in the form of authority. However, recent 
development in the theory of professions by Neal and Morgan (2000) has extended the 
theory with addition of a new key attribute to include continuous professional development 
(Table 2.2).  
 
In terms of professionalisation, the available literature is as equally fragmented and 
disorganised as those on professions and professionalism. Similarly, research evidence 
shows the lack of consistency in the steps towards professionalisation as demonstrated in 
the work of Wilensky (1964), Caplow (1966), Harries-Jenkins (1970) as well as Neal and 
Morgan (2000). While both Caplow and Wilensky argued that professionalising 
occupations pass through five steps, Harries-Jenkins offered three steps. By contrast, Neal 
and Morgan recent research on the subject revealed more than six steps and even included 
a key element - continuous professional development (Table 2.2). For Wilensky (1964) and 
Caplow (1966), the five steps involved the professionalising occupations starting as a full 
time occupation, followed by training, development of a professional association, lobbying 
to gain state support and legal protection of job territory, developing an ethical code of 
conduct. They concluded that professionalisation process followed a typical series or 
sequence of events.  Similarly, Wilensky research found four classifications of professions 
(established, marginal, new and doubtful professions) based on historical sequence of 
events. Wilensky referred to the old occupations such as Medicine and Law as the 
“established professions”. On the other end of the scale were occupations such as Hospital 
Administration and Advertising. Occupations falling into the latter were referred to as 
“new and doubtful professions”. Wilensky found a number of occupations whose historical 
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sequence of events did not fit either the “established professions” or the “new and doubtful 
professions” with examples including social work and librarianship occupations. He 
referred to those as “marginal professions”.  
 
 
Wilensky classification is quite similar to those of Greenwood (1957; 1966) and Etzioni 
(1969). While Wilensky and Caplow models contributed to the literature on the process of 
professionalisation, they are not universally applicable. This limitation is partly due to 
reasons such as cultural variation and the historical development of professions between 
Anglo-American and Continental European Countries as discussed earlier (see Section 
2.1). For instance, while UK professions are largely self-regulating and have the power to 
control training and accreditation (For detailed information, refer to discussion on training 
and education in Section 2.3), those in Continental Europe, particularly Germany and 
France are highly regulated by the State (Neal & Morgan, 2000). Similarly, while 
Wilensky and Caplow models developed in America where professionalisation process 
followed a clear sequence of order or stages, this varied in the UK, where professional 
association emerged before the establishment of training schools. In addition, the 
developments of professions in Continental Europe in countries such as Germany are 
largely State driven initiative (Top-down) approach, compared to the UK with a bottom-up 
approach. 
 
 
In the United Kingdom, the literature on stages of professionalisation is traced to the work 
of Carr Saunders and Wilson in 1933. They provided general conclusions on the stages that 
occupations pass through to achieve professional status (Neal & Morgan, 2000). Since 
then, a number of writers including Harries – Jenkins (1970) had adopted and developed 
the models of profession and professionalisation. Harries-Jenkins work concentrated on the 
evolutionary models of professionalisation. In contrast to his predecessors such as 
Wilensky and Caplow, Harries-Jenkins (1970, p.71) argued that: 
 
Professionalisation involved three-stage process starting with the introduction of 
apprenticeship, followed by examination to supplement the apprenticeship. The 
third stage involved formal training at either University level (graduate entry) or 
academies. 
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Given the complex relationship between educational selection criteria and entry into 
occupational group membership, Harries-Jenkins offered a distinction between graduate 
(exclusive and concessionary) and non-graduate entry routes into an occupation. He 
(Harries-Jenkins) concluded that a high level of professionalisation was associated with 
those occupational groups limited exclusively to graduate entry such as medicine. By 
contrast, low level of professionalisation was associated with occupations accepting non-
graduate entrants but prepared to grant exemptions from previous examinations.  
Regrettably, Harries –Jenkins model falls short of its inability to provide any statistical 
data to support his findings. Nonetheless, it adds to the body of knowledge on 
professionalisation. Neal and Morgan (2000) comparative study on the stages of 
professionalisation between UK and Germany provides one of the most recent studies on 
professionalisation. The study concluded that: 
 
Process of professionalisation has been radically different in the two countries, in 
particular with regard to the role of the state in initiating and administering 
professional bodies. Overall, the study demonstrates that the process of 
professionalisation in the UK has been ‘bottom up’ ... by contrast [that of] Germany 
has been ‘top down’ (Neal & Morgan, 2000, p.9).  
 
Neal and Morgan explained the ‘top down’ approach from the perspective of the State’s 
active interventionist role in the initiation and administration of the professions. 
Notwithstanding the differences, the study introduces one of the most recent typologies on 
the study of professionalisation. In contrast to previous writers, Neal and Morgan model on 
professionalisation is striking because it revealed that, occupations pass through more than 
six stages (Table 2.2). In addition, the model introduces a new concept on the role of 
continuous professional development (CPD) to professions.  Thus, the stages on 
professionalisation identified by Neil and Morgan (2000, pp. 16-23) involved the 
development of the occupation: 
 
• To become a full-time occupation. While this is true given that “originally, most 
occupations were not practised full-time but carried out on a piece-meal basis” 
(Wilensky, 1964, cited by Neal & Morgan, 2000, p. 12), the extent to which it 
applied to contemporary professions is however debatable. This is due to the 
increasing growth in ‘flexible working patterns’ backed by government legislation 
(Caven, 2004). As argued by Caven (2004), ‘flexible working patterns’ is 
generally considered to be a deviation from the “traditional model of an unbroken 
linear career path” (p.518), yet her study on qualified female architects found more 
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than half (54%) had chosen to work part-time, because they wanted to balance life 
and work (Caven, 2006). Caven suggests this did not necessarily mean that those 
women were not committed to the occupation. Rather, they felt there was more to 
life than just working patterns.  
• Having a legal agreement on traineeship or apprenticeship with aspirants, 
otherwise known as the  “articled system”.  
• Creating a professional association to attract better-qualified and prestigious 
practitioners commanding higher fee - earning.  
• Introducing voluntary entry/qualifying examination (later made mandatory) for all 
new members. The purpose was to ensure the admission of competent people into 
the profession. 
• Establishing high level of competence and professional ideals to lobby for legal 
protection for certain areas of work and / or seek the recognition for Chartered 
Status. This has the benefit of enhancing the image and status of the profession as 
well as protecting the association from competition from non-chartered 
practitioners. 
• Establishing training and academic routes to qualification by forming an alliance 
with higher academic institutions. The training and vocational qualifications 
carried out at the academic stage should often provide partial or complete 
exemption from the professional associations own qualifying examination. The 
professional association or body retained the responsibility for professional 
education by means of controlling the course accreditation, training, and awarding 
the qualifications.  
• Introducing rules on mandatory continuous professional development (CPD). This 
would help professionals to develop and update their skills in order to remain 
professionally competent and monitored by the professional body in question.  
 
 2.2.1.. Distinguishing Between Professionalism from a Profession 
Professionalism has gained considerable attention in the literature of professions and 
professionalisation. Although, professionalism has been labelled as a concept “that is easy 
to recognise but difficult to define” (Swick, 2000, p.612), the term is broadly used in the 
context of this study to encompasses the manner in which members of a profession or an 
occupation conduct their affairs by relying on “high standard of competence in providing 
professional services to promote or maintain the image of the profession” (VanZandt, 
1990, p.243).  Professionalism and a profession are not the same, given the difference 
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between them. The key distinction being that, while the latter refers to a professionalised 
occupation, the former relates to the behavioural standards and competence expected of 
members within the profession in discharging their duties to the public. The two are 
distinguished from each other in the context of this study so as to avoid confusing readers 
of the thesis. Failure to show high standard of professionalism in course of discharging 
services to the public could have negative consequences of undermining public confidence 
in the profession (Evetts, 1999; Waugaman, 2000). Examples of those behaviours falling 
below the public expectation of anti-fraud staff that culminated the professionalisation 
agenda were discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 1).  
 
Recapping what has been discussed so far in this chapter, there is no generally agreed 
definition for the terms ‘professional’ and ‘profession’ given the various contexts that the 
terms have been used. Linked to this are various prefixes used to differentiate professions 
in modern society (see Etzioni, 1969; Verhoef, Boon & Mutasingwa, 2006; Webb, 2002; 
Department of Health, 2001; Wilensky, 1964), together with Neal and Morgan (2000) 
classification provide some of the general perspectives that guide professionalising 
occupations. In the context of this thesis, the proposed working definitions for the terms 
‘profession’, ‘professional’ and ‘professionalisation’ are as follows: 
 
A profession is an occupation with entry barriers, higher rewards, acquisition of 
specialised skills through lengthy period of training and the enforcement of 
sanctions in breach of ethical codes of conduct.   
 
A professional is any person who discharges his or her duties, while recognising the 
expected standards of him and the application of the specialised skills and 
knowledge acquired from an accredited training.  
 
Professionalisation is simply the necessary infrastructures needed for 
professionalising occupations to follow in order to achieve the status of a 
profession.  
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2.3. Classification of Professions and Professionalisation – Laying 
the Foundations for Counter Fraud Specialists Profession 
As has been discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the ideological debate to professionalise 
counter fraud work began in response to the growing concern for fraud in UK as far back 
as 1970. Linked to this was the increasing attraction of negative media publicity by fraud 
investigators because they used ‘questionable investigative practices’ at the time. As well 
as this, fraud investigators learnt their skills from their predecessors and there was no 
mechanism for evaluating the training and the acquired skills. Those ‘sharp practices’ 
coupled with the absence of a mechanism for evaluating training for anti-fraud staff had 
serious implications on the standard of professionalism for delivery services to the general 
public (see Section 2.2.1.). These factors led to the government initiative to professionalise 
anti-fraud work (see for example, Department for Works and Pension, 1998; Scampion 
Report, 2000; Smith, 1985). Chapter 1 also provided a brief overview of counter fraud 
activities in preventing fraud, working conditions and available legislations together with 
various investigative strategies in countering fraud.  
 
In spite of the UK government initiatives to professionalise anti-fraud work, the growing 
emphasis on professionalisation in contemporary occupations together with the sensitive 
nature of counter fraud activities, there has not been any major academic study on the 
extent of professionalising counter fraud specialists to date. The earlier discussions in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) provided historical and theoretical perspectives on professions and 
professionalisation to develop the classification of professions and professionalisation 
(Table 2.2).  Table 2.2 therefore provides a brief outline of some of the characteristics 
associated with professions and professionalisation. Although Table 2.2 is limited in terms 
of the breadth of theorists, its relevance to the study is seen in terms of providing 
theoretical basis, which demonstrates some of the similarities and differences on the 
classification of professions and professionalisation. As Nina Toren (1969, p.142) puts it:  
There is increasing development of professions in contemporary society. Therefore, 
it is difficult to talk about professions as a whole. Rather, the extent of 
professionalisation of an occupation should be measured by applying the general 
criteria used to define the professions.  
 
To resolve the difficulty of talking about professions as a whole, Table 2.2 summarised the 
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most common characteristic features of professions and professionalisation. This table 
contained Neal and Morgan (2000) extension of theories of profession to include 
continuous professional development (CPD).  To this end, the previous discussion has 
provided an illustration of what a profession should have, given recent development in the 
theory of professions to include Continuous Professional Development. Addition of CPD 
to the theory of professions was highlighted earlier on page 63. Therefore, the most 
common characteristic features of professions and professionalisation, which have been 
summarised in Table 2.2 (Taxonomy/Classification of Professions and 
Professionalisation), will be applied as the theoretical basis in the study to compare the 
position of counter fraud specialist’s occupation as a profession and the extent of 
professionalisation. Those common characteristic features are discussed under the 
following headings: 
• A body of knowledge and specialised skills 
• Establishing a professional association and professional cultures 
• Developing ethical code of conduct 
• Establishing training and academic routes to qualification in co-operation with 
Universities 
• High rewards (monetary and honorary) 
• Creating qualify entry examination and competency testing 
• Continuous professional development (CPD).  
 
A Body of Knowledge and Specialised Skills 
Preparation for a profession involves gradual development of a body of knowledge, which 
forms the theoretical basis underpinning the discipline. In addition, professions have 
specialised and superior skills requiring a lengthy period of training through formal 
education at a higher institution or University. The specialised skills require mastering to 
perform the task. Items usually denoting the body of knowledge involves the existence of 
academic textbooks, dedicated refereed journals and intellectual publications as well as 
quality research centres and libraries. Professions therefore have a highest level of superior 
skills; scholarship and ability distinguishing it from non-professional occupations 
(Greenwood 1957: Simonsen, 1996; Manunta 1996).  
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Table 2.3.  Medico-Legal and Accountancy Model of Profession 
 Medical, Legal and Accountancy Models of Profession 
Medical Model Legal  Model  Accountancy 
Professional 
Association 
(Trade 
Union) 
British Medical 
Association (BMA) 
The Law Society Institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants of 
England and Wales 
(ICAEW) 
Regulatory 
Body 
General Medical 
Council (GMC) 
Solicitors Regulatory 
Body (formerly Law 
Society Regulation 
Board) 
Financial Reporting 
Council 
CPD Mandatory (Yearly) Mandatory (Yearly) 
since 1985 
Mandatory (Yearly) 
Dedicated 
Publication 
British Medical 
Journal and British 
Medical Association 
Journal 
Law Society Gazette Accountancy and 
Auditing Journals 
Entry 
Criteria 
Medical Degree (5Yrs) 
/ Medical Course (4 
Yrs)+ Apprenticeship  
Law Degree or Degree in 
Any Subject + Minimum 
of Two Year Traineeship 
Mainly University 
Degree from Any 
Academic 
Discipline 
Body of 
knowledge  
Research & 
Publication 
Strategic Research Unit Institute of ICAEW 
based in Moorgate 
Sources: Adapted from (GMC, 2009; ICAEW, 2010; Solicitors Regulatory Authority, 
2009; Law Society, 2010) 
 
For example, Table 2.3 illustrates models of a profession from the perspective of Medical, 
Legal and Accountancy professions. In relation to institutional theory, Table 2.3 act as  
symbolic elements of those pillars of institution that Medical, Accountancy and Legal 
professions rest on, thereby shaping and constraining the action and behaviours of actors 
within those professions. From the table, the Accountancy professions have the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants for England and Wales (ICAEW) with a body of knowledge and 
own academic publications including Accountancy and Auditing Journals as well as 
dedicated research Institute based at Moorgate, London.  A similar body of knowledge 
exists for the medical profession with dedicated research centre, library and occupational 
publishing group with examples including the internationally recognised British Medical 
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Journal (see GMC, 2009). For the legal profession, there exists dedicated research unit and 
publication such as Law Society Gazzette forming part of their body of knowledge (see 
Law Society, 2009). In comparison to counter fraud occupation, the extent of development 
of those pillars and symbols of institution are explored in chapters five, six and seven.  
 
 
 Developing Professional Associations and Professional Cultures 
In addition to a body of knowledge and specialised skills, professions have professional 
culture in the form of formal and informal groups.  The formal group exists in the form of 
professional associations with a wide range of interests and aims. Examples include 
keeping up to date with a subject; protecting the professionals by acting as a single voice of 
the profession against other forces. Additionally, they act as a source of advice to the 
public, maintaining a register of competent members, controlling conduct as well as 
enhancing the prestige and status of the occupation (Millerson, 1964; Neal & Morgan, 
2000; Greenwood, 1957; Simonsen, 1996). As Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1964) described 
it “a profession can only be said to exist when there are bonds between the practitioners, 
and these bonds can take but one shape – that of formal association”  (p.298).    
 
The informal groups by contrast are those groups that tends to be developed around the 
formal groups based on a variety of affiliations such as specialities within the profession, 
personality attractions, religious and ethnic background. The combination of the informal 
and the formal groups provide the profession with a unique culture. Nonetheless, as each 
profession develops its own unique culture, there is the potential for subcultures to develop 
out of the dominant or unique culture (Greenwood, 1957; Waring & Currie, 2009).   In 
addition to the developments of formal and informal groups, Greenwood (1966, pp.16-17) 
argues that professional occupations have cultures. Those cultures distinguished 
professional occupations from non-professional occupations and exist in various forms 
such as norms, values, beliefs and even historical background of the profession. From the 
perspectives of counter fraud specialists’ occupation, examples of those norms range from 
the norms and values guiding the behaviour of professional group members, conference 
attendance and getting involved in the association activities. Others include career 
progression, conducting investigation referrals to the questioning and treatment of people 
suspected to be committing crimes (Chan, 1997).  
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Despite the existence of professional norms, symbols, code, formal and informal groups, 
there may be obstacles to forming the occupational association. Millerson (1964, pp.48 -
51) offered a number of reasons with the potential of acting as obstacles for the formation 
of the occupational association. Those reasons involved small membership size, 
geographical location of some members could cause isolation, loss of prestige, 
underdevelopment of the subject matter, rivalry between occupations and organisations, 
variations in quality of service provided as well as the absence of suitable enthusiastic 
organizers.  
 
Notwithstanding the obstacles, it is evident that the established professions such as 
medicine, law and accountancy have formed recognised associations to further their 
interests (Table 2.3). Medical doctors for example, have the BMA with a dual role as an 
independent trade union and professional association for medical doctors and students with 
over 100,000 members. Two-thirds of these membership comprised of UK practising 
doctors. Similarly, the association acts as a “single voice” for doctors and in the collective 
interest of doctors (BMA, 2009). Following the implementation of the Clementi Review 
(2004), the Law Society is now the professional association (not a trade union anymore) 
for the legal profession and act as the “single voice” for more than 112, 000 Solicitors and 
firms across England and Wales. Similarly, chartered accountants have ICAEW.  
 
Developing Ethical Code of Conduct 
Codes of conduct are standards and behaviours expected from professionals when 
interacting with colleagues, other professional members, clients/customers and the public 
(Greenwood, 1957; Wilensky, 1964; Evetts, 1999). They suggested that the presence of 
ethical codes of conduct had a number of important roles to professions. Firstly, it helps to 
eliminate the unqualified, protect clients and emphasise the service ideals of profession. 
Secondly, it prevents professionals from abusing the monopolistic powers and privileges, 
thereby acting as a mechanism of social control. Thirdly, is the accountability of 
professional groups to their funding bodies, particularly those in receipt of public funding, 
where professionalism is central to service delivery. 
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Failing to adhere to the expected standards and behaviours may result in various punitive 
measures such as loss of membership and suspension. In addition to developing 
professional and ethical codes of conduct, Greenwood (1957; 1966) noted the need for 
professions to have a regulatory body with the powers from the community to police the 
professional groups. Those powers may enable the regulatory body to sanction violators of 
the professional and ethical codes of conduct. In effect, such regulatory bodies will have 
the powers to control training, admission, awarding and withholding of accreditation 
certificates.   
 
Training, Accreditation and Education  
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, professions in the Continental European 
countries such as France and Germany are highly regulated and controlled by the State. By 
contrast, professions in the UK are self-regulating and have the power to control training, 
awarding and withholding accreditation, regulating training schools as well as the 
curriculum content of the educational discipline, needing approval from Universities or 
accredited professional schools (Caplow, 1954; Millerson, 1964; Wilensky, 1964; Carr-
Saunders, 1966; Harries-Jenkins, 1970; Simonsen, 1996; Manunta, Neal & Morgan, 2000).   
Development of training facilities and equipping aspirants with the specialised skills and 
knowledge following years of educational and or vocational training (Evetts, 1999), 
prepares them for admission as well as the final qualification or accreditation. Anyone 
practising the professional skills without accreditation is liable to punishment by public 
authority. As Greenwood (1957, p.49) summarised it: 
 
Anyone can call himself a carpenter, locksmith, or metal-plater if he feels so 
qualified. But a person who assumes the title of physician or attorney without 
having earned it conventionally becomes an imposter. 
 
This means that training and accreditation is one of the essential characteristics of  
professions and professionalising occupations (Table 2.2). In addition to the qualifying 
entry examinations that are normally generalist, there exist academic routes to 
qualifications enabling the pursuit of further academic qualifications in the specialised 
field at a University (normally at undergraduate or postgraduate level). Providing such 
academic routes would have the potential for creating a career ladder with the necessary 
credentials to encourage and acknowledge professional growth (Mackinnon, 1984; Harries-
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Jenkins, 1970; Simonsen, 1996; Neal & Morgan, 2000). As Simonsen (1996, p.232) notes: 
These kinds of skills must be garnered not just from training classes, but solid 
educational programmes that convey the business skills required to survive in 
today’s corporate environment. Doing ‘more with less’ means that those who 
compose the ‘less’ must be better educated, trained and prepared to work smarter 
not harder 
 
In comparison to the medical, legal and accountancy professions (Table 2.3), such analysis 
departs markedly from counter fraud specialists whose training and accreditation requires a 
maximum period of four weeks (Button et al, 2007b). In addition, only a limited number of 
counter fraud specialists have the desire to pursue any form of advanced academic 
qualifications to a degree or masters level (Button et al, 2007a).  
 
Higher Remuneration or Honorary Awards for Achievements  
Carr-Saunders (1966) and Goode (1966) noted members of a profession supply skilled 
services or advice to others in return for higher incomes or salaries because of devotion of 
years of training to adequately acquire specialised skills (Table 2.2).  Similarly, Simonsen 
(1996, p.234) asserts, “Salary is a good indicator of a profession and is largely determined 
by the level of education and training which must be comparable with those of a doctor, 
architect or a lawyer”. Despite an increasing number of professionals in modern society 
working as salaried employees within bureaucratic organisations, there exist a number of 
self-employed professionals with the same level of education and training but working for 
a fee (Wilensky, 1964). Nonetheless, while self-employed fee-paid professionals enjoyed 
the freedom of not working in more bureaucratic organisations, they are however 
vulnerable to “loss of autonomy when demand is low with powerful clients becoming 
unreceptive to independent professional judgement” (Wilensky, 1964, p.148).   
 
Despite the various arguments and perspectives on professionals and remunerations, it is 
noted by a number of theorists on professions (Wilensky, 1964; Carr-Saunders, 1966; 
Goode, 1966; Simonsen, 1996; Neal & Morgan, 2000) that salary, length of training are 
good indicators of professions. For example, Langlands Report (2006) entitled “The 
Gateways to the Professions” revealed that legal professionals, medical practitioners and 
accountants experience higher earnings throughout most of their working life. Similar 
example demonstrating the higher earnings of professions is illustrated in the BMA (2005) 
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research report cited in the Law Society (2008, p.18). The report compared the 
remunerations of professions including Accountants, Salaried General Practitioners (GPs) 
and Solicitors and found that those professions had higher remunerations. This may 
possibly be due to the existence of professional infrastructures (Table 2.3) providing 
“social closure” on entry into those professions.  What is unclear is the extent to which the 
earnings of counter fraud specialists compared to those professions.  
 
In addition to monetary or financial reward, professionals on rare occasions, receive non-
financial rewards in the form of honorary awards for high achievements and performance 
at work. For counter fraud specialists, this may be in the form of a judge-recommending 
award to fraud investigators for displaying a high level of professionalism in bringing a 
complex case to a successful prosecution.    
 
Qualifying Entry Qualifications and Competency Testing 
As Millerson (1964, p.125) pointed out, “qualifying entry examination for admission into 
most professional associations received much attention towards the latter part of the 19th 
Century, with barristers, solicitors and doctors having to pass written examinations before 
entering the profession”.  Since then, the approach has become the norm for most 
occupations attempting to professionalise (Table 2.2). The relevance of qualifying entry 
examination as well as the fulfilment of other competency criteria for admission into the 
profession is to control entry. In addition, it helps to separate the qualified from the 
unqualified, protects the public and the   interest of the profession (Carr-Saunders, 1966; 
Harries-Jenkins, 1970; Simonsen, 1996; Neal & Morgan, 2000).  In this context, the 
qualifying entry examination and competency testing is consistent with Macdonald’s 
(1985) sociological theory on “social closure”.  
 
For example, the General Medical Council (GMC) regulates entry into the medical 
profession within the powers of Medical Act 1983. In addition, it is legally obliged to 
maintain the records (registration and licensing) of qualified doctors. Similarly, it ensures 
medical doctors entering the profession have attained the minimum entry qualification of 
completing a five (5) year University degree in medicine or Graduate Entry Programme 
(usually four-year medical courses). Furthermore, applicants must complete a two-year 
period of traineeship (Table 2.3).  By contrast, entry into the legal profession as a Solicitor 
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consists of seven routes (Law Society, 2009), but the two main entry qualifications 
involved University degree in Law and Other Non-Law related degrees (Figure 2.1 – Main 
Routes to Legal Profession), followed by two-year traineeship. The Solicitors Regulatory 
Report (2009) provides some of the statistics on applicants into the legal profession. As 
indicated in the report, between January 2008 and December 2009, nearly half (48%) of 
applicants admitted into the legal profession held Qualifying Law degree. Within the same 
time period, just over a quarter (26%) entered with Postgraduate Law Conversion 
qualifications compared to under a quarter with other qualifications.  
 
Figure 2.1: Main Routes into Legal Profession 
 
 
In terms of Accountancy profession, entry is mainly by University degree with 87% of 
2006-2007 entrants holding such qualifications (ICAEW, 2010). In addition to the 
academic entry qualifications, members need to have few years of practical experience 
(Table 2.3). The Financial Reporting Council is the regulatory body for the UK 
Accounting Profession, having taken over from the Accountancy Foundation as 
recommended in the 2004 Accountancy Review (DTI, 2004). As has been discussed earlier 
in the theoretical framework on profession (see Section 2.1, see also Table 2.1), one of the 
key arguments of structuralist (Marxist) theorists is the emphasis on occupational control 
(Caplow, 1954; Wilensky, 1964; Millerson, 1964). One of the main strategies for 
occupational control is using what Macdonald (1985, p.541) described as “social closure”.  
Therefore, qualifying entry examination and competency testing are key mechanisms for 
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“social closure”. In spite of this, there are problems with the use of qualifying entry 
examinations to a profession. Millerson (1964, pp. 125 -126) identified some of those 
problems to involve increased reluctance of experienced people already working in the 
occupation to join or buy into the philosophy of professions and professionalisation. 
Furthermore, it encourages those not bothering to join to seek entrance either by the easiest 
route or by alternative ways of joining, causing resentment and discontent from people 
who submitted to the qualifying entry examination.  
 
Continuous Professional Development (CPD) 
There are growing concerns for training professionals and leaving them to their own 
devices. Neal and Morgan typology of professionalisation provides emerging perspectives 
on recent developments in professions and professionalisation in the form of rules for 
continuous professional development (Table 2.2).  Evetts (1999) also proposed a similar 
argument in support of CPD and argued that: 
 
Although initial education and training of professionals cannot provide all the 
skills, knowledge and expertise needed for a professional career, there is less 
agreement on this because of the perception of CPD as largely voluntary in nature 
(p.126). 
 
Evetts, Neal and Morgan therefore advocated for mandatory CPD as a requirement for 
continuous professional registration by licensing/regulatory bodies. Table 2.2 for instance 
illustrate that in the medical profession, medical practitioners continuously maintain 
knowledge and skills in the relevant area of work through regular CPD. Since 2009, the 
GMC has made it mandatory for medical doctors to demonstrate evidence of CPD in the 
area of practice to have their licenses revalidated (GMC, 2009). Similarly, the legal 
profession has the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (formerly Law Society Regulation 
Board). This body has the responsibility for ensuring training and CPD for Solicitors 
(Solicitors Regulatory Authority, 2009). The Law Society is the body that maintains the 
register of all qualified Solicitors and issue yearly practising certificate under the Solicitors 
Act 1974 (Law Society, 2010).  In relation to accountancy profession, the ICAEW has the 
responsibility for ensuring education, training and yearly continuous professional 
development opportunities for members.   
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Despite the existence of CPD infrastructures for the Medical, Accountancy and Legal 
professions, that of Counter Fraud Specialists profession is unknown. While the medical, 
legal and accountancy models of professions that have been provided in Table 2.3 
illustrates the existence of infrastructures for professionals within those occupation on 
CPD related issues, those for counter fraud specialists are yet for exploration in Chapter 
five, six and seven.  Nonetheless, the application of Neal and Morgan’s typology would 
have the potential for exploring the extent of developments in the area for Counter Fraud 
Specialists.  
 
2.4. Other Typological Features of Professions and 
Professionalisation and Charter Status 
In addition to the key issues described in Section 2.3, there are other characteristics 
exhibited by professions and professionalising occupations (Table 2.2). Furthermore, some 
professionalised occupations continue to seek further symbols of ‘status’ and ‘prestige’ in 
the form of ‘Charter status’ as a means of distinguishing them from other professions in the 
social structure. However, examples of the other characteristics of professions and 
professionalising occupations will be discussed first, followed by a brief outline of 
‘Charter status’.  Table 2.2 provides examples of the former in the form of gaining public 
support and state protection by law, the occupation becoming full time, 
apprenticeship/traineeship, altruism (service orientation) and professional authority. 
However, the process by which professionalising occupations gain public support and state 
protection formed part of the professions relationship with the state, economy and society. 
This was discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1 as part of the relationship between 
professions, state and society. In addition, Section 2.2 also discussed Wilensky (1964) 
together with Neal and Morgan (2000) assertion that professionalising occupations develop 
to become full-time, with practitioners performing functions on full-time basis. As noted 
earlier, this assertion does not hold true within contemporary professions as demonstrated 
in Caven (2004; 2006) studies. Caven (2006) argues that while ‘flexible working patterns’ 
is generally seen as deviation from the “traditional model of an unbroken linear career 
path” (p.518), contemporary professionals are choosing to do so because they wanted to 
balance life and work. In addition, ‘flexible working patterns’ is backed by UK 
government legislation. 
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As pointed out in the earlier discussions (Chapter 2, Section 2.3), professionalising 
occupations develop professional cultures of various forms (Greenwood 1957, 1966). 
Those involved changing the name of the occupation and taking on new occupational 
identity as pointed by Caplow (1954) in Table 2.2. Caplow (1954) also noted that changing 
of the name formed part of the stages that professionalising occupations passed through.  
Similarly, Harries –Jenkins (1970) noted that traditionally, professional education involved   
‘learning by doing’ in the form of apprenticeship or vocational training, which was later 
supplemented by formal examination (Table 2.2). Recently, there has been further 
extension in the form of acquiring the systematic theory and body of knowledge in a 
formal academic environment. In relation to counter fraud specialists, there seem to be 
considerable research evidence illustrating the departure from traditional method of 
vocational training and the name change of the occupation. As pointed out in Button et al 
(2007a, 2007b), the introduction of the professionalisation agenda changed the currency 
for describing what was traditionally considered as ‘fraud investigator’ to ‘counter fraud 
specialist’. The name change from ‘fraud investigator’ to ‘counter fraud specialists’ 
provides a clear illustration of the occupation taking on new occupational identity 
highlighted in Caplow (1964).  
 
Also, the professionalisation agenda changed the mode of training, which was based 
traditionally on learning from peers with no mechanism for evaluating the skills and 
knowledge gained to professional training and accreditation. One of the philosophies of the 
functionalist sociologists is the provision of public services to protect the public interest of 
those relying on the service (Davenport & Dellaportas, 2009). In spite of this, Davenport 
and Dellaportas argue that this philosophy is diluted by the increasing contracting – out of 
some of those services to private sector companies as illustrated by the UK fraud 
investigators architecture (Chapter 1, Figure 1.3). In addition, the emphasis on targets and 
efficiency drive through cost cutting impacts on the logics of providing services in a 
professional manner (Davenport & Dellaportas, 2009; Evetts, 2003; Dent & Whitehead, 
2002; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Currie, Finn & Martin, 2008; Prowle, 2010). The 
transformation to market logics could create tension and conflicts among institutional 
actors (Wilensky, 1964; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Waring 
& Currie, 2009). 
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Professional Authority    
The earlier discussion in the previous chapter noted various legislative tools and 
instruments available from the state to counter fraud specialists for the detection, 
investigation and prosecution of fraud. In addition to this, professionals have autonomy 
and authority in relation to the extent of involvement in organisational decision-making, 
policy formulation and promotion opportunities as well as the authority available to 
professionals in performing tasks as salaried employees (Friedson, 1984, Wallace, 1995) 
within bureaucratic organisations. From Greenwood’s perspective, the basis of 
professional authority is derived from the specific spheres and academic discipline in 
which the professional is extensively educated. Those elements of professional authority 
gave the professional a monopoly of judgement over the client. Nonetheless, Greenwood 
also cautioned against professionals abusing or exploiting the position of authority to the 
detriment of the client or for personal gratification. Nonetheless, the latter is however 
debatable in the 21st century Britain given numerous cases on abuse of professional 
authority. Recent examples involved the conviction of the Metropolitan Police Commander 
Ali Dazaei (Dodd, 2010, para 1-17), professionals in the child care profession using their 
employment to abusing children (Sullivan & Beech, 2002). The emergence of such cases 
of abuse of professional authority calls for a debate and research into re-examination of the 
autonomy of professionals. Indeed, those cases marked a clear departure from the 
professional – client relationship that the functionalist theories sought to address  
(Macdonald, 1995; Greenwood, 1957; Goode, 1960; Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933). 
Similarly, the increasing de-professionalisation of the majority of professionals with 
associated reasons provides further perspectives on examining professional authority 
(Haug, 1975; Lupton, 1997). Those challenges have led raised critical comments on the 
relevance on increased professionalisation in the UK public sector as discussed in Section 
2.4.1.  
 
Chartered Status  
As referred to earlier in this chapter (see Section 2.4), chartered status is one of the 
symbols of enhancing a profession’s reputation and standing in society. Therefore, 
attaining the status of a profession is not the end for most occupations. Rather most 
occupations strive for further titles, prestige and recognition in society by attaining 
important professional ‘kite mark’ in the form of “Chartered” status. Structural/Marxist 
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sociologists on professions place more emphasis on professions and class system in society 
(Table 2.1). Therefore, those professions with “Chartered” status illustrate the social class 
and status of the particular profession and its’ members in society. In addition, members 
also see the Charter status as the ultimate expression of professionalism in their discipline, 
up-to-date expertise, quality and safety, and capacity to exercise leadership and undertake 
independent practice (Ford, 2004).  Royal Charters / Chartered status are granted by the 
sovereign on the advice of the Privy Council dating as far back as the 13th Century, with 
the original purpose of creating public or private corporations (including towns and cities), 
and defining their privileges and purposes. Nowadays, granting new Royal Charters are 
comparatively rare, but are reserved for important professional bodies, institutions or 
charities working in the public interest and could demonstrate sound financial stability 
including a record of accomplishment of achievement in the field over a number of years. 
It must also represent a unique field of activity not covered by other professional bodies. In 
addition, it is an expectation from a professional body seeking a Charter status to have five 
thousand members (5000) or more. In addition, 75 per cent of those members have to be 
qualified to at least first-degree level in a relevant discipline (Privy Council, 2010).  
 
 2.4.1. Dilemmas of Increased Professionalisation 
As highlighted in Section 2.4, increased professionalisation has attracted a number of 
critical comments. While many would argue that parts of the UK public sectors are very 
over-professionalised, there are merits and demerits associated with increased 
professionalisation. Exemplifying the merits of increasing professionalisation are the need 
for professions to increase social and market closure to reduce competition, separate the 
qualified from the unqualified (Greenwood, 1957), bringing proper recognition and status, 
public protection and create market for particular services that benefit society (Greenwood, 
1957; Evetts & Wilson, 2006).  Linked to this are the rapid changes in technology, 
dynamic nature of knowledge, division of labour and specialisation, new public 
management policies of bureaucratisation, rationalisation and accountability pursued by 
the 21st Century governments (See Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, Scott, 2008, Currie et al, 
2009). Those have created new opportunities for new tasks domain that requires 
professionalisation (Haug, 1973). Haug (1973) described those new tasks domain that are 
professionalised as ‘para professions’ or ‘new professions’.  
 
In spite of the merits of increased professionalisation, critical theorists have argued that 
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increased professionalisation brings with it associated problems.  For instance, Haug 
(1973) in his deprofessionalisation thesis on the medical profession provided critical 
perspectives on the problems associated with increased professionalisation. Illustrating 
those problems were how extensive professionalisation creates situations where 
professionalised occupations struggle over jurisdictional claims, occupational tasks and 
territory, decrease in monopoly power and the unquestionable authority previously 
enjoyed. Those factors either on their own or in combination with others, often create 
conflicts and cause professionals to develop their own strategies to maintain their authority 
as evidenced in Waring and Currie (2009) study on NHS Clinicians and the introduction of 
risk management reporting system.    A similar study by Currie et al (2009) on the impact 
of workforce modernisation and the introduction of the General Practitioners specialising 
in genetics education and delivering genetics services to patients in their primary care 
settings revealed tensions between specialist geneticists that traditionally provided those 
services in the Regional Genetic Centres and GPs in primary healthcare settings 
specialising in the area. This idea was seen by Specialist geneticists as encroachment of 
GPs into their domain, despite those services not being available at primary healthcare 
settings. The gap in the primary healthcare settings on GPs with specialised skills in 
genetics led to the emergence of a new profession for GPs called ‘General Practitioners 
with Specialist Interest in Genetics’.  Furthermore, the growing emphasis on increased 
professionalisation and commitment to serving and protecting the public interest has also 
been criticised as a ‘window dressing exercise’ or ‘rhetoric’ given the UK government 
emphasis on increasing cost cutting and contracting out public services to the private sector 
(Davenport & Dellaportas, 2009; Dent & Whitehead, 2002; Prowle, 2010; Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Currie, Finn & Martin, 2008; 2009; Waring & Currie, 2009).  
 
While the author acknowledges the demerits of increased professionalisation, it could be 
argued in the context of this study that increased professionalisation is always a good thing 
given the merits. Evidence supporting this view is illustrated by the earlier discussion on 
the police reluctance and disinterest in tackling the growing fraud problem in the UK 
public sector, despite the negative consequences of fraud on victims and the economy as a 
whole (Chapter 1). The negative attitude of the police towards fraud in general, created a 
gap in the market for the agencies involved in policing fraud. This gap created an 
opportunity for public sector organisations to take responsibility upon themselves to tackle 
fraud within their own organisations leading to the emergence of the new ‘breed’ of 
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civilian fraud investigators otherwise known as counter fraud specialists. Therefore, 
increased professionalisation is good for society because it contributes to meeting the 
specialised skill gaps in areas neglected by law enforcement agencies such as the police in 
tackling the growing problem of fraud in the UK public sector.   
 
2.5. Institutionalist Perspective 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, institutional theory has gained recent attention in the 
study of professions as it extends both the ‘traits’ and power approaches discussed earlier 
in this chapter. The theory has been used to help researchers to gain broader insight and 
understanding into symbolic elements that give meaning and social reality to institutions 
which includes professions (Figure 2.3). Linked to this is the historical nature of using the 
concepts to studying diverse institutions such as the: 
• Processes of institutional transformation of American Mutual Funds Industry and 
their status mobility through professionalisation (Lounsbury, 2002).  
• Higher Education Publishing Industry shifting emphasis from the traditional values 
of an ‘editorial logic’ to ‘market logic’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) due to 
changes in organisational practices pursued by chief executives.  
 
Recently, the theory has been applied to study institutional forces affecting knowledge 
sharing in the UK NHS and allied professions (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006). They found 
that while historically, the institutional logic (‘old logic’) between healthcare delivery 
organisations and higher education institutions (such as University Medical Schools and 
Teaching Hospitals), had shared a common objective of establishing “close links between 
research, teaching and clinical practice” (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006, p.6), a ‘new logic’ 
had emerged following introduction of the New Public Management policies with 
emphasis on performance indicators. The impact of the ‘new logic’ had resulted in a 
situation where actors in the respective institutions pursued separate interest, as opposed to 
the commonly shared traditional objective. Currie and Suhomlinova (2006) for instance, 
illustrated the divergence of practices from the ‘old logic’ to the ‘new logic’ with 
academics within University Medical Schools concentration on research assessment 
exercise (RAE) and publication to improve research rating and funding attraction, rather 
than teaching. Similarly, Healthcare delivery organisations such as Hospitals had placed 
emphasis on reducing patient waiting list and time to improve ‘star rating’ and 
performance. They pointed out that, the pursuit of diverse activities and interest to meet 
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performance indicators created problems of developing and sharing knowledge, as well as 
best practice among professionals within an institution. 
 
The main link between the institutional theory and ‘traits’ based approach to 
professionalisation is that both recognises that professions have unique elements such as a 
body of knowledge that could be shown to be beneficial to society (Empson, 2007). 
Empson (2007) points out that institutional theory perspective put more emphasis on the 
degree to which those ‘traits’ of a profession are socially constructed as opposed to 
objectively defining it.  The theory argues that, in order to understand individual and 
organisational behaviour, it has to be framed in societal and institutional contexts because 
both have a stake in society (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Currie 
& Suhomlinova, 2006). In addition, there exist a number of key institutions (organisations) 
in the societal environment such as the professions, the capital markets, the corporations, 
the state (bureaucratic state), family and religion that place strong emphasis on instilling 
values, promoting stability and allowing structures in society to persist over time (Scott, 
1987; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  Those institutions in the 
environment are the ‘actors’ and each of those actors has its own central ’logic’ and 
pursues diverse interests. Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p.804) defined institutional logics 
as:  
the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.   
 
Institutional theory therefore provides a framework for understanding the wider views 
between organisations and their environments, together with the relevant ‘logics’ pursued 
by actors to achieve their interests (see Figure 2.3). The theory argues that, “all societal 
organisations exist in an institutional environment that defines and [shapes] social reality “ 
(Scott, 1987,p.507).  
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Figure 2.3. An Illustration of Institutional Environment 
 
 
Proponents of institutional theory (Scott 1987; 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Thornton 
& Ocasio, 1999; 2008; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006) have also argued that, the 
institutional environments are multiple, diverse and not static as it responds to various 
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures from the environment. The coercive or 
persuasive pressures may exist in the form of the state /government legislations and 
regulation to control the activities of institutions polluting the environment or abusing the 
stock market (Barnes, 2011). Similarly, the state may also pressurise institutions to change 
their behaviour and actions to meet cultural expectations in society within which they 
function. Illustrating state coercion and persuasion for an organisational change were 
earlier discussed in Chapter 1 on the growing fraud problem to the government, society as 
well as the questionable investigative practices and fraud investigators culture at the time 
which led to professionalisation initiatives. The institutional ‘logics’ pursued by the state 
(government) at the time in relation to the professionalisation initiatives varied. This 
ranged from socio – economic to psychological and political reasons. The socio - economic 
logics related to an effort for protecting the public purse, while creating a niche institution 
with state mandate to tackle public sector fraud. The psychological and political logics on 
the other hand, relate to appealing to the public for being ‘tough’ on crime and canvassing 
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for more electoral votes.  
 
Mimetic pressure by contrast refers to a situation where institutions respond to changes in 
their environment by just replicating what other organisations or professions have done,  
because they perceived those organisations or professions as more legitimate or successful 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Mimetic pressure often develops out of the need for 
institutions to respond to change, but sometimes the institutions themselves lacked clear 
direction or are uncertain on mechanisms for response. The extract from the Department 
for Works and Pension (1998) Green Paper “Beating fraud is everyone’s business”, 
provides an insight into the mimetic pressure to change the fraud investigation 
environment.  It reads: we must develop a body of highly-skilled anti-fraud specialists 
capable of tackling fraud in the same way other professions have applied their skills 
“(DSS, 1998, p.46).  In addition to coercive and mimetic process, institutions also use 
normative processes to respond to changes in their environment. This occurs where the 
state or members of a particular occupation attempt to control entry into the occupation 
using professionalisation process elaborated earlier in this chapter. Therefore, coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures affect institutional environments and institutions need to 
have mechanisms for response. 
 
As has been discussed, professions constitute one of the key institutions in society. 
Developing a profession such as counter fraud, therefore need to have in place, what is 
described as ‘pillars of institution’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott 2008). Scott (2008) 
described those pillars providing symbols of an institution as a combination of “regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements, that together with associated activities and 
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (p.48). The ‘regulative pillars’ refer 
to the existence of elements that support the institution and regulate members behaviour 
such as code of conduct and ethics, sanctions and rewards, rule –setting and monitoring 
that ensure conformity. By contrast, the ‘normative pillars’ refer to prescriptive and 
obligatory elements such as professional association, certification and accreditation of 
qualifications of formal education by recognised universities. The ‘cultural-cognitive 
pillars’ however, refer to indicating symbols such as socialisation and common shared 
identity, beliefs and shared logics of action. The presence of those symbolic elements in an 
institution defines and shape actors action and behaviours. In addition, Scott (2008), 
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Friedland and Alford (1991) suggest that an institution needs to strive for legitimacy, 
resources and social acceptability to be able to survive in the environment (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1.1 – Professions, Environment and Strategies). 
 
  2.6 . Summary 
There is much written about and debated on the concepts of professions and 
professionalisation, yet there is lack of consensus due to the fragmented nature of the 
literature on the concepts. The introduction of ‘new public management’ policies has also 
increased the growing emphasis on professionalisation in contemporary professions. While 
increased professionalisation has advantages, critical theorists have raised concerns over 
increased professionalisation in the UK public sector (Section 2.4.1). While 
acknowledging those concerns, the author asserts that increased professionalisation is good 
because fraud is an increasing problem in the UK public sector. In spite of this, the public 
police have negative attitude towards tackling fraud in general. This has created a gap in 
the market for the agencies involved in policing fraud. This gap created an opportunity for 
public sector organisations to take responsibility upon themselves to tackle fraud within 
their own organisations to protect the public purse as well as increase confidence in the 
system.  
 
The chapter was structured into four key sections, with the first section examining the 
historical development of professions within the United Kingdom and the distinction from 
Continental European Countries. In addition, it outlined the theoretical concepts of 
professions together with how professionalising occupations strive to gain legitimacy, 
resources and social acceptability in their environments.   Next was section two (Section 
2.2), which examined the concepts determining professions together with what writers 
such as Etzioni (1969), Verhoef, Boon and Mutasingwa (2006) and NMC (2010) described 
as ‘neo-professions’. The section also examined the concepts of professionalisation.  The 
third and fourth sections (Sections 2.3 and 2.4) discussed the classification of professions 
and professionalisation (Table 2.2) as well as the dilemmas of increased 
professionalisation. The section also provided a brief outline of ‘charter status’ and how 
professionalised occupations use it as a ‘kite mark’ for further status, as well as the strategy 
for distinguishing themselves from other professions. As has been highlighted, those 
typological features in Table 2.2 formed the conceptual framework or theoretical basis for 
benchmarking the extent of professionalisation of counter fraud specialists’ occupation. In 
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addition, the discussion involved using the medico-legal and accountancy model (Table 
2.3) to illustrate how those occupations have developed into professions by having in place 
the necessary pillars of a profession/institution.   The chapter also reviewed institutionalist 
perspective to professionalisation and links to ‘traits’ theory, given that professions 
constitute one of the key societal institutions (Figure 2.3). Therefore, any attempt to 
professionalise an occupation such as counter fraud, need to have in place those structures 
or symbolic elements described as ‘pillars of institution’ (Scott, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 
1991). Scott (2008, p.48) suggests symbols of the ‘pillars’ exist in the form of “regulative 
(such as code of conduct and ethics, sanctions), normative (such as accreditation, 
certification and professional association) and cultural-cognitive (such as socialisation, 
shared identity, norms and beliefs) together with activities and resources providing 
meaning to social life”. Those pillars are relevant because they provide support and shape 
the behaviour of actors within a particular institution or profession. 
 
The next chapter (Chapter 3), discusses the research methodology, together with the 
ontological and epistemological perspectives of the research project. As outlined earlier, 
the main aim of this research is to examine and explore the professionalisation of counter 
fraud specialists in the UK public sector by focussing mainly on the DWP, NHS and Local 
Authority (Chapter 1, Section 1.1.5).  As well  specifying the scope of the study, Chapter 1, 
Section 1.3 also stated the research questions for the study,  with the main question 
focussed on whether counter fraud specialism is a profession or not, while the second 
question related to how to develop a profession of counter fraud specialists.  In answering 
those questions, the study will attempt to apply the conceptual framework of functionalists 
/’traits’ theory of professions and professionalisation elaborated earlier in this chapter. In 
addition, the study would draw on philosophical ideas and ethical principles outlined in 
chapter 1, Section 1.3.  Thus, the study would draw on ideas and issues raised in the 
previous chapter as well as this chapter to study professionalisation of counter fraud 
specialists in those three organisations focussed in this study. Examining those initiatives 
and the extent of professionalisation would require the application of the most common 
characteristic features of a profession and professionalisation summarised in Chapter 2, 
Table 2.2.    The next chapter (Chapter 3) discusses the research methodology for the 
study, with an overall research framework (research process) for the study illustrated by 
Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter 3:  Research Methodology 
3.0. Introduction  
One of the key challenges in any research work is designing a research framework and 
deciding on the choice of research strategy for the study. Cresswell (1998) also highlights 
the need for researchers to recognise the existence of a basic set of beliefs or assumptions 
guiding research enquiries.  Chapter 1 – Section 1.3 explained those basic set of beliefs and 
emphasised that, all research begins with ontological and epistemological philosophies 
(assumptions or claims) concerning the nature of social reality and how it can be known. 
The ontological position adopted for this study is therefore concerned with claims and 
assumptions on the social reality of professionalising counter fraud specialists in the UK 
public sector, mainly DWP, NHS and the Local Authority.  The scope of the study was 
outlined earlier in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.5 together with the rationale for focussing on 
particular public sector organisations but not others. As described earlier (Chapter1 - 
Section 1.2), the initiatives to professionalise counter fraud work began in response to the 
government attempt to tackle the growing fraud problem, the questionable investigative 
practices and the wider fraud investigators culture including learning the ‘tricks of the 
trade’ from their experienced colleagues, without any proper formal mechanism for 
assessing the quality of the training (Button et al, 2007a; 2007b). Thus, the government’s 
recognition of those problems led to the initiatives for the professionalisation agenda. The 
earlier discussions and the literature review (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2; also Chapter 2) 
provided illustration on some of those studies on professions and professionalisation using 
functionalist / ‘traits’ approach. In spite of this, my literature review on fraud and counter 
fraud specialists professionalisation identified the lack of any major academic study 
employing the functionalist/‘traits’ approach to assess the extent of professionalising 
counter fraud occupations since initiating the professionalisation agenda.  
 
Gaining knowledge on the social reality on the extent of professionalising counter fraud 
specialists’ creates the need for adopting epistemological philosophies. As was described 
earlier (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3), there exists multiple ways of gaining knowledge on 
social reality (Kerlinger, 1986; Grix, 2002; Kamla, 1995). However, obtaining what is 
generally accepted as legitimate and adequate knowledge involve the need for the 
researcher to identify, explain and justify the epistemological stance [position] adopted 
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(Crotty, 1998).   For the purpose of this thesis / research, the researcher adopted a more 
interpretive stance to the study. Researchers adopting this approach hold the view that 
reality is not discovered but constructed by individuals involved in the study by means of 
interactions with the object of study (Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 1998; Robson, 2002). 
Adopting interpretive approach to the study will enable the researcher to interact with 
various trained and accredited counter fraud practitioners working for the three UK public 
sector counter fraud organisations focussed on this study to gain knowledge about the 
social reality of counter fraud occupation.  While the adoption of a more interpretive 
position to gain knowledge about the nature and extent of professionalising counter fraud 
specialists, the relationship between the researcher and the object of study could have 
impact on the research outcome in terms of research bias (Creswell, 1998).  As a strategy 
of reducing the research bias, the author provided a reflective account for the study 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.1).   
 
As well as recognising the philosophical perspectives for the study, researchers when 
making a decision about the elements of the research inquiry need to identify the 
conceptual framework for the study. In the context of this study, this would be functionalist 
/ ‘traits’ theory of profession and professionalisation. This would consist of applying the 
most common elements of professions and professionalising occupations summarised in 
Table 2.2 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). This theory has been employed by classical 
theorists to study diverse occupations and professionalisation (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2) 
and contemporary occupations such as Social Work (Greenwood, 1957) and Foster Carers 
(De Lona Martin, 2006; Kirton, 2007).   This introductory section has therefore established 
the groundwork for the inquiry by identifying the philosophic principles, together with the 
conceptual framework of gaining knowledge on counter fraud specialists and the extent of 
professionalisation. Undoubtedly, the conceptual framework on its own could not stand. 
Rather, it needs linking to research methodology and methods for the study. This chapter 
discusses the research strategy and methods of data collection together with their sources 
and data analytical tools. The chapter is organised into three main sections as follows. The 
first section discusses the research strategy and rationale as well as sampling, questionnaire 
design and piloting techniques for the study. The section further discusses how the 
researcher gained access to research participants, consideration of ethical issues and 
reflexive account (Section 3.1). Following this is the second section which discusses the 
data collection methods together with sources of data (Section 3.2), while the third section 
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examines the data analytical tools (Section 3.3). The chapter concludes with a summary of 
discussions.  
  
 3.1. Designing the Inquiry - Research Strategy and Rationale 
Having outlined the groundwork for the inquiry, the next stage to consider is the research 
methodology which is essentially the strategy the researcher chooses to acquire knowledge 
on the object of study or explore the phenomenon of interest (Grix, 2002; Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995; Crotty, 1998).   
 
Figure 3.1: The Overall Research Framework for the Study  
 
Selecting research problem (Problem 
recognition) or topic, identifying 
aim(s) and objectives, study scope  
 
Identifying philosophical and 
theoretical framework for the 
study, conducting literature review 
Identifying and selecting research 
participants for the study through: 
- Sampling study population, choosing 
criteria and method of selection, 
- Ethical issues consideration,  access       
negotiation & piloting 
- Reflexivity (Role of researcher) 
 
Selecting research strategy & rationale: 
(Mixed-methods) 
Generating results, findings & discussions 
-Ideas & emerging findings 
-New ideas & lines of further research 
Selecting data analytical tools  
-Use of SPSS v. 15 software,  
-Microsoft 2007 office Word & Excel 
package 
-NVIVO v8  qualitative data analysis 
Software 
Selecting methods of data collection  
& sources of data -  
 
Primary methods & sources 
Survey: questionnaire with closed & open-
ended questions to counter fraud specialists 
 
Interviews: semi-structured (follow up) 
interviews with a selected number of counter 
fraud specialists 
 
Secondary methods & sources: 
Documentary analysis: CFPAB minutes, Job 
adverts for DWP, NHSCFSMS & Local 
Authority counter fraud specialists, Journals, 
Reports, Books & Articles 
 
Adapted from: Grix (2002, p.184); Silverman (2005, p. 111);  Marshall  & Rossman (1995, 
p.41); Gravetter & Forzano (2011, p.26). 
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Chapter 1, Section 1.3 outlined the methodological assumption for the study. In addition, a 
number of writers (see Crotty, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 1995; Robson, 2002) have 
highlighted the existence of wide ranging research methodologies available to researchers 
to select from when conducting research. Examples of those methodologies cited include 
survey research, ethnography, case study, feminist standpoint and experimental research. 
As noted in Chapter 1, this study adopted survey research methodologies involving the use 
of mixed-methods consisting of survey questionnaire and interviews to gain knowledge on 
the extent of professionalising counter fraud specialists in the UK public sector (DWP, 
NHS and Local Authority). Figure 3.1 summarised the overall research framework for the 
study with detailed outcome of employing the mixed-methods strategy provided in the next 
three chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
 
Mixed-methods research strategy is the “the class of research where the researcher mixes 
or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, 
concepts or language into a single study” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p.17). Although 
there is no conclusive agreement among writers over which terms to apply to typologies of 
‘mixed methods’ (Alexander et al, 2008),  the term ‘mixed-methods’ is a very broad 
metaphor used to describe research approaches involving triangulation, multi-methods, 
multi-trait and multi-methods (Jick, 1979). Denzin (1978) for instance, illustrates ‘mixed-
methods’ using the concept of ‘triangulation’ as the “combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon” (p.291). Fielding and Fielding (1986) also provide similar 
perspective and suggest that “knowing a single landmark only locates one somewhere 
along a line in a direction from the landmark, whereas with two landmarks one can take 
bearings on both and locate oneself at their intersection” (Fielding & Fielding, 1986, p. 
23).  
 
The increasing importance of mixed – methods  has made it one of the most popular tools 
for integrating qualitative and quantitative data to gain knowledge about a particular 
object. The growing importance and interest in the approach stem from their application in 
various academic fields. Exemplifying this was Elton Mayo’s Hawthorne Studies (1924 – 
1932) on human relations and workplace efficiency (Brewer & Hunter, 2006). Since then, 
Campbell and Fiske have applied the methods in academic fields such as psychology in the 
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study of multi-trait or multiple enquiries (Creswell, 2003). In addition to psychology and 
management, there is increasing interest of employing mixed-methods in studies relating to 
academic fields such as social care (De Lona Martin, 2006),  education (Onwuegbuzie et 
al, 2007 - students perceptions of teachers in higher education), fisheries (Biao, 2009), 
marketing research (Harrison & Reilly, 2011).  Besides various academic fields, research 
environments are experiencing increasing pressures from funding bodies on both sides of 
the Atlantic (UK, Europe and America) for research to inform policy and have practical 
relevance (Brannen, 2011). Because of those reasons, there is now growing importance and 
interest in studies integrating mixed-methods. Therefore, employing mixed-methods 
strategy to study counter fraud specialists professionalisation adds to the body of 
knowledge on the method.  
 
 
Five reasons account for the rationale of choosing mixed – methods to gain knowledge on 
the extent of professionalising counter fraud specialists in the UK public sector counter 
fraud organisations focussed in the study.  Firstly, is the growing importance and 
increasing popularity of mixed –methods in research because they enable researchers to 
combine two or more methods to get closer to reality and study different aspects of the 
same social phenomena (Olsen, 2004).  The second rationale relates to resource constraints 
and time limitation on the project. Given this, the researcher decided that using mixed 
methods would provide the convenience of involving varieties of data to gain knowledge 
about counter fraud specialists. Thirdly, is the complementary nature of the mixed –
methods strategy (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The complementary nature allowed the 
researcher to clarify results from one method with results from the other. An instance of 
the complementarity in this study is the use of follow-up interviews with key individuals in 
the counter fraud sector (see discussions in Chapter 1, Section 1.3).  
 
Another reason is the strength of the method in data display in terms of using pictures in 
the form of graphs and tables while embedding qualitative comments / extracts to illustrate 
results. Lastly, it allows the researcher to gain multiple viewpoints (Jick, 1979; Murray, 
1999) from counter fraud specialists on their profession together with the extent of 
professionalisation. Despite these advantages, there are limitations associated with using 
mixed -methods. Those involve the time consuming nature of the approach such as 
training, cost and resource issues as the researcher has to learn multiple methods and 
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approaches for effective combination (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Assessing the 
strengths and limitations in choosing a research approach therefore plays a crucial role in 
the phenomenon under study. However, it is a good research practice to consider other 
aspects of the research design process before implementing the strategy. Those involve 
sampling, questionnaire design and piloting as well as gaining access to the world of 
counter fraud specialists and ethical consideration.   
 
 Sampling, Questionnaire Design and Piloting 
It is difficult to gain detailed knowledge of all people and events in society, but it is 
possible to make a choice to focus the study on people within a particular population 
through sampling (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). Sampling is a process of “collecting 
information about a subset of a population” (De Vaus, 2002, p.363).   There are two basic 
methods of sampling (Fink & Kosecoff, 1985; Kalton, 1983; Robson, 2011). Those 
involved probability and non-probability sampling. Probability sampling is a type of 
sampling method in which each person in the population has an equal chance of selection. 
Probability sampling techniques when applied in research studies have advantages of 
reducing sample selection biases and increasing representativeness. Despite the 
advantages, Robson (2011, pp. 276 – 277) points out that, real-world research conducted 
with non-probability sampling techniques tend to be very difficult, and often impossible to 
fulfil.  Robson attributed the challenges to factors such as cost, poor response rate, data 
attrition and time involved in obtaining and selecting the sample population.  
 
Conversely, non-probability is any sampling plan that lacks the possibility of specifying 
the probability of including any person on which the survey is based, with examples 
involving snowball and convenience sampling techniques (Robson, 2011). As a result, all 
non-probability sampling techniques have main weakness in sample representativeness 
(Robson, 2011; Kalton, 1983). In addition, the results suffer from generalisation and 
researcher bias. Notwithstanding the theoretical weakness, Bryman (1989, p.113) have 
argued that few research studies on organisations “are rarely based on probability 
samples”. Rather, what tends to happen in real-world research is that most studies use non-
probability samples.  For the purpose of this study, the sample population were fraud 
investigators. The sampling frame were fraud investigators trained and accredited to 
Professionalism in Security Management (PINS) standard, with a minimum qualification 
of an Accredited Counter Fraud Specialists (ACFS)/Accredited Counter Fraud Officer 
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(ACFO) status.  Convenience (non representative) sampling was used for the survey 
questionnaire. Ideally, the researcher would have liked to contact all accredited counter 
fraud specialists on the CFPAB database. In reality, this was however not possible because 
the CFPAB declined to give permission. As at March 2007 that the survey research begun, 
the CFPAB database had more than 8000 accredited counter fraud specialists (Button et al, 
2007b). Because of CFPAB declining their permission, the researcher resorted to using 
alternative databases available to him at the time. 
 
Four databases used to distribute survey questionnaire at the time involved the Institute of 
Counter Fraud Studies (ICFS), which had 307 counter fraud specialists, while the NHS 
CFSMS had 474. Similarly, the Local Authority had 453 while the BSc (Hons) Counter 
Fraud Students had 169 counter fraud specialists. In total, the four databases had 1403 
counter fraud specialists, with detailed account and methods of distribution (This is 
described in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 and Table 3.1).  The semi-structured interviews 
involved using stratified sampling. The rationale for using stratified sampling approach 
was that the semi-structured interviews were conducted with specialists (Counter Fraud 
Specialists, Fraud Managers, Managing Directors and Chief Executives)  occupying 
different positions within  the  respective organisations. This has the benefit of gaining 
insights into how specialists in different positions across the relevant organisations 
perceive counter fraud profession as well as recommendations for the future.   
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, survey questionnaire and interviews are instances of key 
research tools or instruments for gaining information on the object of study. However, their 
effectiveness in meeting the research goals depends on the design of the questionnaires 
relating to the survey. As discussed in Robson (2011), it is essential that researchers 
established a link between the research question and the designed questionnaire for 
soliciting information from respondents. In addition to this, researchers need to consider 
factors such as the theoretical framework for the study, method of administrating or 
distributing the survey, method of data analysis together with respondents’ technical 
knowledge and understanding of the concepts on the questionnaire (De Vaus, 2002).  
 
As noted   in the earlier discussions (Chapter 1, Section 1.3 and Chapter 2, Section 2.6), 
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this study sought to answer two questions, with the main question essentially concerned 
with whether counter fraud specialism is a profession or not, while the second question 
related to how to develop a profession of Counter Fraud Specialists. Answering those 
questions involved using functionalists’ theoretical framework of professions and 
professionalisation to inform the study. Those theories were elaborated in the literature 
review (Chapter 2, Section 2.3 and Summarised in Table 2.2).  Consequently, the survey 
research questions were developed with the theoretical framework in mind to produce the 
questionnaire (Appendix 1B). One of the key decisions made by the researcher when 
designing the questionnaire was to ensure questions were clearly written and simple to 
understand by providing easy to follow instructions. As well as this, the researcher also 
avoided the use of ‘jargons’. Furthermore, the researcher gave consideration to criteria for 
distributing the questionnaire to a gain relatively high response rate within the resource and 
time constraints for the project. The benefits of making such a decision were two fold. 
Firstly, to help respondents devote time to answering the questionnaire. The second reason 
was to help the researcher save time and resources involved in the design and analysis of 
those responses. Nonetheless, the survey questionnaire contained a mixture of formulated 
questions involving open-ended and closed questions that would yield both quantitative 
and qualitative data for the study.  
 
However, it is good practice in research to evaluate the designed questionnaire before final 
distribution to survey respondents. De Vaus (2002) described the process of evaluating the 
questionnaire before final distribution as the “pilot testing or pretesting” (p.114). Three 
reasons account for the rationale to pretest or pilot survey questionnaire. Firstly is to ensure 
the survey questions conform to the standards of a good survey design. Secondly is about 
receiving advance warning on the pitfalls in the questionnaire. Thirdly, piloting allows the 
researcher to assess the feasibility of the study, the appropriateness of the proposed 
research instruments and improved questionnaire reliability (Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 
2001). Despite those advantages in piloting, there is the potential for some problems not to 
become obvious until the implementation stage (Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001), but 
researchers have to learn from that.  
 
In the context of this study, piloting the survey questionnaire involves three stages with the 
aim of following standards of good survey design discussed in De Vaus (2002) and Van 
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Teijlingen and Hundley (2001). Stage one involved piloting on distance learning students 
enrolled on BSc (Hons) Counter Fraud Degree Course.  Secondly, the researcher had in the 
past worked as a research assistant in partnership with the NHS Counter Fraud and 
Security Management Service research team. Therefore, the researcher had established a 
good working relationship with them. Consequently, a copy of the survey questionnaire 
was sent to the research team in London who provided very useful feedback. The third 
stage of the piloting process involved sending copies to supervisors and work colleagues 
for feedback. All these consultations provided valuable feedback for the final versions used 
for the study. In relation to the semi-structured (follow up) interviews, the questionnaire 
for that study was piloted on colleagues and some experienced counter fraud professionals. 
Robson (2011) suggests focus groups as an alternative form of piloting because they (focus 
groups) provide opportunity to meet people from the same occupational background to 
meet and express their views on the study. However, it was impossible to use focus group 
approach because of time and resource constraints on the project.  
 
 Accessing Counter Fraud Specialists and Ethical Consideration 
As well as paying attention to sampling population, questionnaire design and piloting, 
considering how one gains entry into the community, or the social world of the respective 
research participants together with the necessarily ethical implications play a central role in 
research. As May (2001, p. 157) puts it “ to become part of a social scene and participate in 
it requires that the researcher is accepted to some degree”. As Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialist who had attended various counter fraud related meetings and presented research 
findings to the counter fraud community including the accreditation body (CFPAB), 
gaining access to counter fraud specialists was less difficult. In addition, the researcher had 
developed a network of contacts with a number of specialists through conference 
attendance, meetings as well as previous employment as a researcher.  Those network of 
contacts and acceptance in the counter fraud community provided what Lofland (1971, p. 
95) described as a “pre-existing relations of trust” as an entry into the community. In 
addition, the already established contacts acted as “gate keepers” at the data collection 
stage.   
 
In spite of those contacts and gatekeepers, one cannot begin to collect data without 
following the norms. Drawing on institutional theory, community exists as part of society 
with norms and values that define and shape actors behaviour (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; 
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Scott, 2008). Therefore, researchers seeking entry into the community need to follow the 
ethical values and norms of the community. Robson (2002, p.65) described those ethics as 
“the rules of conduct, typically to conformity to a code or set of principles”. The 
importance of ethics in research has also been emphasised in Kent (2000). From Kent’s 
perspective,  “social science research covers a very wide field of studies, and those who 
engage in it will find themselves in all kinds of different situations” (p. 59). Henn, 
Weinstein and Foard (2009) discussions on those ethical situations that social researchers 
tend to encounter are briefly illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 : Broad Issues on Research Ethics 
 
In order to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 as well as anonymity and 
confidentiality, all individual responses from the survey were treated with strictest 
confidence. Any information with the potential to identifying research participants were 
anonymised using pseudonyms. In order to maintain respondents’ confidentiality, the 
researcher took measures to create identification (ID) numbers for survey returns before 
coding them onto electronic files. The reason for this was to avoid keeping any record of 
the respondents name on the electronic file. Similarly, those electronic files acting as the 
database for survey returns were encrypted using a secure password. Following this, the 
hard copy versions were kept safely in a cupboard with a security lock in line with 
Focus of 
Research 
Ethics 
Consent 
Privacy 
Harm  
Confidentiality 
Anonymity 
Consequentiality 
Source: Adapted from Henn, Weinstein & Foard (2009, p.80) 
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recommendations from De Vaus (2002).   
 
In relation to harm reduction and consequentiality, the researcher collected data by first 
seeking consent of the counter fraud specialists and willingness to participate in the 
project. In addition, research participants were informed of the research purpose, intended 
outcome, confidentiality and data protection issues (Appendix 1A, 1A2 and 1A2B). 
Furthermore, given the sensitive nature of the study, copies of interview transcripts 
(transcribed semi-structured interviews) were sent to the relevant research participants to 
confirm and highlight any information that might identify or harm them in various ways. 
The questionnaire was dealt with by NHS staff who sought ethical approval from Senior 
Management. It was distributed by NHS CFSMS who made assurance that all ethical 
approval had been complied with.   
 
Thus far, the previous section discussed the groundwork for the inquiry (Chapter 3, Section 
3.0).  This section by contrast (Chapter 3, Section 3.1), explored the strategy for designing 
the research inquiry and rationale for the choice of strategy. In addition, the section also 
discussed the sampling process for the study, questionnaire design and piloting. As well as 
this, the mechanisms for gaining access to counter fraud specialists together with the 
relevant ethical issues were discussed. Besides this, researchers need to realise they 
inevitably form part of the studies they conduct as a result of their interactions with the 
research participants. This interaction affects the study outcomes and researchers need to 
account for their positions in relation to the research participants to help reduce bias in the 
study (Roulston, 2010). The next section considers those issues.   
 
 The Role of the Researcher (Researcher’s Reflectivity) 
Robson (2002) described research reflectivity as “…an awareness of the ways in which the 
researcher as an individual with a particular social identity and background has an impact 
on the research process” (p.22). The researcher’s background as an Accredited Counter 
Fraud Specialist was revealed earlier in Chapter 1.  In addition, the researcher was a 
member of the Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists (ICFS). At the time of conducting this 
study, the author was employed in counter fraud related research role within an academic 
institution. Given this multiple roles, the researcher occupied ‘hybrid’ position in the study. 
McGhee, Marland and Atkinson (2007) explained ‘hybrid’ position in relation to research 
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reflexivity as “a researcher who undertakes research into the practice of other practitioners 
and is familiar with that research area” (p.6).  With the above concepts in consideration, 
the researcher made his professional qualification as an Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialist (ACFS) status known. This position was clearly stated on the covering letter 
inviting research participant’s willingness to participate in the study. In addition, the 
researcher explicitly declared his membership of the counter fraud specialists’ professional 
association (The Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists -ICFS) together with his role as a 
researcher in counter fraud related issues in an academic institution.  Declaration of the 
researcher’s position had the synergetic effect on the study in terms of gaining access and 
support from counter fraud community as well as increasing the response rate.  
 
Reynolds (2003) suggests various reasons behind individuals, organisations and 
professional bodies that act as ‘gatekeepers’ in research study. An example of those 
reasons involved ensuring that members’ voices are heard and represented in the best 
possible ways. Furthermore, proponents of institutional theory and logics (Scott, 1987; 
Thornton & Ocasio 1999; 2008) argue that institutions in society have multiple logics and 
pursue diverse interests in their wider environments.  Renzetti and Raymond (1993) 
however assert that researchers need to maintain objective and detached perspective in 
their study. With those reasons in consideration, the researcher ensured that the study was 
not used as a political agenda to further the interest of those organisations. Hence, the fact 
that ICFS and NHS acted as gatekeepers in the study had no impact whatsoever on the 
researcher’s analysis and interpretation of survey data. Nonetheless, the researcher 
acknowledges the potential issues associated with the quality of responses from 
respondents, given that the researcher made his position (Accredited Counter Fraud 
Specialist) known to respondents. Therefore, the position of the researcher, coupled with 
the sensitive nature of the study, may have created the danger on respondents not to reveal 
too much information having the potential of working against them in the future.  
 
The issue of unequal power relations between the researcher and research participants has 
gained increased attention in research studies. Where this was present in research study, 
the researcher has to provide reflexive account of it in their study. Reynolds (2003) 
provides two dimensions of the unequal power relations between the research participants 
and the researcher. According to Reynolds (2003) the research participants have the power 
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and ability to “select the information they will make available to the researcher during 
interviews” (p.303). This often limits the amount of information available to the researcher 
and often prompts them to seek alternative sources of information. Equally, the researcher 
has power in terms of control over the “selection, interpretation and analysis of the 
information provided” (p.303).  
 
 
 
Three main areas of research participants’ power that was encountered in relation to data 
access for the study were as follows. Firstly, was the CFPAB denial to grant permission to 
the researcher to use their database to circulate survey questionnaire. As indicated earlier, 
the CFPAB database is the biggest database with more than 8000 counter fraud specialists 
registered (see Button et al, 2007b) to it, as at March 2007 (the time this survey started). 
Given the access denial, the researcher had no choice but to seek alternative sources of 
information for the study. Those sources have been represented in Table 3.1. Similarly, the 
CFPAB denied the researcher’s request for copies of the Board’s archived minutes. This 
request was made under the Freedom of Information Act, yet again; the CFPAB refused it 
citing reasons of sensitivity. Secondly, one of the research participants withdrew his 
support for the study because he was displeased with the researcher’s transfer of the 
research study from the University of Portsmouth to Nottingham Trent University. 
Illustrated below is the comment from this particular research participant:  
 
I did give you the interview because I understand that you were pursuing your 
studies at Portsmouth and I’m not really content for it to be quoted for research 
pursued elsewhere (Respondent X, personal communication, September 24, 2010). 
 
 Ethically, research participants have the right to withdraw from the study at anytime. 
While this was understandable, the researcher had no choice but to respect the wishes of 
this particular research participant by withdrawing his interview transcript from the study.  
 
In addition to the CFPAB and the other research participant’s use of power to limit the 
researcher’s access to information, the third issue of unequal power relations encountered 
involved gender. As indicated earlier, while there was near gender balance for respondents 
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in the survey questionnaire (Chapter 4, Figure 4.1), the participants for the semi- structured 
interviews were largely male. The researcher attempted to increase the number of female 
research participants willing to be interviewed but this was not possible except one person. 
Unfortunately, following poor recording quality the researcher had to remove her transcript 
form the study. This affected the holistic nature of the semi-structured interview results as 
they represented the ‘voices’ of male respondents. Nonetheless, the selection of interview 
participants based on stratified sampling provided multiple ‘voices’ and multiple realities 
based on respondents position (Finlay, 2002) as opposed to one ‘voice’.  The researcher 
however did not confront any unequal power relations in terms of race; because more than 
90 per cent of respondents in the overall study were predominantly white origin (Chapter 
4, Section 4.1). The researcher admits the interview analysis may be susceptible to the 
risks of bias and ambiguity in meanings. This is due to the fact that the emergent themes 
are meanings that have been socially constructed by the researcher using the human mind 
akin to interpretivist perspectives (Crotty, 1998; Robson, 2002). The next section however 
considers the data collection methods and sources of primary (survey questionnaire and 
interviews) and secondary (document analysis) data for the study. 
 
 
 3.2. Data Collection Methods  
One of the fundamental bases of any research is data. Hayden, Shawyer and Creaton 
(2009) defined data as the “information collected in the process of conducting research and 
may include statistics as well as written information” (p.17).  Methods on the other hand, 
are the “specific tools for conducting the exploration” (Marshall & Rossman, 1995, p.40) 
or the “techniques and procedures to collate and analyse data” (Grix, 2002, p.182).  The 
sources of the data may be primary or secondary (see Figure 3.1 for data collection 
methods and sources). The research study employed a combination of primary and 
secondary sources of data. However, primary data would be described first, followed by 
data from secondary sources.  
 
  3.2.1. Primary Data  
 
 Survey Questionnaire and Response Rate 
Generally, primary data is a form of data that the researcher is involved in the process of 
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collection and analysis. This study employed two types of primary data. Those involved 
survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews (Chapter 3, Figure 3.1).  Primary data 
is relevant in research because their findings often have the benefits of influencing future 
research, as well contributing to the body of knowledge on the respective academic 
discipline.  The researcher ensured that respondents held the minimum qualification of an 
Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist (ACFS) or Accredited Counter Fraud Officer 
(ACFO). In order to conform to issues of research ethics and consideration as indicated 
earlier, a letter was attached to the questionnaire (Appendix 1A and 1B),  with the aim of 
seeking consent of specialists willing to participate in the project including a description of 
research purpose and intended outcome. In order to increase the response rate, reminder 
letters were sent closer to the survey return deadline (Appendix 1A3). The design of the 
survey questionnaire included a combination of open-ended and closed questions.  Gorard 
and Taylor (2004, p.8) suggest that combining responses from both qualitative data (open – 
ended responses) and qualitative data (closed question responses) help to increase the 
valuable amount of evidence available to the researcher (see Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3: Combination of Approaches to the Object of Study 
 
 
Following the completion of the questionnaire design, it was piloted on counter fraud 
specialists. In addition, my academic supervisors received copies and provided feedback as 
discussed in the previous section (Chapter 3, Section 3.1) before circulating to respondents. 
The survey questionnaire provided a useful method of collecting self-report data on 
Source: Gorard & Taylor (2004, p.8) 
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counter fraud specialists and has the following benefits. Firstly, the approach allowed 
respondents to provide answers about their beliefs, perceptions and attitude on the 
occupation as a counter fraud specialist. Secondly, the use of open-ended questions 
allowed the researcher to capture qualitative data written in respondent’s own words. 
Thirdly, the addition of closed questions and rating scales helped the researcher to obtain 
more quantitative data to measure respondents’ views and perceptions.  Lastly, it is 
relatively low cost for the researcher as well as convenient for the respondents to complete 
in their own natural environment.  Plumb and Spyridakis (1992) however identified a 
number of limitations in using survey questionnaire. Those involved the researcher lacking 
control over respondents as well as the researcher’s inability to seek clarification or 
elaboration of responses. In addition, it is difficult to verify the accuracy of responses.  
Nonetheless, the integration of open and closed ended questions in the survey 
questionnaire revealed interesting results on counter fraud specialists, with detailed 
discussion provided in the next three chapters (Chapters five, six and seven).  
 
Traditionally, survey questionnaire had been mostly administered using methods involving 
postal mail, focus groups, face-to-face and telephone interviews (De Vaus, 2002; David & 
Sutton, 2004). However, the increasing growth in modern telecommunication technologies 
have created new survey administration methods (Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Babbie, 2001; 
Graham & Harvey, 2002), in the form of fax, electronic mail (e-mail) and web-based 
technologies (survey monkeys). Consequently, contemporary researchers are now 
presented with wide ranging methods and techniques for survey administration. In spite of 
this, researchers need to consider the cost-benefit analysis of the methods chosen for 
survey administration.  
 
In this research project, administering the survey questionnaire involved the use of two 
mechanisms – the traditional postal survey and electronic communication (e-mail). As 
noted in the previous section (Chapter 3, Section 3.1), the study used convenience 
sampling techniques (a form of non – probability sampling method) to select research 
participants for the survey. The survey questionnaire administration involved four stages 
over three-month period (from the 22nd March 2007 to 29th June 2007) as illustrated in 
Chapter 3, Table 3.1. In order to increase response rate and encourage participants (counter 
fraud specialists) contribution to the study, the researcher sent reminder letters at each 
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stage of the cut off date. Furthermore, a note was attached to the questionnaire at each 
stage of distribution for participants not to complete, and return the questionnaire if they 
had already done so. The purpose was to avoid a situation where the same respondent 
completed and returned a questionnaire twice (double counting).  
 
The first stage (Survey 1) involved using the Institute of Counter Fraud Studies (ICFS) 
updated e-mail distribution list to contact counter fraud specialists affiliated to the 
organisation. The list had 307 counter fraud specialists with e-mail addresses as of 22nd 
March 2007. Respondents had the option of returning the completed questionnaire either 
by post or by e-mail. Therefore, the first stage of the study involved distribution of 307 
questionnaires by e-mail. Of this, 33 completed questionnaires were returned (23 by e-mail 
and 10 by post), giving a response rate of 10.7%. The second stage (Survey 2) involved 
sending out questionnaires to 474 NHSCFSMS counter fraud specialists using 
NHSCFSMS e-mail distribution list with 474 e-mail addresses. Of the 474 questionnaires 
distributed, 49 completed questionnaires were returned (e-mail 36, post 13), yielding a 
response rate of 10.3% for the NHSCFSMS.  
 
The third stage (Survey 3) involved sending out 453 questionnaires by post to various 
fraud investigating teams across Local Authorities in the United Kingdom. For stage three, 
184 completed questionnaires were returned resulting in a response rate of 40.6%.  The last 
stage (Survey 4) involved using the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies (ICJS) e-mail 
distribution list to contact students on the distance learning BSc (Hons) Counter Fraud 
Programme. This list contained 169 e-mail addresses for Counter Fraud Students as of 17th 
May 2007 (date of e-mailing questionnaires). In total, 169 questionnaires were e-mailed to 
169 respondents in the last stage of the survey (Survey 4). Of the 169 questionnaires sent 
out, 30 questionnaires were undelivered (bounced back), while 55 completed 
questionnaires were returned (E-mail 49, post 6) giving a response rate of 32.5%.  In all, 
the survey resulted in a total distribution of 1403 questionnaires to counter fraud 
specialists, with 321 completed questionnaires returned, thus giving a response rate of 
22.9% as illustrated in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1:   Table response by sector  
Stages Sectors Methodology  Total  
sent out 
Received Total 
Received  E-Mail Post 
Survey 1 ICFS E-Mail 307 23 10 33              
Survey 2 NHS CFSMS2  E-Mail 474 36 13  49 
Survey 3 Local 
Authorities 
Post 453 0 184 184 
Survey 4 Counter Fraud 
Students 
E-Mail 169 49 6 55 
 Total  1403 108 213 321            
 
 
Mehta and Sivadas (1995) research study compared postal mail and e-mail questionnaires. 
They concluded that surveys using postal mail had higher response rate (45%) compared to 
e-mail (40%). Although the current study used both mechanisms and received a total 
response rate of around 23 percent (321/1403 x 100), comparing the total response rate by 
e-mail 7.69% (108/1403 x 100), to that of postal mail of 15.18% (213/1403 x 100) reveals 
similar result as found in Mehta and Sivadas (1995).  
 
Five possible reasons may account for the least number of counter fraud specialists 
responding by e-mail compared to postal mail. The first reason may probably be due to the 
higher number of undelivered / bounced e-mails (about 150 in total). Secondly, there is the 
probability that counter fraud students who changed e-mail address may not have informed 
the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies. Thirdly, unlike postal mail, respondents may have 
not taken the initiative to open the survey questionnaire and considered it as one of those 
unsolicited mails (Selwyn & Robson, 1998; Babbie, 2001; Mehta & Sivadas, 1995). 
Another issue for the low response rate from the e-mail was probably due to guarantee of 
complete anonymity. As Selwyn and Robson (1998, p. 4) argues, “it is virtually impossible 
to guarantee the respondent anonymity as their name (or at least their e-mail address) is 
automatically included in their reply” .  However, in the context of this survey, the 
researcher attempted to increase anonymity by guaranteeing respondents confidentiality.  
 
                                                            
2
 This figure includes response from NHSCFSMS Scotland 
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The use of survey questionnaire to gather information about counter fraud specialists and 
their profession encountered some limitations. Ideally, all counter fraud specialists should 
have been contacted using the CFPAB database. However, this was not possible in reality 
given the reasons discussed earlier in Chapter 3, Section 3.1. The researcher had to rely on 
other mechanisms in the form of databases, e-mails and postal questionnaire to solicit 
information from counter fraud specialists. Those limitations affected the response rate, 
particularly the use of e-mails and impact on anonymity. Ideally, a third party company or 
research agency would have been a better option to administer the e-mail questionnaire. 
Using a third party ensures that the survey responses are anonymous (Graham & Harvey, 
2002). However, given the financial, time limitation and resource constraints for this study, 
it was impossible to do so.  Furthermore, the use of e-mail to distribute questionnaires 
meant that ICFS members and counter fraud students without e-mail addresses were unable 
to participate in the study. Similarly, the undelivered e-mail had an impact on the study as 
it affected the response rate for the study.  
 
In spite of the adopted approach generating more data for analysis and their respective 
limitations, it was felt that three key alternative approaches could have been used for 
distributing the survey questionnaire to increase the sample size and response rate. The 
first was the use of Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board (CFPAB) database. It 
had more than 8000 Accredited Counter Fraud Specialists registered to it (Button et al, 
2007b) as of March 2007 (This was the period this survey started). Using the CFPAB 
database would have had the potential of increasing response rate and sample 
representativeness. However, the CFPAB declined to give consent when approached by 
citing reasons of sensitivity of the database. The inability to use the CFPAB database 
therefore affected the representativeness of the survey. The second alternative method 
involved personally handing out survey questionnaires to respondents (counter fraud 
specialists’) at their various workplaces. However, this was not feasible because of 
geographical location of respondents, cost and time involved (De Vaus, 2002; Babbie, 
2001). Thirdly was the use of fax or web-based technologies (Graham & Harvey, 2002; 
Babbie, 2001; David & Sutton, 2004).  This approach too was not feasible, because the 
researcher did not have access to fax numbers and e-mail addresses of all respondents. As a 
result, the researcher had to find other methods of contacting counter fraud specialists for 
the study as Table 3.1 illustrates.  
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 Primary Data – Semi-Structured Interviews and Response Rate 
 
Robson (1993, p.227) suggests that “an important category of enquiry method is by asking 
people questions, obtaining responses and concurrently recoding those responses”. Thus an 
interview involves an interaction between the researcher and the researched in a process 
whereby the researcher asked the researched a series of questions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2009).  Interactionists would argue that by undertaking semi-structured interviews with the 
respondents in their workplace, the researcher is interacting with the respondents in their 
natural or own environment. Having employed a survey questionnaire in the first stage of 
the study to gain primary data about counter fraud specialists, the next stage of gaining 
primary data involved the use of semi-structured interviews (see Figure 3.4 – which 
summarises the stages of primary data collection for the study). Robson (1993) described 
semi-structured interview as a type of interview with,  
  
predetermined questions, but the order can be modified based on interviewer’s 
perception of what seems most appropriate. Question wording can be changed and 
explanations given; particular questions, which seem inappropriate with a particular 
interviewee can be omitted, or additional ones included (p.270). 
 
In this study, those interviews involved undertaking sixteen (16) semi – structured 
interviews (face-to-face) interviews with key individuals in the field of counter fraud in the 
UK.  The sixteen key players consisted of counter fraud specialists, fraud managers, 
current and past managing directors including chief executives with experience in 
countering fraud across the three key government departments (Local Authority, NHS 
CFSMS and DWP).  
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Figure 3.4: Summary of the Stages of Data Collection  
 
 
The rationale for choosing to undertake semi-structured interviews involved the following. 
Firstly, it allowed the researcher to engage with interviewees as well as modify the line of 
enquiry, unlike questionnaires where there is no face-to-face interaction with the 
respondent. Secondly, it allowed the researcher to probe for answers and clarify areas in 
the study where other methods such as questionnaire had failed (Robson, 1993; Neuman, 
2000). Thus, the semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to gain answers to 
supplement identified gaps arising from the results of the survey questionnaire. The topics 
for the semi-structured interview questions were developed by taking into consideration 
the emergent themes in Chapter 4 (see also Chapter Summary in Section 4.11) from the 
survey questionnaire and relationship to professionalisation theories discussed in the 
literature review (Chapter 2). Exemplifying those emergent themes involved issues such as 
counter fraud specialists’ body of knowledge, training and accreditation, rewards disparity, 
education, entry criteria, occupational publication and body of knowledge, code of 
conduct, professional association and membership and CPD. Others involved prestige, 
autonomy, and perception of counter fraud profession, resourcing and satisfaction levels. 
Chapter 5 discussed the themes that emerged from the follow – up survey (Semi-structured 
interviews).   
 
 
Open – ended questions 
(Qualitative data) 
          Survey questionnaire 
Closed – ended questions 
(Quantitative data) 
      Semi-structured interviews 
             (Follow – up survey) 
Analysis    (Emerging Gaps) 
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The semi-structured interviews with research participants to gain insights on the above 
emergent themes lasted for a maximum of ninety minutes (90 minutes). All the interviews 
took place from March 2009 to the end of July 2009. One of the key ethical principles in 
conduct of research is not harming the research participants either psychologically, 
physically or professionally (Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 2009; Refer also to Figure 3.2). 
The impact of Zimbardo’s 1973 prison experiment also reminds researchers about their 
obligation to research participants (Haydon, Shawyer & Creaton, 2009). With those ethical 
principles in mind, the researcher asked interviewees to declare their informed consent for 
participation in the study (Appendix 1A2B). In addition, the researcher sent copies of the 
interview transcripts to the respective individual participants for validation and 
confirmation. In addition, the interviewer asked respondents (interviewees) to highlight 
any information they would not like to appear in the public domain. Equally important in 
research ethics is the voluntary participation and right to withdraw from research. The 
study complied with ethical requirements at the University of Portsmouth and Nottingham 
Trent University.  
 
Two interviewees who participated in the semi-structured interviews withdrew their 
consent to participate in the project, while the other interview had poor quality recording 
making the tape inaudible for recording. Therefore, only thirteen interviews were analysed 
for the study. The emerging findings from those interviews are discussed in Chapter 5. The 
inclusion criteria for selecting participants for the semi-structured interviews involved the 
following:  
• Firstly, the participant must be a trained and qualified counter fraud specialists 
accredited through the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board (CFPAB).  
• Secondly, the participant had experience of practical fraud investigation using the 
skills and knowledge acquired from the accreditation training.  
• Thirdly, the participant had either remained as a Counter Fraud Specialist, Fraud 
Manager or progressed to Chief Executive /Managing Director level (Senior 
Manager) following the accreditation process.  
 
The selection of different people with wide ranging skills and experience across the sector 
ensured reduction in bias from responses. Interview participants were consulted in advance 
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on their willingness to participate using the University headed paper. Having received their 
confirmation, a meeting was scheduled with them for the interviews that were digitally 
recorded.  At the beginning of the interview, participants were informed not to comment on 
issues conflicting with their personal and professional responsibilities. Due to time 
constraints, a recognised transcription company transcribed all the sixteen-taped 
interviews. The transcribed interviews including the tapes were all password protected to 
ensure data security and preventing any unauthorised access. In order to ensure 
authenticity of the transcribed interviews, the researcher listened to all the digital tapes and 
double-checked all the interview transcripts. The concepts of gender, particularly women 
oppression and involvement in professions and other occupational decisions are noted in 
Witz (1995). In order to ensure fair representation of views from both sexes (Male and 
Female) in the interviews, the researcher attempted to gain consent from a number of 
female counter fraud specialists. This was however, a challenge as most female counter 
fraud specialists were reluctant to do so. Only one female research participant consented 
for involvement in the semi-structured interviews. However, the poor recording quality of 
the interview tape resulted in the elimination. Therefore, the participants from the semi-
structured interviews were all male, with most of them working in South East England (see 
Figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5: Location of Interviewees 
 
 
Two main reasons account for the imbalance in terms of the location of research 
participants. The first reason is due to the location of regional headquarters for the 
respective organisations. The second reason relates to easier access to the researcher. On 
reflection, the researcher thought that it would have been useful to include participants 
10
2 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
London and South East Wales and West 
Midlands
South WestN
o
 o
f 
In
te
rv
ie
w
e
e
s
Locations
Location of Interviewees
   
Page 
120 
 
  
from the different regions. However, this was not possible given the resource and time 
constraints on the project.  
Figure 3.6: Background of Fraud Investigation Career 
 
 
Figure 3.6 revealed that most of the thirteen interviewees started their anti fraud career 
within Department for Health and Social Security (now DWP) and the Local Authority (5), 
with the remaining in the Police and HMRC. They had either stayed within the same 
organisation or progressed to other organisations but remained in the counter fraud arena.   
Two striking findings emerged from the analysis of the career background of research 
interviewees. Firstly, was the tendency for counter fraud specialists to move in and out of 
their careers, but tend to stay within the fraud environment. The second reason was the 
career mobility of counter fraud specialists. This probably illustrates the existence of a 
career structure for counter fraud specialists.  In spite of the emerging findings, the data 
collection process for the semi-structured interviews encountered the following two main 
problems.  The first problem related to the time and resource constraints on the project, 
which made it impossible to interview every counter fraud specialist, except those selected. 
The second challenge involved learning to use the Qualitative Data Analysis Tool - 
NVIVO 8 software. The researcher had to rely on the support of fellow PhD students with 
experience in using the software. The NVIVO 8 was used because it is specialist software 
for analysing qualitative data. It enabled the researcher to identify emerging themes from 
the interview (followed up survey). Thus, the primary data collection from the semi-
structured interviews provided additional information to support findings from the survey 
questionnaire. This was relevant because it generated other previously unknown 
occupational information about counter fraud specialists.  
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  3.2.2. Secondary Data and Document Analysis  
Having established the primary data for the study (survey questionnaire and interviews) 
together with sources and methods of data collection in the previous section (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.1), the researcher decided to explore secondary sources of information in the 
form of document analysis to generate secondary data. Generally, secondary documents 
are information or other materials produced for other purposes by institutions and 
individuals in course of their activities, but their contents could be analysed by researchers 
to generate data to support a particular study (Glaser, 1963; Robson, 1993; Bryman, 2008; 
Macdonald, 2008).  
 
Broadly speaking, the sources of those documents are many and varied (Macdonald, 2008). 
Exemplifying those sources are documents in the public domain such as corporate policies, 
reports and conference presentations, academic publications, minutes of meetings, job 
advertisements and newspapers available through the internet. Others include private 
sources such as corporate intranets, personal diaries and even photographs.   The analysis 
of those documents provide avenues for adding new dimensions to existing ones, with the 
potential of uncovering unexamined subjects (Macdonald, 2008) relating to the object of 
study. Nonetheless, Macdonald cautioned for their selection and interpretation due to 
issues with authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning, for there is the 
tendency for researchers to collect information having little to do with research objectives.   
 
Table 3.2: Secondary Data Sources and Document Analysis 
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Given these cautions, the contents of documents relating to counter fraud specialists job 
descriptions, terms and conditions together with necessary information supporting the 
study were accessed from those sources listed in Table 3.2. This generated various themes 
such as the entry requirements; minimum educational attainment, main duties and the 
working environment of counter fraud specialists (Chapter 1, Table 1.2). The document 
analysis found variations in job descriptions across the sector, but mainly related to the 
minimum educational attainment and professional qualification of entry. For instance, 
whereas accreditation to PINS (Accredited Counter Fraud Specialists) standard was a pre-
requisite for counter fraud positions within the NHS, this was not so within the DWP. 
Similarly, documentary analysis on the established professions such as Medicine, Law and 
Accountancy revealed the existence of various professional infrastructures within those 
occupations as described earlier in the literature review (Chapter 2, Table 2.3).  There are 
two reasons behind using data from secondary sources for the study. Firstly, that 
information is freely available and accessible. Secondly, the analysis of such data did not 
involve any financial cost to the researcher thereby saving time and money. The main 
drawback encountered in using the secondary data sources were the tediousness of the 
process involving data assembling and understanding the nature of the data.  Ideally, the 
researcher had wanted to use archived minutes of meetings from the Counter Fraud 
Professional Accreditation Board (CFPAB) as indicated in Table 3.2.  Such minutes had 
the potential benefit for uncovering further information on counter fraud specialists. In 
practice, the researcher’s requests for copies of those minutes were denied. Despite making 
a number of official requests to the Secretariat for copies of CFPAB minutes under the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, the researcher was still denied access based on reason 
of sensitivity.  
 
 3.3. Data Analysis and Instruments 
Research of this nature involving survey questionnaire, interviews and other secondary 
sources generate large amount of data. This creates the need for analysis and interpretation 
(Robson, 1993) using various data analytical tools. Thus, basically, data analysis is “the 
process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data” (Marshall 
& Rossman, 1995, p.111). Three different analytical tools or computer programmes used 
for the data analysis consisted of Statistical Package for Social Sciences Version 15 (SPSS 
15),  Microsoft Office Excel and Word 2007 and NVIVO 8 qualitative data analysis. Given 
the large volume of data generated at the data collection stage, the researcher followed the 
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following three guiding principles of data analysis suggested by Marshall and Rossman 
(1995): 
• Organising the data through reading and familiarisation, cleaning up and coding 
using the relevant computer programmes 
• Generating categories, themes and patterns to construct meanings about the social 
life and beliefs held by counter fraud specialists and their social world 
• Evaluation of emergent results against the literature (Chapter 2) and the relevant 
conceptual framework informing the study, while considering ethical research 
principles (Chapter 3, Figure 3.2).   
 
The analysis of the survey questionnaire involved two stages. Firstly, all the survey 
responses were given identification numbers (ID) by creating an SPSS data file and coding 
the responses from the closed-ended questions (the quantitative data) onto SPSS 15. The 
rationale was to provide anonymity to survey respondents. The second stage involved 
entering the open-ended questions (the qualitative data) onto Microsoft Office Excel 2007 
Spreadsheet, thereafter creating codes for the emerging themes for later conversion into 
SPSS to form quantitative data.  It is also worth noting that, this study used the NHS 
regional classifications as the basis for coding towns and cities where respondents worked. 
The researcher chose the approach because it is practical for coding the towns and cities 
where survey respondents worked. In addition, previous study on counter fraud specialists 
has also used the same approach for coding towns and cities for survey respondents (see 
Button et al, 2007a). Having created an electronic file for the survey data in SPSS and 
populated it with survey responses, the researcher checked the data for errors before 
analysis. This was to ensure data integrity. Following this, the researcher employed various 
descriptive statistics involving the use of Frequencies and Descriptives to explore the data, 
which generated various graphs, tables and pie charts display for the analysis. Descriptive 
statistics essentially describes the characteristics of the sample (research participants) and 
helps readers to understand the study (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2009; Pallant, 2007).  
 
In addition to descriptive statistics, the study employed non-parametric tests (distribution 
free tests). Non-parametric tests are statistical tests performed to test for differences 
between groups or conditions. The techniques are used where the survey questionnaire has 
data measured on nominal (categorical – as in Appendix 1B, Question 1) and ordinal 
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(ranked – as in Appendix 1B, Question 4.1 or 4.9). Non-parametric tests are useful 
techniques because they do not have stringent conditions and do not make assumptions 
about the underlying population distribution, unlike parametric tests. Despite those 
advantages, the techniques have a disadvantage of being less sensitive and “may fail to 
detect differences between groups that actually exist” (Pallant, 2007, p.210).  Nonetheless, 
the use of descriptive and non-parametric statistics (such as chi-square, kruskal wallis test) 
to analyse the survey questionnaire revealed a mix of quantitative and qualitative data, with 
some of the qualitative extracts used to illustrate the views of respondents.   
 
Data analysis of the semi-structured involved a series of processes. As indicated earlier, all 
the sixteen (16) semi-structured interviews were digitally recorded with participants 
consent. The transcription of the taped recorded interviews onto Microsoft Office Word 
2007 software produced the qualitative data for analysis. However, the researcher analysed 
only thirteen (13) semi- structured interviews for the study because two of the sixteen 
interviews had poor recording and transcription quality. In addition, one of the 
interviewees withdrew his consent for research participation following the circulation of 
interview transcripts to research participants for validation and confirmation. The right of 
research participants to withdraw from research project at any time conforms to ethical 
research principles (Robson, 2002). In total, thirteen (13) interview transcripts were 
analysed and involved three Counter Fraud Specialists, three Fraud Managers and three 
Senior Managers from each of the three groups of employers. The remaining four 
participants were other experienced practitioners within the counter fraud community.   
 
The researcher played back all the audio tapes, while reading the respective interview 
transcripts to ensure quality checks.  Following this, the researcher imported the interview 
data into NVIVO 8 software and performed content analysis to generate emerging themes 
to support the results from the survey questionnaire (Chapter 4). The researcher developed 
those themes by taking into consideration the theories of professions and 
professionalisation discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2 and Table 2.2). However, 
due to the problems encountered in learning the software coupled with the lack of technical 
support, the researcher decided to export the casebook data onto Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet for analysis. In spite of the problems encountered, the semi-structured 
interviews generated various themes, patterns and interesting insights into the social world 
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of counter fraud specialists and the extent of professionalisation as broadly discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
 3.4. Summary 
The previous chapter provided the literature review and explored the theoretical framework 
informing the study. This chapter (Chapter 3) has discussed the research (framework) 
process for the project (Chapter 3, Figure 3.1). It started by outlining the ontological and 
epistemological philosophies guiding the inquiry as well as the theoretical framework 
before proceeding to discuss the research strategy and rationale for choosing mixed-
methods approach for the study. In addition, the chapter also examined the relevant criteria 
for selecting participants for the study including the broader ethical and access issues, 
piloting and accounting for the position of the researcher in relation to research participants 
in the study. Following this was a discussion on the methods of data collection in the form 
of survey questionnaire, interviews and documents as well as the relevant data analytical 
instruments for analysing the data.  Chapter 4 (the next chapter) provides detailed results 
on the survey questionnaire distributed to counter fraud specialists. This is followed by 
Chapter 5 which examines the emerging themes from the follow-up interviews. Chapter 6 
Following draws together the emerging themes from the overall study with findings and 
recommendations.  
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Survey Results 
4.0. Introduction 
It was proposed in Chapter 1 of this thesis and the literature review (Chapter 2) that 
theoretical models of a profession and professionalisation would be used to assess the 
extent of professionalising counter fraud specialists in relation to established professions 
(Chapter 2, Table 2.2). In addition, it would act as a benchmark for assessing the extent to 
which counter fraud specialists meet more or less of those elements (Chapter 2, Table 2.2) 
in relation to established professions. The survey results were based on a questionnaire 
distributed to counter fraud specialists across the National Health Service (NHS), Local 
Authorities, Department for Works and Pension (DWP). However, given the stages of 
distributing the survey questionnaire (Chapter 3, Table 3.1), the researcher received 
responses from other agencies. In spite of this, the number of responses from those 
agencies was very small (Chapter 4, Table 4.1). Given the responses from those agencies, 
it will be inappropriate to make detailed comparisons between those groups. Consequently, 
this chapter will be limited to the analysis and comparison of responses among the three 
sub-groups of local authorities, NHS CFSMS and DWP.  Therefore, the main aim of this 
chapter (Chapter 4) is to provide detailed results emerging from the analysis of survey 
questionnaire that was distributed to counter fraud specialists in the study. The chapter is 
structured into eleven main sections, beginning with revelations on the general profile of 
respondents (Section 4.1), remuneration (salary) and education (Section 4.2), training and 
accreditation (Section 4.3), professional cultures and association (Section 4.4), as well as 
the body of knowledge for counter fraud specialists (Section 4.5). Following this are 
discussions on the results emerging from professional and ethical code of conduct (Section 
4.6), continuous professional development (Section 4.7), policy involvement and 
management interference in investigations (Section 4.8) as well as management support 
and resourcing issues (Section 4.9). In addition, the chapter examines the results on the 
counter fraud specialists satisfaction levels and perception of counter fraud occupation in 
relation to others (Section 4.10).  The chapter concludes with chapter summary together 
with areas for further exploration using semi-structured interview (Section 4.11). Themes 
emerging from the semi-structured interview (follow up survey) are discussed in Chapter 
5. 
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 4.1. General Profile of Respondents 
The study provides the general overview of the personal characteristics of respondents in 
relation to employers, gender, age and ethnicity, length of time as accredited counter fraud 
specialist / officer (ACFO/S), region worked and current job titles. In addition, it generates 
insights into the previous occupation of respondents as well as the motivation for 
respondents applying to work as a counter fraud specialist. These are discussed as follows. 
Beginning with the type of organisations where respondents currently worked, Table 4.1 
illustrates the three biggest groups of responding organisations involved,  the local 
authorities (63.2%), the National Health Service Counter Fraud and Security Management 
Service (NHS CFSMS) (20.2%) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) with 
8.1%.  In addition, there was a wide range of responses received from other organisations 
including the United Kingdom Border and Immigration Service and Ministry of Defence 
(MoD). As previously suggested (Chapter 4, Section 4.0), the small numbers of those 
responses made it inappropriate for detailed comparisons between those groups. Hence, 
analysis and comparison of responses was limited to Local Authority, NHS CFSMS and 
DWP.  
Table 4.1:   Respondents by Current Employers 
Respondents by group 
 N % 
Local Authority 203 63.2 
NHS CFSMS 3 65 20.2 
Others4 27 8.4 
DWP 26 8.1 
Total 321 100.0 
 
 Gender, Age, Ethnicity and Length of Time 
As well as providing information on where respondents were currently employed, the 
study reveals the gender, age and ethnicity of respondents.  For the gender, Figure 4.1 
illustrates that for all respondents in the survey (309), there were a near gender balance 
with 54% male and 46% female, while 12 respondents did not provide any information on 
                                                            
3
 Includes Audit & LCFS /NHS Consortium;  Other NHS Body; NHS CFS Scotland; 
General Medical Council 
4
  Others include other groups such as the UK Border & Immigration Agency;  Ministry of 
Defence; HMRC; United Kingdom Identity & Passport Service. 
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their gender. The commonest age ranges for all respondents were the 35-44 (40.3%) and 
45-54 (30.5%) age groups. While a total of 315 respondents indicated the age range, six 
did not (see Appendix for Chapter 4 – Age range of respondents).  
Figure 4.1. Gender Balance of Respondents 
 
All (320) but one respondent did not indicate ethnic origin. Of those that did, this was 
predominantly white, with 97.8% (see Appendix for Chapter 4 – Ethnicity of respondents). 
These profiles were similar across the three subgroups. The median length of time that 
respondents have worked as a counter fraud specialist was 8 years for all, but longest in the 
DWP (10.5 years), compared to local authority (9 years) and NHS CFSMS with 6.5 years 
(see Figure 4.2). There was no significant difference in the length of time worked as a 
counter fraud specialist for male and female respondents (p= 0.31, Mann-Whitney U 
Test5).  
Figure 4.2: Length of Time as Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist 
 
                                                            
5
 Mann-Whitney U Test probability value (p), is not less than or equal to 0.05. Hence the result is not 
significant 
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 Region Worked, Job Title, Previous Occupation and Motivation 
In addition to current employer, gender, age, ethnicity and length of time as ACFO, the 
study further revealed regions where respondents worked as well as job titles held. Out of 
the 321 counter fraud specialists that responded to the survey, only one did not indicate the 
region worked (see Appendix for Chapter 4 – Region where respondent worked). As 
Figure 4.3 illustrates, the three biggest groups of respondents worked in the South East 
(17.5%), North West (11.3%) and London (11.3%), with Northern Ireland having the least 
number of respondents (0.9%).  A breakdown of the whole sample into sub-groups shows 
that a highest response rate for the local authorities came from the South East (18.3%), 
Eastern (11.4%) as well as the North West (11.4%). For the NHS CFSMS, there was a 
higher response rate from London (20.0%) and the South East (16.9%). The highest 
response rate for the DWP came from the South East (19.2%). 
 
Figure 4.3: Regions Where Survey Respondents Worked 
 
 
The survey revealed a wide range of job titles currently held by respondents. Out of the 
321 respondents, 316 indicated their job titles while 5 did not. Most respondents held the 
job title ‘Fraud Manager’ (29.4%), followed by ‘Investigation Officer’ (16.8%) and ‘Fraud 
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Investigator’ (16.8%). Other job titles included ‘Team Leader’ and ‘Counter Fraud 
Specialist’. A breakdown of the job titles into the three sub-groups however revealed the 
most common job title for the local authority as ‘Fraud Manager’ (36.9%). In the NHS 
CFSMS, this was ‘Local Counter Fraud Specialists’ with 38.5%. For the DWP, this was 
‘Fraud Investigator’ with 61.5%.  The existence of different job titles across the sectors, 
despite staff performing comparable jobs probably illustrate cultural issues within the 
respective organisations.  
 
In order to establish the career trajectory of counter fraud specialists, respondents were 
asked to state their occupation prior to applying for the position as a counter fraud 
specialist as well as the best reason for applying for the position as a counter fraud 
specialist. Figure 4.4 indicates that counter fraud specialists had a wide range of 
backgrounds. While fewer than 13.0% of the respondents across the sample responded 
none to previous occupation, the three main areas where respondents worked prior to 
becoming counter fraud specialist related to roles in benefit assessment (21.8%), followed 
by Police /HM Forces (13.7%) and Customer Services (10.3%). A breakdown into the 
three sub-groups revealed three key factors. Firstly, while nearly two – thirds (61.7%) of 
respondents within the DWP (34.6%) and local authority (27.1%) previously worked in 
benefit assessment roles; this was significantly less so for those within the NHS CFSMS 
(7.7%). The difference is due to the fact that whereas knowledge and experience of the 
social security benefits system was a prerequisite to counter fraud related positions within 
both the DWP and Local Authority, this was not so within the NHS CFSMS as revealed in 
the documentary analysis (Chapter 1, Table 1.2).   
 
Secondly, just over a quarter (27.1%) of respondents within the local authority had 
backgrounds in either the Police/HM Forces (15.8%) or Customer Service related roles 
(11.3%), compared to a percentage minority in the NHS CFSMS (18.5%) and DWP 
(11.5%). It is probable that people with law enforcement experience (Police/HM Forces) 
are attracted to counter fraud positions because of their personality and crime fighting 
skills (Page & King, 2008; Albrecht et al, 2009), yet they still need to be trained and 
accredited.  Thirdly, for the NHS CFSMS, there were a higher number of respondents with 
Audit and Compliance as well as Fraud Investigation background with 18.5% and 15.4% 
respectively. This survey illustrates two key issues. Firstly, counter fraud specialists come 
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from a wide variety of occupational backgrounds before training as specialists. Secondly, it 
illustrates a culture within the local authority and the DWP where employees progress 
from benefit assessment roles to fraud investigation.  
Figure  4.4.   Occupation Prior to Becoming a Counter Fraud Specialist 
 
 
Besides revealing occupation prior to becoming a counter fraud specialist, the survey also 
revealed wide ranging responses on motivations for applying for the position as a counter 
fraud specialist. Figure 4.5 revealed the three most popular and least responses from 
respondents across the sample. The most popular response for all respondents indicated by 
a quarter of the sample (25.8%), was that they “enjoyed doing this type of job”, followed 
by “work is stimulating” (22.3%) and “Job pays too well” (16%). A breakdown of the 
responses revealed a rather interesting picture. Whereas for the NHS CFSMS, “job pays 
well” was the most popular reason (26.2%), for their counterparts within the Local 
Authorities this was “enjoy doing this type of job” (27.5%). The least popular response 
indicated by all respondents was the “prestige of the job” (0.3%).  
 
While individuals in society have different levels of motivation as suggested by Maslow 
theory (Mullins, 2005;2007),  ‘prestige of the job’ being the least motivated factor to 
applying for the position as a counter fraud specialist opposes the very tenet of cultural 
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school theory (Chapter 2, Table 2.1) and relationship to professions. For cultural school 
theorists, professions have prestige and are used by the practitioners to achieve social 
mobility or the ‘American Dream’ (Bledstein, 1976), although Dzuback (1993) asserts that 
professions are not equal in prestige. Similarly, it deviates from functionalist perspectives 
of professions as having ‘prestige’ (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). 
 
Figure 4.5: Best Reason for Applying for Position as Counter Fraud Specialist 
 
 
While Figure 4.5 illustrates a wide range of motivational factors for respondents, future 
research should examine those motivational factors enabling specialists to ‘enjoy doing 
this type of job’ as opposed to ‘prestige of the job’. The results from exploring those issues 
using semi-structured interview are discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.6. To this end, the 
section has revealed the personal profile of respondents in terms of employer, gender, age 
and ethnic origin as well as length of time in an accredited position. It has also yielded 
insights into various regions where survey respondents worked, the diversity of job titles 
across the sector and motivations for the position as a counter fraud specialist. The next 
section (Chapter 4, Section 4.2) discusses those monetary rewards for counter fraud 
specialists.  
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 4.2.  Remuneration /Salary and Education 
Generally, professional occupations receive higher financial rewards to compensate for 
time spent in acquiring those specialised skills as demonstrated in accountancy, legal and 
medical professions (Langland Report, 2005; Law Society, 2008). The literature review 
(Chapter 2 and Table 2.2) also noted higher monetary rewards (remuneration) constitute 
one of the key elements of a profession. As well as this, research studies on inequity in 
financial rewards also revealed how most respondents felt they would be angered, if they 
found themselves paid less in relation to others doing the same or similar job in different 
organisation (Nash, 1972, cited in Romanoff et al, 1986, p.21). The survey sought 
information on respondents’ annual average salary inclusive of overtime. While previous 
study on counter fraud specialists revealed NHS CFSMS were best paid compared to their 
counter parts working for the local authority and DWP (Button et al, 2007a), the current 
study found similar result (Figure 4.6).  As Figure 4.6 revealed, counter fraud specialists 
working for the NHS CFSMS were best paid, compared to their counter parts within the 
local authorities.  In contrast, DWP respondents were the least paid and none earned more 
than £40,001. For the current study, the most common salary for all respondents ranged 
from £20,001 to £30,000 (50.4 %) of respondents (Figure 4.6).  
 
Figure 4.6 : Counter Fraud Specialists Average Annual Salary Range  
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For the local authority, this was the most common salary range with just over half (57.3%) 
of respondents yearly earnings falling within this range. For the DWP, nearly three 
quarters (73.1%) of respondents’ earnings fell within £20,001 to £30,000 salary bracket, 
compared to NHS CFSMS where only 22.5% earned that amount. For the NHS CFSMS, 
the most common salary ranged from £35,001 to over £40,001, with almost half of NHS 
CFSMS respondents (49.2%) earnings within that salary bracket. A chi-square test for 
independence indicated the proportion of annual average salary earned by female counter 
fraud specialists was not significantly different from their male counterparts [ x² (1, n=305) 
= 11.08, p=0.86, Cramer’s V6=0.19].  Therefore, there is no association between gender 
and annual average salary earnings.  Similarly, Chi-square test found minimal association 
between highest educational achievement and counter fraud specialists annual average 
salary earnings.  
 
Interesting about the average annual earnings of counter fraud specialists in the survey was 
the disparity in earnings across the respective employers, despite performing comparable 
jobs. The disparities in remuneration across the sectors oppose functionalist perspectives 
on professions as supplying services for higher rewards (Carr-Saunders, 1966; Simonsen 
1996; Neal & Morgan, 2000), which is determined by the person’s length of training and 
education into the profession as discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). 
For instance, while research study on professions revealed higher earnings associated with 
professionals such as Accountants, General Practitioners (GPs) and Solicitors (Langland 
Report, 2005; Law Society Report, 2008), it raises the question on whether counter fraud 
specialists could be classified as one of those professions associated with higher earnings.  
It also raises the additional question on the existence of disparity in remuneration for 
counter fraud specialists in those three organisations, despite the initiative to 
professionalise the UK public sector counter fraud specialists in those organisations. 
Further exploration of those issues using semi-structured (follow up) interview, revealed 
the perspectives in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.  
 
                                                            
6
 Cramer's V is a way of calculating correlation in tables, which have more than 2x2 rows 
and columns. It is used as post-test to determine strengths of association after chi-square 
has determined significance.  
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As well as seeking information on remuneration, the survey also sought information on 
respondents’ highest level of educational achievement. In addition, the study together 
asked questions involving respondents’ intentions for Advanced Level counter fraud study 
(CCFS) and the importance of completing relevant University Degree or Masters. As 
discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.3), education helps to develop skill 
of aspirants and members belonging to a professional organisation with the necessary 
academic concepts and theoretical debates underlying the discipline. Similarly, the level of 
education acts as a springboard for further personal and professional development.  Out of 
the 321 respondents, 315 indicated their level of highest educational attainment with the 
remaining six not indicating (Table 4.2). Previous studies on counter fraud specialists 
revealed more than three quarters of the sample (84%) were educated to either 16 or 18 
(Button et al, 2007a). The current study found similar results with more than half (56.5%) 
of counter fraud specialists educated to 16 or 18 years of age (23.5% and 33% 
respectively) as illustrated in Table 4.2. Similarly, just over a third of the sample (35%) 
was educated either to HND equivalent or graduate level (19.0% and 16.5%). In addition, a 
minority were educated to postgraduate level (7.9%).  
 
Table 4.2: Highest Education Achievement 
Highest 
Educational 
Achievement 
All  
Respondents 
Local  
Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Educated to 16 74 23.5 56 28.0 9 14.3 6 23.1 
Educated to 18 104 33.0 68 34.0 17 27.0 9 34.6 
HND Equivalent 60 19.0 35 17.5 16 25.4 4 15.4 
Graduate 52 16.5 31 15.5 10 15.9 6 23.1 
Postgraduate 25 7.9 10 5.0 11 17.5 1 3.8 
Total 315 100.0 200 100.0 63 100.0 26 100.0 
 
However, breaking down the responses indicated the level of education differed across the 
sub-groups. For the local authority, a third were educated either to an HND equivalent or 
graduate level (17.5% and 15.5 %). In the NHS CFSMS, this was under a half (25.4% and 
15.9%), while in the DWP it was just over a third (15.4% and 23.1%). Further analysis 
using Chi-square test for independence indicated minimal association between highest 
educational achievement and annual average salary earnings [ x² (1, n=311) = 35.32, 
p=0.64, Cramer’s V = 0.17].  
   
Page 
136 
 
  
Three key findings emerged from the question on educational achievement. These were:  
• Firstly NHS CFSMS had the highest number of respondents educated to 
postgraduate level (17.5%).  
• Secondly, the growth in the number of respondents progressing to the HND 
equivalent or graduate level education is attributed to the government agenda on 
professionalising counter fraud specialists. This finding sets the debate for taking 
this professionalization agenda to the next level.  
• Thirdly, there is the need for debate and future research into the highest number of 
respondents (40.3%) aged 35-44, but educated to 18 (33% of the sample) at the 
time of applying for position as a counter fraud specialist. Those raise issues for 
professions and professionalisation, given that the literature on professions and 
professionalisation had not addressed the age limit for entering professions. 
 
Intentions for Advanced Level Study (CCFS) and Masters Degree  
In addition to asking respondents their highest level of educational attainment, the study 
also solicited information on respondents’ intentions to study for Advanced Level counter 
fraud study (CCFS).  Of the 321 counter fraud specialists responding to the survey, 316 
indicated their responses to this question while 5 did not answer. Table 4.3 reveals those 
responses with only a minority of the sample (6.6%) intending to pursue the Advanced 
Level Study leading to dual qualification - the academic qualification of Certificate of 
Higher Education in Counter Fraud (CertHe), and professional award of Certified Counter 
Fraud Specialist (CCFS) status . A majority of around two-thirds did not intend to do (‘No’ 
(44.6%) or ‘Don’t Know’ (24.1%)). For those not intending to do, this was highest in the 
local authority (53.3%), compared to NHS CFSMS (41.5%) and DWP with 15.4%.  
 
Table 4.3   Intention to Study the Advanced level (CertHe) 
Advanced level  
(CertHe) Studies 
All 
 
Respondents 
Local  
Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
No 141 44.6 106 53.3 27 41.5 4 15.4 
Don't Know 76 24.1 57 28.6 14 21.5 2 7.7 
Done it  45 14.2 15 7.5 14 21.5 11 42.3 
Currently studying for it 33 10.4 9 4.5 6 9.2 6 23.1 
Yes 21 6.6 12 6.0 4 6.2 3 11.5 
Total 316 100.0 199 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
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Respondents cited nine reasons for not intending to pursue the advanced level study. 
Despite a minority of (11.3%) of the sample responding ‘none’, a quarter of the sample 
(26.2%) cited time and commitment as the key reason behind intention. Following this was 
irrelevance of the qualification including not being a job requirement (14.2%), lack of 
enthusiasm for the course (10.6%) and aging (9.9%). Other reasons cited by respondents 
included lack of employer support and funding (7.1%), poor career prospects ( 6.4%), 
currently pursuing more advanced qualification (5.7%), fraud work not forming full time 
job in current role (2.8%) and others (5.7%). The qualitative extracts below further 
illustrate some of the views of respondents for not intending to pursue the advanced level 
study: 
 
I do not need the qualification. My knowledge has been obtained through practical 
experience of investigating since 1988, and adopting a “hands on approach" to 
management (CFSP304 – Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
Counter fraud is part of my job and is not an area that i wish to specialise in. 
Training received to date is inadequate in terms of the work I currently undertake 
(CFSP 7 – Internal Auditor, NHS CFSMS) 
 
Too time consuming and will not benefit from it regarding job prospects or salary if 
achieved (CFSP 276, Fraud Investigator – DWP) 
 
The above qualitative extracts together with emerging perspectives on counter fraud 
specialists’ rationale for not intending to pursue Advanced Level counter fraud study have 
potential implications on the overall initiatives of professionalising counter fraud 
occupation.  
 
Nonetheless, when the survey asked those same respondents with no desire (meaning those 
who indicated ‘No’ in Table 4.3), whether any incentives would encourage them, nearly 
half (46.8%) responded affirmatively by identifying wide ranging incentives. As Figure 4.7 
illustrates, over a third of the sample (40%) favoured employer support, followed by 
financial reward on completion, career advancement and recognition, employment 
opportunity, modular delivery of the course and inclusion of Scottish Law in the module.  
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 Figure 4.7. Incentives Encouraging Further Study  
   
 
Notwithstanding the need for incentives, the minority of respondent that responded ‘yes’ to 
the desire for pursuing the Advanced Level studies in counter fraud (Table 4.3) cited the 
expansion of knowledge, increasing employment opportunities, gaining further 
qualification and personal development as well as career progression as the motivation for 
intending to pursue the advanced level study. Motivational factors therefore play important 
roles in encouraging individuals to pursue the academic routes to further qualifications, yet 
the literature on professions and professionalisation had failed to account for this.   Besides 
the intention for pursuing advanced level study was the extent of importance  attached to 
completing relevant University Degree or Masters to improving work performance using a 
scale of  0 – 10 (where 0 is not very important and 10 is very important).  Figure 4.8 
revealed that generally, this was less important (mean score = 4.1) for all counter fraud 
specialists. For the subgroups, this was least important within the local authorities (mean 
score = 3.8) compared to NHS CFSMS and DWP.  
 
Thus, generally, the fewer number of respondents with higher educational attainment, 
counter fraud specialists reluctance to advance their levels of education beyond the initial 
accreditation training (ACFS), coupled with the least importance attached to completing 
relevant University Degree or Masters to improving working performance are dissimilar to 
Mackinnon (1984) and Harries-Jenkins (1970); Simonsen (1996) view of professions and 
professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2).  For Mackinnon (1984) and Simonsen (1996), 
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qualifying entry examination into professions is normally generalist. However, once a 
person gains admission into a profession, there exists various academic routes in the 
specialised fields that could be pursued to improve career advancement. Similarly, the 
importance and relevance of pursuing higher education by members within occupational 
groups is illustrated in Harries-Jenkins evolutionary theory of professions (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2, see also Chapter 2, Table 2.2). For Harries-Jenkins, occupational groups with 
members educated to graduate level tend to have graduate entry. As a result, those 
occupational groups (such as medicine) have achieved a high level of professionalisation 
compared to those accepting non-graduate entrants.  
 
Figure 4.8 : Importance for CFS Completing Degree or Masters 
 
 
In terms of highest educational achievement and the levels of importance for completing a 
masters degree, there was a statistically significant difference (p= 0.03, Kluskal – Wallis 
Test) across the different educational achievement groups. Counter fraud specialists 
educated to HND equivalent reported a higher importance (median score Md=36) of 
completing a University degree or Masters than those educated to 16 and 18, with both 
recording median values of 32.  
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 4.3. Counter Fraud Specialists Training and Accreditation 
The literature review in Chapter 2 discussed training, accreditation, and their relevance to 
professionalising occupations (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). As well as this, Chapter 1 also 
outlined the modules of the foundation level training required for completion to gain entry 
into counter fraud occupation (Chapter 1, Figure 1.2). Similarly, institutional theories also 
emphasised how training and accreditation act as one of those symbolic pillars of 
professionalising occupations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 2008). Professional 
accreditation is defined as the action of a professional body or registration authority in 
approving practitioners, following the completion of some form of examination or 
assessment as fit or competent to practice (Lester, 2000, p.408). Given these, the 
questionnaire sought information from respondents on the foundation level training and 
accreditation, adequate preparation for role and suggestions for improvement as well as 
other counter fraud related qualifications possessed. There were several insights that 
emerged from those questions. 
 
Firstly, was the array of training providers for the foundation level training course (Figure 
4.9).  Figure 4.9 revealed that the three biggest training providers for all respondents were 
the DWP, which trained more than half (58.8%) of all counter fraud specialists responding 
to the survey, followed by the NHS CFSMS with nearly a fifth (19.3%), and LA (14.5%). 
 
Figure 4.9:  Foundation Level Training Accreditation Providers 
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The existence of training providers approved by the Counter Fraud Professional 
Accreditation Board is one of the major developments in professionalising Counter Fraud 
Specialists. This finding confirms the models of professions and professionalisation 
proposed by Caplow, 1954; Greenwood, 1957, Millerson, 1964; Wilensky, 1964; Carr-
Saunders, 1966; Harries-Jenkins, 1970; Simonsen, 1996; Neal & Morgan, 2000 (Chapter 2, 
Table 2.2). From the perspectives of those theorists, training and accreditation from 
recognised and accredited training providers or Universities distinguished the imposter 
from the qualified with specialised skills and knowledge gained through a considerable 
period of training.  
 
Secondly, was the quality of the foundation level training. The survey asked respondents to 
indicate whether the foundation level training adequately prepared them for the role as a 
counter fraud specialist (Table 4.4), and where not, provide reasons for the inadequacy 
(Figure 4.10). Of the 321 respondents, 311 indicated their answers while the remaining 10 
did not. Of those that did, nearly two-thirds (64.0%) of the sample felt the foundation level 
adequately prepared them for the role.  By contrast, nearly a third of the sample (31.8%) 
felt negative for adequate preparation for the role, while a minority of 3.5 percent did not 
know.  One per cent did not offer any suggestion. The level of negativity to the foundation 
level training was highest within the NHS CFSMS (50.0%), compared to the local 
authority and DWP with around a quarter respectively.  
 
Table 4.4.  Foundation Level Training and Adequacy for Role 
Adequacy of 
foundation 
training for role 
All  
Respondents 
Local  
Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Yes 199 64.0 142 72.1 27 42.2 20 76.9 
No 99 31.8 50 25.4 32 50.0 6 23.1 
Don't Know 10 3.2 3 1.5 4 6.3 0 0.0 
None  3 1.0 2 1.0 1 1.6 0 0.0 
Total 311 100.0 197 100.0 64 100.0 26 100.0 
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Respondents expressing negativity to the adequacy of the foundation level training 
provided a number of reasons. They identified four key reasons with the commonest being 
‘not practical enough’ (26.3%), followed by training being ‘too basic’ (26.3%), ‘late 
delivery of training’ (15.2%), followed by ‘already experienced and skilled’ (8.1%) before 
embarking on the training (Figure 4.10).   
 
Figure 4.10:  All Respondents - Why Inadequate Preparation for Role 
 
 
The following comments further illustrate some of the respondents’ views on the training 
inadequacy:  
 
Most of it was not practical enough, and I felt the training was there for the 
purposes of passing the tests at the end of the individual modules. It also did not 
have any post course material; therefore it is difficult to see whether I use any of 
the skills I gained during the course. Finally, there does not appear to be any checks 
after accreditation that requires me to maintain my skills (CFSP84 – LCFS, NHS 
CFSMS) 
 
It was very much theory based. However, I had over 20 years previous 
investigative experience, although many others didn’t (CFSP 28 – LCFS, NHS 
CFSMS) 
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PINS is crap, everyone passes and the Trainers tell you to write down things that 
will be in the test (CFSP 181- Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
Performed the job for six years before i was sent on PINS (Foundation level 
training leading to the status of an Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist)  
(CFSP13, Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
I was already a fraud investigator when I did my PINS. It was mostly consolidation 
of existing skills (CFSP 8 – Fraud Investigator, DWP) 
 
Respondents suggested a number of ideas for improving the adequacy of the training. The 
most popular reason suggested was making the training more practical (more than a third 
of the sample – 38%). Among other reasons suggested included: 
• Making the training more challenging, comprehensive assessment and orientation 
to the local authorities (23.2%), 
• Better organisation of the training and joint working (9.1%) 
• Offering of post-accreditation support (4.0%) 
• Mentoring and CPD programme (4.0%) 
• Less emphasis on foot surveillance as it is rarely used (1.0%). 
 
The emerging perspectives on the inadequacy of the foundation level training in 
preparation for the role as Counter Fraud Specialist weakens the quality of the 
accreditation certificate including the professionalisation agenda.  
   
The third emerging perspectives besides the foundation level training and adequacy for 
role related to other counter fraud and related qualifications held by respondents. The 
rationale was to gain detailed information about counter fraud qualifications that public 
sector counter fraud professionals may have access to, as well as compete with the CFPAB 
qualifications. For this question, 312 out of the 321 respondents indicated their responses, 
with the remaining  9  not indicating.   Table 4.5, revealed a wide range of qualifications 
most of which were accredited by the CFPAB, except the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE). It is worth noting that ACFE is largely an American based counter 
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fraud qualification that has not yet been approved by the UK Counter Fraud Professional 
Accreditation Board (CFPAB). The survey revealed that more than a third of respondents 
(45.8%) possessed multiple CFPAB award qualifications. Under a third (26.3%) possessed 
ACFS, ACFO (13.1%), and ACFM (7.4%). The reason for the larger number of 
respondents holding multiple CFPAB awards reflects the increasing number of respondents 
progressing from the foundation level training (ACFS/O) to a higher award.  
 
Table 4.5. Accredited Counter Fraud Qualifications Possessed 
Counter fraud  qualification  All  Respondents 
 N % 
CFPAB Multiple7 143 45.8 
ACFS8 82 26.3 
ACFO9 41 13.1 
ACFM10 23 7.4 
AFI11 9 2.9 
CCFS12 5 1.6 
GCFS13 5 1.6 
ACFE14 4 1.3 
Total 312 100.0 
 
As well as revealing accredited counter fraud qualifications possessed by respondents 
(Table 4.5), the survey asked for further information on other counter fraud related 
qualification possessed by respondents. This revealed four other counter fraud related 
qualifications as illustrated in Figure 4.11.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7
 Holders of any or a combination of ACFS, ACFO, ACFM, AFI, CCFS, GCFS;  
8
Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist 
9
 Accredited Counter Fraud Officer 
10
 Accredited Counter Fraud Manager 
11
Accredited Fraud Investigator 
12
 Certified Counter Fraud Specialist 
13
 Graduate Counter Fraud Specialist 
14
 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
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Figure 4.11:  Other Counter Fraud Related Qualifications Possessed 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 revealed that for all respondents, the most popular counter fraud related 
training qualification possessed BTEC/NVQ Investigations, with over a third of the sample 
(41.8%). While research shows that around 78% of accredited courses were paid for by the 
employer (Booth & Bryan, 2002), it is rather surprising to note the high proportion of local 
authority counter fraud specialists (47.8%) trained in courses outside the CFPAB 
framework, compared to the NHS CFSMS (33.3%) and DWP (11. 2%). Despite the 
popularity of the BTEC/NVQ Investigations, it is not a qualification accredited by the 
Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board, yet holders of such qualifications 
investigate fraud. Whether this was one of the best ways to spend taxpayer’s money, 
despite PINS training freely available to organisations signatory to the accreditation is a 
discussion outside the scope of this project. However, the ability for some employers to use 
those qualifications as a substitute for the CFPAB qualification illustrate weaknesses in 
one of the normative symbols acting as pillars for professionalising occupations (Scott, 
2008).  
 
 
This emerging perspective contradicts one of the fundamental  criteria of  
professionalisation identified in Greenwood (1957), Wilensky (1964), Simonsen (1996), 
Evetts (1999), Neal and Morgan (2000). Generally, those proponents of theories of 
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professions and professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2) hold the view that qualifying 
entry examination and competency testing must be the norm for entering professions 
because it plays the multiples logic of controlling entry, public protection and professions 
interest.  Clearly, this has been the norm for professionalising occupations since the latter 
part of the 19th Century, with aspirants into the Medical, Legal and Accountancy 
professions having to pass the relevant examination (Millerson, 1964) and apprenticeship 
(competency testing) before entry (Chapter 2, Table 2.3). However, for counter fraud 
specialists, the emerging perspectives on training, accreditation and entry reveals a clear 
departure from the norm (Chapter 2, Table 2.2).   
 
Similarly, the survey sought the views of respondents in the introduction of compulsory 
entry qualification before practising and to suggest the required award. This resulted in 
positive response, with more than three quarters of the sample (79.7%) in favour of the 
idea. In relation to the name of the award qualification, most respondents (80% of the 
sample) identified the use of the existing minimum entry qualification (ACFS), with only a 
minority suggesting the HND equivalent (CCFS) or graduate entry (GCFS). The 
preference for using the existing minimum entry qualification was rather striking, given the 
responses on the inadequacy of the same training in preparation for the role as a counter 
fraud specialist (Table 4.4 and Figure 4.10).  Nonetheless, the inadequacy of the existing 
minimum entry qualification is evident in the study (Figure 4.10) and this needed 
improving. Linked to this is the number of counter fraud specialists trained outside counter 
fraud qualifications not accredited by the CFPAB, yet allowed to practice departs from the 
functionalist theory of professions and professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). Further 
exploration of the issues raised with follow up interview, revealed the responses in Chapter 
5, Section 5.2.  
  
 4.4. Professional Cultures and Association   
In addition to revealing the profile of counter fraud specialists, remuneration, education, 
training, accreditation and entry criteria, professionalising occupations have cultures  
(Chapter 2, Table 2.2). Institutional theorists broadly conceptualise those cultures to 
encompass the socio-cultural and cognitive symbols that emphasised indicators of common 
shared beliefs, social identities, professional networks, associations and socialisation of 
members (Scott, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Currie, Finn & Martin, 2009; Waring & 
Currie, 2009). The survey therefore solicited a series of views relating to professional 
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association, with emerging perspectives and insights revealed below.   
 
 Membership of Professional Association 
Previous studies on counter fraud specialists found that three quarters of counter fraud 
specialists did not belong to a professional association (Button et al, 2007a). In addition, 
the same survey revealed this was worst within the DWP with nearly all (97.4%) the 
counter fraud specialists within that organisation not affiliated to a professional 
association. For the local authorities, this was nearly 72% compared to the NHS with non-
membership rate of around 52.8% (Button et al (2007a).  By contrast, the current study 
revealed that over half of counter fraud specialists (58.6%) did not belong to any 
professional association. Comparing the current study with the previous study in Button et 
al (2007a) shows a percentage minority (16.4%) drop in non-membership affiliation.  
 
The current study further revealed that a minority of just over a third (39.5%) belonged to a 
professional association, while 1.9 percent indicated ‘don’t know’. Of those belonging to 
an association, this was highest for the NHS CFSMS (44.6%) compared to local authority 
(39.1%) and DWP (19.2%).  As illustrated in Figure 4.12 below, respondents belonged to a 
wide range of professional associations.  
Figure 4.12:  All Respondents: List of Professional Associations 
 
 
Interestingly, Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists (ICFS) and the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) were the only two recognised counter fraud professional 
associations. ICFS was the most popular counter fraud professional association with 29.4% 
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of the sample. A breakdown of the results revealed that ICFS had highest membership 
from within the NHS CFSMS (55.2%). This was not a surprise since it originated from the 
NHS. While the number of non-affiliation to professional associations has reduced in 
relative terms, the survey findings on poor attachment to association illustrate an additional 
weakness in the counter fraud specialists profession and professionalisation. 
  
 Professional Association Activities 
Besides revealing membership of professional association, the study also generated 
insights on the activities undertaken by respondents belonging to professional association. 
126 out of the 321 respondents indicated activities undertaken. Table 4.6 illustrates that by 
far, half (50.0%) did not undertake any activities related to the association, while the 
remaining half did so (50.0%). Of those that did, the activities related to annual meeting 
and conference attendance (22.2%), executive committee activities (7.9%), accountancy 
and internal auditing (5.6%), discussion forum participation (5.6%), continuous 
professional development (CPD) courses and training (5.6%), and  others (3.2%). 
Similarly, the survey revealed that a significant number of respondents (92%) read the 
association’s literature.  
 
Table 4.6:  Professional Association Activities Undertaken 
Professional association activities All  Respondents 
 N % 
None 63 50.0 
Attend annual meetings & 
conferences 
28 22.2 
Executive committee activities 10 7.9 
Internal auditing & accountancy 7 5.6 
Participation in discussion forum  7 5.6 
CPD  courses & training 7 5.6 
Other15 4 3.2 
Total 126 100.0 
 
The survey further examined respondents’ commitment to professional association 
activities and sought information on the frequency of participation. Table 4.7 revealed that 
for all respondents, more than half (56.3%) did on a monthly to yearly basis. This however 
differed for the subgroups. While the level of participation in association activities was 
                                                            
15
 I assist with the marketing of the association, undertakes photography,  Liaison /Consultations etc. 
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similar within the local authority (58.3%) and NHS CFSMS (51.7%), this was less so for 
the DWP. A further research is needed to develop strategies encouraging specialists to 
participate in association activities. The less involvement in the professional association 
activities is detrimental to professionalising occupations. Equally, it has impact on 
socialisation and networking to enhancing the prestige and status of the profession.  
 
Table 4.7: Frequency of Participation in Association Activities 
Frequency 
of 
participation 
All  
Respondents 
Local 
 Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
None 12 9.5 9 11.4 0 0.0 1 20.0 
Daily 8 6.3 4 5.1 4 13.8 0 0.0 
Weekly 9 7.1 3 3.8 5 17.2 1 20.0 
Monthly 42 33.3 27 34.2 9 31.0 2 40.0 
Quarterly 7 5.6 7 8.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Yearly 29 23.0 19 24.0 6 20.7 0 0.0 
Never 19 15.1 10 12.6 5 17.2 1 20.0 
Total 126 100.0 79 100.0 29 100.0 5 100.0 
 
 Why No to Professional Association Membership 
As revealed in Table 4.8, a reasonable number of respondents in the study who answered 
the question were not affiliated to professional association (187 out of 321 respondents). 
Those respondents not affiliated to professional association cited a number of reasons for 
non-membership. Table 4.8 demonstrates that for all respondents, the top reason cited by 
over a quarter of the sample (29.4%) was simply ‘no specific reason’. Around a fifth of 
counter fraud specialists (21.4%) expressed being ‘unaware’ of counter fraud professional 
association:  
 
Other than being accredited, I am unaware of any specific "bodies" or 
“associations" I would belong to (CFSP308 – Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
 
The lack of awareness illustrated the need for the existing associations to promote 
themselves about their existence to counter fraud organisations.  
Around one in ten (10.7%) of respondents felt the existing associations lacked value for 
money. A similar proportion also cited that being a member of professional association 
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was irrelevant:  
I was for a time a member of ICFS. However as it did not assist me in the practical 
application of my work I have not renewed my membership (CFSP61- LCFS, NHS 
CFSMS) 
 
In addition, around a quarter of the sample (26%) cited apathy (8.5%), lack of time (8.0%), 
professional association membership not forming part of job-requirement (5.3%) and lack 
of recognition as well as awareness of existing counter fraud association (4.2%) as the 
reasons for non membership.  
 
Not aware of any organisation and if there was, cost would be important as I would 
have to self fund (CFSP 274, Benefit Fraud Investigator, DWP) 
 
Professional bodies are generally run in my experience by 'jobsworths' who like the 
sound of their own voices (CFSP 187 – Counter Fraud Specialist, Local Authority) 
 
Not a requirement of the job role (CFSP3- Fraud Manager, DWP) 
 
Because they are not officially recognised for some unknown reason (CFSP131 – 
Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
Nonetheless, a minority of respondents (2.7%) however cited the lack of faith and 
orientation in existing associations as explanations for non-membership. As one 
respondent commented: 
 
If I am honest then it is because I don’t feel that the NHS driven Institute of 
Counter Fraud Specialists would concentrate on anyone other than NHS fraud 
investigators. My opinion is that a professional body is a long way off but in aiming 
for it we need to have input from all sides. We need to have an entry level (ACFS), 
Intermediate level (CCFS) and a professional level (GCFS). Furthermore, we need 
a campaign to promote the profession to all bodies; a system of regulation 
including disciplinary and sanction procedures; accredited further training (CPD) 
and a governing body made up of stakeholders, independent members and lay 
persons (CFSP35- Investigating Officer, DWP) 
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Table 4.8: Reasons for  Non-Membership 
Why No to professional association All Respondents 
 N % 
No specific reason 56 29.9 
Unaware 40 21.4 
Lacks value for money 20 10.7 
Irrelevant 17 9.1 
Apathy 16 8.5 
Time 15 8.0 
Not job requirement 10 5.3 
Recognition 8 4.2 
Faith & orientation issues 5 2.7 
Total 187 100.0 
 
 Importance of Professional Association Membership  
In order to examine the importance that counter fraud specialists attached to relevant 
professional association membership, the survey asked all respondents to indicate the level 
of importance of being a member of a relevant professional association on a rating scale of 
0 -10 (where 0 is not very important at all and 10 is very important). The survey revealed 
that generally, respondents across the survey attached less importance to professional 
association membership (mean score for all respondents was 5.8). A breakdown into the 
subgroups revealed that this was equally less important for the local authority respondents 
(mean score 5.6) compared to NHS CFSMS (mean score 6.1).  The higher level of 
importance that NHS CFSMS respondents attached to professional association 
membership demonstrates their stronger affiliation to ICFS, with membership affiliation of 
just over half  of the sample (55.2%).   
 
Thus, contextualising the emerging perspectives on counter fraud specialists in relation to 
professional cultures indicates two issues (positive and negative). On the positive side, it is 
evident that as a minimum, a key professional association has emerged for public sector 
counter fraud specialists in the form of ICFS (Chapter 4, Figure 4.12), given the number of 
respondents affiliation compared to the others . This provide credence to support the views 
of advocates of professionalisation theories (Chapter 2, Table 2.2), who argues that 
professional cultures are relevant because they provide bonds between members, shape 
behaviour as well as enhance status and prestige (Millerson, 1964; Greenwood, 1957; Neal 
& Morgan, 2000; Simonsen, 1996; Carr-Saunders and Wilson ,1964). Similarly, the 
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presence of professional association and related cultures lend support to the conceptual 
framework on the socio-cultural elements of professionalising occupations (see Goode, 
1960; Wilensky, 1964; Greenwood, 1957; Roslender, 1992; Scott, 2008; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). On the negative side, the number of respondents not affiliated to 
associations as well as the less importance attached to professional association 
membership, have implications on professionalising the UK public sector counter fraud 
specialists. Further exploration of the issues relating to the professional cultures of counter 
fraud specialists and professional association, using semi-structured interview provided the 
results in Chapter 5, Section 5.3. 
 
 4.5. A Body of Knowledge   
In addition to professional association and related activities discussed earlier, the existence 
of a body of knowledge is one of those normative (symbolic) pillars underpinning 
professions and professionalising occupations (Scott, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
Instances of items that normally illustrate the body of knowledge exist in the form of 
academic textbooks, research centres and dedicated occupational publications in the field. 
Other evidence of emerging body of knowledge includes the establishment of academic 
routes for further education at University. Examples of the latter involved the Advanced 
Level Study (CertHe/CCFS/Diploma), Degree or Masters in counter fraud.   In finding out 
more information on the body of knowledge in existence for counter fraud specialists, the 
survey sought a series of questions on relevant occupational publications read, frequency, 
and the importance of reading relevant occupational publications. Those results are 
provided in Figure 4.13 (Relevant occupational publication read), Frequency (Table 4.9), 
and the importance of reading relevant occupational publications (Figure 4.14). 
 
The survey revealed that for all respondents, just over three – quarters (75.7%) affirmed 
reading publications relevant to their occupation. A minority of under a quarter (24.3%) 
however responded negatively for doing so.  Of those that read occupational publications 
(Figure 4.13), the most popular form of publication read related to fraud websites (more 
than half of the sample - 54%).  In-house magazines such as Insight Magazine and Housing 
Benefit Direct were the next popular publication, but largely read within the local authority 
with 22.5 per cent and 5.3 per cent respectively. In addition, respondents indicated reading 
various academic journals relating to criminology and law enforcement agencies but those 
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were less popular. 
 
Figure 4.13: Relevant Occupational Publications Read 
 
 
Although the responses demonstrate the existence of various in-house magazines and 
related publications, there seem to be more that needs to be done to increase the body of 
knowledge for counter fraud specialists. For instance, while professions such as Medicine, 
Accountancy and Law (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3) have dedicated/overarching occupational 
publication symbolising shared identities and body of knowledge, for counter fraud 
specialists this was non-existent. While the body of knowledge on counter fraud specialists 
is emerging with dedicated research centres at Nottingham Trent University (International 
Fraud Prevention Research Centre) and the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies (University 
of Portsmouth), the body of knowledge is relatively weak which departs from the views 
held by advocates on theories of professions and professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2), 
such as Greenwood (1957) and Simonsen (1996). They hold the view that a body of 
knowledge is essential because it provides the highest level of scholarship and intellectual 
publication to guide members. In addition, a body of knowledge helps to distinguish 
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professional occupations from those that are non-professional as discussed in the literature 
review (Chapter 2).  
 
The existence of a dedicated professional publication, including readership by members is 
important for the development of a profession and keeping updated with developments in 
the field. In relation to the extent of reading occupational publications, only 126 out of the 
321 respondents did reveal the type of occupational publications read with the rest not 
indicating.  Of those answering, Table 4.9 illustrates that less than half (40.4%) read 
relevant occupational publication more frequently (weekly to monthly basis). By contrast, 
more than half of counter fraud specialists (53.2% of the sample) did so infrequently on a 
quarterly to yearly basis (28.6%) or never did (24.6%). The frequency of reading 
occupational publication did vary across the three subgroups. In the local authority, more 
than a third (35.4%) of respondents did so more frequently on a daily to weekly basis, 
compared to under a third in the NHS CFSMS (26.5%) and DWP (29.4%). Generally, the 
variation in the frequency of reading occupational publication probably reflects the lack of 
a dedicated journal for counter fraud specialist as indicated in Table 4.9. The findings also 
illustrate that there is more scope to increase readership of occupational publication 
amongst specialist, thereby expanding the knowledge base and disseminating the latest 
publication to enhance the profession. 
 
Table 4.9: Frequency of Reading Occupational Publication 
Frequency of 
occupational 
publication 
All  
Respondents 
Local 
 Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Daily 8 6.3 3 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Weekly 9 7.1 54 33.5 13 26.5 5 29.4 
Monthly 42 33.3 69 42.9 27 55.1 9 52.9 
Quarterly 7 5.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Yearly  29 23.0 31 19.3 9 18.4 3 17.6 
Never 31 24.6 4 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 126 100.0 161 100.0 49 100.0 17 100.0 
 
In addition to revealing the frequency at which counter fraud specialists read relevant 
occupational publications in their field, the survey revealed the extent of importance on 
reading occupational publication. This was measured using a rating scale of 0 to 10 (where 
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0 is not very important at all, and 10 very important). Figure 4.14 demonstrates that the 
mean score for all counter fraud specialists in the survey was under 10 (Mean rating = 7.2), 
illustrating that reading relevant occupational publications in the specialised field was 
more important to counter fraud specialists.  
 
Figure 4.14: Importance of Reading Occupational Publication 
 
 
A breakdown into the three subgroups revealed a variation in the level of importance. 
While it was more important for both the local authority (mean rating =7.3) and NHS 
CFSMS (mean rating = 7.4), this was less so for the DWP (mean score = 6.3). The more 
importance attached to reading relevant occupational publication by local authority clearly 
demonstrates why more than a third (35.4%) of them did so more frequently on a daily to 
weekly basis (see Table 4.9). This finding provides evidence to illustrate that, reading an 
occupational publication is an important part of a profession and should be encouraged. It 
helps to build the knowledgebase for the professionals in the field, yet this was nonexistent 
for counter fraud specialists.  However, there is the potential to achieve this, if there was a 
dedicated occupational publication for counter fraud specialists. The follow up (semi-
structured) interview in Chapter 5, explored those issues with emerging views discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4. 
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 4.6. Professional and Ethical Code of Conduct 
As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the symbolic elements or pillars supporting 
professionalising occupations involves professional and ethical code of conduct.  They are 
essential for most occupations striving for the status of a profession and usually developed 
at the early stages of the professionalisation process (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). Creating 
awareness of the code of conduct “help shape the behaviour of members of the profession 
as they familiarise themselves with the content of the code” (Wotruba, Chonko & Loe, 
2001, p.61) and gain trust from clients. Institutional theorists also share similar 
perspectives as it provides the regulative pillars supporting the professionalising 
occupation (Scott, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 1991).  In addition, it may lead to higher 
levels of organisational commitments by “increasing members belief that their 
profession/organisation has strong ethical values” (Valentine & Barnett, 2003, p.359).  
 
In order to find out more about the professional and ethical codes for counter fraud 
specialists, the survey asked respondents to indicate the level of importance of awareness 
of any professional code of conduct governing their activities as counter fraud specialists. 
313 out of the total 321 respondents indicated their responses for this question, while the 
remaining 8 did not answer (Table 4.10). As revealed in Table 4.10, respondents indicated 
positive responses with over two-thirds of the sample (70.6%) affirming the awareness of 
their professional code of conduct, compared to a minority of under a third (29.4%) 
responding either ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’.  
 
Table 4.10: Awareness of Professional Code of Conduct 
Awareness of professional  code of conduct All  Respondents 
 N % 
Yes 221 70.6 
No 51 16.3 
Don't Know 41 13.1 
Total 313 100.0 
  
Respondents answering ‘yes’ to awareness of their professional code of conduct were 
further asked to name them. This revealed fragmentation in codes of conduct guiding the 
activities of counter fraud specialists (see Figure 4.15), and could be generally classified 
into three main forms (employers’ code, professional association (ICFS) code, and that of 
the accreditation board (CFPAB). The employers’ codes of conduct ranged largely from 
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various fraud legislation and relevant acts to applying professional and ethical approach to 
investigations. Within the local authority for example, respondents indicated being guided 
largely by the employers’ local code and additional code of conduct for investigators 
(34.8%).  
Figure 4.15: If Yes, Name the Code of Conduct 
 
 
Similarly, respondents from within the local authority and DWP were guided by DWP 
guidelines, since the local authorities investigate and prosecute fraud on behalf of the DWP 
(see the Welfare Reform Act 2007 which ended the controversial “Howell Opinion”; 
House of Commons Research Paper, 2006).  By contrast, respondents from within the NHS 
CFSMS were largely guided by the NHS fraud investigators guide/manual (38.3%) as well 
as the professional and ethical approach (10.6%).  As well as asking respondents to 
indicate the code of conduct guiding their activities,  respondents were asked to indicate 
the importance of having a mandatory code of conduct governing activities of counter 
fraud specialists, using a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0=not important, 10 = very important). 
For all respondents across the sample, respondents indicated that it was more important 
doing so (mean score = 8.03) with a similar score for the subgroups.  
 
Generally, while the survey demonstrated the existence of various codes of conduct 
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guiding the activities of counter fraud specialists, they raise issues for concern. Firstly is 
the extent of awareness of the CFPAB code and the resultant sanctions for breaching the 
code. What was rather striking was the limited number of counter fraud specialists aware 
of the CFPAB’s code of conduct (Figure 4.15). Given this, it is arguable whether most 
respondents knew the implications of their actions on non-conformance to the CFPAB 
(accreditation board) code of conduct. While advocates of theories of profession such as 
Greenwood (1957; 1966) hold the view that professions and professionalising occupations 
need to have a regulatory body with the powers to enforce sanctions for non-conformity, 
the emerging perspectives raise issues on whether the CFPAB had a mechanism of 
reminding or educating respondents on code of conduct.  
 
In addition, it raises further questions on the powers and ability of the CFPAB to act as a 
regulatory body for counter fraud specialists. While proponents of institutional theory have 
emphasised on the importance of regulative symbols /pillars for professions (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008; Scott, 2008), the limited number of respondents aware of the CFPAB code 
of conduct raise issues on the strength of the regulative pillars on professionalising counter 
fraud specialists occupation. Thus, to this end, it is evident from the survey that, there 
exists a code of conduct for counter fraud specialists. This is consistent with the views held 
by theorists of profession and professionalisation in the literature (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). 
Nonetheless, the limited number of counter fraud specialists that had awareness of the 
accreditation board’s (CFPAB) code of conduct raises issues of concern. Further 
exploration on counter fraud specialists’ code of conduct using semi-structured interview 
provided various perspectives as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5. 
 
 4.7. Continuous Professional Development (CPD) 
In addition to the personal profile of respondents, training, education and accreditation, 
remuneration, body of knowledge, professional cultures and association as well as code of 
conduct, the study sought information on continuous professional development and 
relevance to counter fraud specialists. As discussed in Chapter 2,  CPD is about “ 
maintenance and enhancement of the knowledge, expertise and competence of 
professionals throughout their careers according to a plan formulated with regard to the 
need of the professional, the employer, the profession and society” (Madden & Mitchell, 
1993, cited in Lester 1999, p. 2).  Staff development in the form of CPD was relatively 
new until at least the 1960s (Houle, 1980, cited in Lester 1999, p.2.). In addition, Neal and 
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Morgan (2000) point out that “there is no such thing as qualifying for life” (p.18). This 
means that CPD has become an essential element of professions (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). 
  
 
In the context of counter fraud specialists and related occupations, pursuing a professional 
career in the twenty-first century requires professionals in the relevant fields to regularly 
update themselves. This is due to non-static nature of the institutional environment as a 
result of various pressures exerted on it (Millerson, 1964; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) such as changes in legislation. Therefore, practitioners have to 
update their skills through continuous professional development.   In order to explore 
views from counter fraud specialists on the relevance of CPD for their profession, the 
survey asked a series of questions from counter fraud specialists on the importance of 
continuous professional development,  the type of CPD undertaken over the last three years 
and views on introducing compulsory CPD to remain accredited and frequency of 
assessment.  In relation to the importance of CPD to improving counter fraud specialists 
levels of performance, respondents were asked to indicate their level of importance on a 
scale of zero to ten (where 0 is not very important, and 10 very important).  
 
Figure 4.16 Importance of CFS Completing CPD 
 
 
Figure 4.16 illustrates that for all respondents across the survey, this was important (mean 
score for all respondents = 7.6), with a similar pattern for the subgroups. Generally, the 
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importance respondents placed on CPD illustrate Neal and Morgan (2000) view on post 
qualifying training to update skills. 
 
As well as revealing the importance of CPD, the survey further revealed that under half of 
all respondents (44.5% of the sample) had not undertaken any CPD over the last three 
years (Figure 4.17). Although Neal and Morgan’s study did not provide  specific time 
frame for undertaking CPD, given that anti-fraud work is one of the areas with regular 
changes in legislation, most respondents would have had yearly updates. However, in the 
context of counter fraud specialists’ occupation, the emerging perspectives with 44.5% of 
the sample not undertaken any form of CPD over the last three years illustrates a departure 
from 21st Century professions (Chapter 2, Table 2.2).  Breaking down the figures for those 
who have not had any CPD over the last three years revealed that,  it was highest within 
the local authority (48.2%) compared to DWP and NHS CFSMS with 38.5% and 33.3% 
respectively.  
 
Figure 4.17.  CPD in the Last Three Years 
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undertaken were updates and refresher (12.6%) and counter fraud degree related courses 
(12.1%), but were mainly within the local authorities and NHS CFSMS.  Respondents also 
revealed other CPD course undertaken, those included PINS training (8.2%), fraud 
conferences and seminar (7.1%), NHS CFSMS intermediate course (5.5%), NVQ /BTEC 
investigations (3.3%), Non Counter Fraud Specialists related course (2.7%) and Masters in 
Criminology, and Security related (1.6%).  
  
Furthermore, the survey solicited views from respondents on the introduction of 
compulsory continuous professional development for counter fraud specialists to remain 
accredited. Of the 321 respondents in the study, most respondents (318) indicated their 
responses while the remaining 3 did not (Table 4.11). Table 4.11 revealed that of the 318 
that responded, more than half of all respondents (57.2% of the sample) indicated ‘yes to 
compulsory CPD. By contrast, less than half of the sample (42.8%) responded negatively. 
This was however highest within the local authority with more than a quarter of the sample 
doing so.  
 Table 4.11: Compulsory CPD and Accreditation 
Compulsory 
CPD and 
accreditation 
All 
Respondents 
Local 
Authority 
NHS 
 CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Yes 182 57.2 114 56.7 42 65.6 13 50.0 
No 75 23.6 55 27.4 6 9.4 6 23.1 
Don't Know 61 19.2 32 15.9 16 25.0 7 26.9 
Total 318 100.0 201 100.0 64 100.0 26 100.0 
 
The survey further explored the views of those respondents who provided positive 
responses to the introduction of compulsory CPD (the 57.2% of the sample that responded 
yes in Table 4.11) to outline the form the CPD should take including frequency of 
assessment. Respondents indicated a wide range of CPDs’ (Figure 4.18). By far, the most 
common CPD was updates and refresher training (around half of the sample – 48.9%), 
while annual examination was the least suggested (1.6% of all respondents). Under a 
quarter (22%) of the sample were unable to identify any form of CPD.  
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Figure  4.18: If Yes, Recommended CPD  
 
 
A breakdown of all responses into the three subgroups however revealed an interesting 
picture. For example, while respondents from within the local authority (7.0%) and NHS 
CFSMS (19.0%) placed emphasis on practical sessions and training portfolios, for the 
DWP, this was none. This probably reflects the inadequacy of the foundation level training 
in preparing NHSCFSMS staff particularly for role as counter fraud specialists (see 
discussion on section 5.3). Similarly, the NHSCFSMS placed emphasis on CPD related to 
presentation and articles read (11.9%) compared to local authority (2.6%) and none within 
the DWP. This probably demonstrates a strong anti-fraud culture within the NHS CFSMS 
where counter fraud specialists undertake regular fraud awareness to all staff working for 
the NHS.  
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DWP 
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In terms of the frequency of undertaking CPD, the median time indicated by all 
respondents was yearly (Table 4.12). The frequency of assessment however differed across 
the subgroups. While it was yearly for the local authority and NHS CFSMS respondents, 
this was every other year for the DWP. The differences in the frequency probably 
demonstrate the difference in culture and attitude the three agencies had towards counter 
fraud and continuous professional development in general. To this end, the results from the 
survey questionnaire has revealed the lack of CPD as requirement for counter fraud 
specialists to remain accredited, as compared to professions such as Medicine, 
Accountancy and Law (Chapter 2, Table 2.3).Similarly, it was evident in the study that 
nearly half of counter fraud specialists in the study have not had any CPD in the last three 
years (Figure 4.17), despite attempts to professionalise counter fraud specialists. This 
finding deviates from Neal and Morgan (2000), view on professions and professionalising 
occupations. In addition, it has failed to support the theory of study (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). 
Given the emerging issues on CPD from the survey questionnaire, a follow-up interview 
was conducted to gain further perspectives on counter fraud specialists CPD and 
accreditation. Chapter 5, Section 5.5 discussed the results from the follow up study.  
 
 4.8. Policy Involvement and Interference in Professional Authority   
Chapter 2 discussed the authority of counter fraud specialists.  Kerson (1997) also 
highlights the need to involve professionals in every aspect of organisational and 
professional decision – making policies because of their experience and regular interaction 
with clients. In order to obtain information about those issues on counter fraud specialists’ 
profession, the survey asked respondents on various questions relating to policy 
involvement and investigations interference.  
 
In relation to counter involvement in the development of counter fraud policy, previous 
research found that less than a quarter (21%) was involved in the formulation and 
development of counter fraud policy and was highest within the local authority, with 
28.9% (Button et al, 2005).  The current study however revealed an improvement with 
around a quarter (24.7%) of the sample indicating 50 per cent or more of their role 
involved formulation or development of counter fraud policy (Figure 4.19). Of those that 
were involved, this was highest within the local authority and had more than a quarter 
(27.4%) of counter fraud specialists involved in such activities. This finding is similar to 
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Button et al (2005) earlier research. 
 
Figure 4.19:  Involvement in Counter Fraud Policy Development 
 
 
By contrast, counter fraud specialists from within the NHS CFSMS and DWP were less 
likely to be involved in counter fraud policy formulation and development. Those have 
implications on the work autonomy of counter fraud specialists and need further research. 
The more involvement of counter fraud specialists within the local authority in policy 
formulation and development reflects a higher number of respondents from that sector with 
job titles as fraud managers (Chapter 4, Section 4.1). Indeed, a chi-square test for 
independence indicated a significant difference between respondents’ current job title and 
involvement in the formulation or development of counter fraud policy [ χ² (1, n=274) = 
25.61, p= 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.31]. Therefore, there is an association between 
respondents’ current job title and involvement in counter fraud policy formulation or 
development.  
 
As well as asking questions on involvement in policy development, the study solicited 
information on experience regarding investigations interference, frequency and rationale 
for senior management pressure to interfere with the investigations before reaching a 
concluding stage. In relation to experience with investigations interference, the study 
revealed that 18.8% of all respondents had experienced pressure to end investigations 
(Figure 4.20a). This finding is consistent with previous study (Button et al, 2005) which 
found similar results of 18.8% who had experienced pressure from their senior 
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management to end investigation into suspected fraud or corruption cases before 
concluding the case. 
 
Figure 4.20a.  Experience of Pressure to End investigation 
 
 
In relation to the frequency of occurrence,   Figure 4.20b shows a third of the sample 
(36.7%) had experienced it once or twice. Similarly, around a fifth of the sample (20.0%) 
has had it on three or four occasions.  
 
Figure 4.20b: Occasions Pressured 
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finding from the survey questionnaire has failed to support the theory of study (Chapter 2, 
Table 2.2), as it opposes the view of proponents such as Greenwood (1957; 1966); 
Friedson (1984) who believed extensive training in the relevant area of work gives 
professionals monopoly of judgement over their clients when performing their tasks. It also 
departs from Hall (1968), Waring and Currie (2009) who perceived professionals had the 
autonomy including freedom to exercise professional judgement without pressures from 
clients or the employing organisation, yet, the introduction of New Public Management 
policies in contemporary professions had led to the loss of autonomy. Although the 
numbers of respondents that had experienced pressure to end investigations were just under 
a fifth (18.8%) of the sample, it sets out the debate for future research.  Similarly, 
respondents provided wide-ranging responses for the reasons behind the pressure. Previous 
studies on policing including fraud and white collar crime investigators identified various 
reasons behind ending investigations (Doig, 1995; Fraud Review, 2006b;  Doig & 
Macaulay, 2008).  As Figure 4.21 illustrates, the key reason indicated by a third of counter 
fraud specialists (33.3% of the sample) was attributed to resource constraints (Frimpong & 
Baker, 2007; Ganon & Doig, 2010). 
 
Figure 4.21: Reasons to End Investigation 
 
 
Illustrated below were some of the comments from counter fraud specialists highlighting 
resource constraints:  
Lack of finance, fear of failure, risk of negative outcome to court action, dislike of  
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Specialist, NHS CFSMS) 
 
Many cases are not interviewed as they are not deemed to be serious however the 
fraud can still amount to several hundred pounds.  There is a pressure to close the 
case if it is perceived to have gone on for a long time. There are investigations that 
have not been started due to a shortage of staff. These cases are then closed as the 
information is deemed to be too old to be worthwhile investigating (CFSP101- 
Fraud Investigator, DWP) 
 
A fifth of the sample (20.0%) expressed ‘politics’ as the second reason. Respondents felt 
that sometimes the offence involved investigations into local Councillors. Where such 
cases ended up in court, it may look bad on the Council. In addition, senior management 
may put pressure on counter fraud staff to end investigations where they had concern on 
public interest over customer service:  
 
Political as the case involved council employees. (CFSP166 – Fraud Investigator, 
Local Authority) 
 
The investigation was into local Councillors (CFSP 247 – Counter Fraud Team 
Leader, Local Authority) 
 
 
Around a quarter of the sample (25.0%) attributed the reasons for dropping the 
investigation to the complex nature of the case including the difficulty of achieving a 
successful prosecution (13.3%), as well as pressure to achieving targets (11.7%) by 
concentrating on easier cases. Sometimes, the impact of adverse publicity associated with 
the case as cited by 10.0% of the sample, played crucial role too as illustrated by the 
following quotes: 
 
My manager sometimes think we go too far with the amount of evidence gathered 
and is looking at cutting down the length of time an investigation is ongoing 
(CFSP233 – Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
To meet target – take on cases that would provide a result within specified time 
slot. Targets drive perverse behaviour (CFSP319 – Fraud Investigator, DWP). 
 
The Council was more concerned about potential publicity issues and support was 
withdrawn (CFSP 265 – Audit and Investigations Manager, Local Authority). 
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Respondents also indicated other reasons such as the position of the claimant or suspects 
made it impossible to pursue the investigations. By contrast, some respondents indicated 
‘rather not commenting’ on the reasons for interference but this was a minority. Further 
exploration on management interference with fraud investigations using semi-structured 
interviews provided additional insight (Chapter 5, Section 5.6).  
 
 4.9. Management Support and Resourcing for Role 
As discussed in Chapter 2, institutional theorists suggests that in addition to those symbolic 
elements acting as pillars for professionalisation, professionalising occupations need to 
strive for resources to survive in their environment and to remain socially acceptable 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 2008; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006). The Scampion 
Report (2000, Section 7.8 – 7.11) on Social Security anti-fraud recommended the 
appointment of motivated and trained managers with experience of investigation for at 
least some part of their career,  and managerial competence or potential for it to support 
and manage counter fraud specialists. Management support and resourcing counter fraud 
specialists role is therefore an important factor in the delivery of quality service by 
professionals and increase professionalism.  
 
In order to find out more information on management and support, the survey sought 
information from counter fraud specialists on resource availability including senior 
management support for the role and recommendations for improvement.  In relation to 
resource availability for the role, the study revealed that more than half of the sample 
(52.5%) expressed under resourcing for counter fraud work.  Previous studies on counter 
fraud specialists also found similar results with 52.4% (Frimpong & Baker, 2007).The 
level of under resourcing was however highest within the NHS CFSMS and DWP with 
around 50 per cent each. While the Fraud Review Team (2006b) report found that public 
sector fraud investigation agencies such as DWP and NHS are well resourced, the 
emerging findings from the Frimpong and Baker (2007) and current study found otherwise.  
Respondents citing under resourcing for role in the current study provided four key reasons 
to support their views. Those views are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 4.22.  
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Figure 4.22: Reasons for not Resourcing CFS Role 
 
 
 
By far, the main reason cited by over two thirds (72%) of all respondents was ‘simply 
under resourced’ in various forms including under –staffing and equipped. Respondents 
comments illustrate the under resourced nature for anti-fraud work: 
 
Counter fraud is generally seen by management as a ‘necessary evil’ and a bit 
'micky mouse' to which resources are very limited (CFSP53 – Fraud Manager, NHS 
CFSMS) 
 
The above comment on management seeing fraud as a ‘necessary evil’ and a bit ‘micky 
mouse’ echoes a similar feeling on corporate security management (Kovacich & 
Halibozek, 2003; Molinsky & Margolis, 2005).  Respondents cited ‘budgetary restrictions 
and target culture’ (13%) as the next reason. In addition to this, 10 per cent of the sample 
cited ‘low prioritisation of fraud and poor managerial direction’ from fraud managers as a 
further reason for not being properly resourced for the role.  The rise of performance 
monitoring culture and emphasis on targets in the UK Public Services in the latter part of 
the 21st Century (Bird et al, 2005; Prowle, 2010; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006), coupled 
with poor prioritisation of fraud resources (Doig, 1995; Gannon & Doig, 2010) has 
affected professionals working in bureaucratic organisations (Dent & Whitehead, 2002; 
Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006) including counter fraud specialists. These lead to conflicts 
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thereby making it difficult to display professionalism in their work due to the management 
emphasis on chasing targets as opposed to the quality of the investigation: 
 
Managers in DWP are only interested in hitting performance targets. There is no 
wider concept of the fraud "profession" as we are managed within Jobcentreplus 
which has a different culture at its core (CFSP 8 – Fraud Manager, DWP) 
 
 
Within the LA its all about chasing statistics. This results in more cases being given 
to investigators that can be reasonably managed. It does not allow for full and 
proper investigations to be carried out (CFSP27 – Investigation Officer, Local 
Authority) 
 
 
Continuous professional development enhances the professionalism (Neal & Morgan, 
2000; VanZandt, 1990). For some respondents, this was less so and the lack of proper 
resourcing for role to undertake anti-fraud work had affected their continuous professional 
development (3% of the sample):    
 
I am a trainer, it is my role to train the ... , as such you would expect that we would 
be given the opportunity to continually develop the course content and ourselves so 
that we could pass on continued learning to those who need and want it! 
Unfortunately, this is not the case, there is very little if any personal development, 
no organised way to keep up to date with the changing best practice and no 
opportunity to deliver refresher training to those who want it as we are so under 
staffed, we barely have the resources to deliver our core function (CFSP60 – 
Counter Fraud Training Officer, DWP) 
 
As well as revealing insights into resourcing for the role, the study also provides 
information on management support for the role as a counter fraud specialist (Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13 revealed that, for the 321 respondents in the study, 317 respondents provided 
answers to the question on support from management. The rest (4) did not indicate their 
responses. Table 4.13 also revealed a majority of around two thirds (63.4% of the sample) 
responded positively, compared to just under a third (31.3%) that responded negatively.  
This probably, reflects the higher number of respondents in managerial roles that 
responded to the survey (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1 – General Profile of Respondents). 
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Table 4.13: Senior Management Support for Role 
Adequate support 
from  senior 
management 
All  
Respondents 
Local  
Authority 
NHS 
 CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Yes 201 63.4 132 65.7 40 62.5 15 57.7 
No 99 31.2 63 31.3 19 29.7 9 34.6 
Don't Know 17 5.4 6 3.0 5 7.8 2 7.7 
Total 317 100.0 201 100.0 64 100.0 26 100.0 
  
The questionnaire further sought information from those counter fraud specialists that 
responded negatively (Table 4.13) to adequate support from senior management to provide 
reasons for their responses. Figure 4.23 revealed the major reason indicated by about two 
thirds (64.4% of the sample), for the inadequate senior management support was the ‘lack 
of experience and fraud insight’ by their senior managers.  Such managers may not have 
had an anti-fraud experience and may have different priorities’ outside fraud. Again, this 
clearly departs from the earlier discussion on Scampion Report (2000) recommendation on 
the appointment of fraud managers to manage fraud teams. Clearly, the management and 
resourcing of counter fraud specialists have potential impact on staff motivation, 
professional development and the overall initiatives to professionalising counter fraud 
specialists.  
 
Figure 4.23: Reasons for Inadequate Management Support for Role 
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The following extracts illustrate some comments from respondents on senior management 
inexperience including poor fraud insight: 
Many of the managers do not come from an investigative background. They got 
promotion and were placed in the investigative branch and do not have an 
investigators mindset. This can be very frustrating as they do not understand many 
of the issues or laws that govern our work (CFSP101 – Fraud Investigator, DWP) 
 
 
For too long my organisation has had senior managers who pursued alternative 
agendas. When I and colleagues have had real concerns about the conduct of others 
there has not been a route by which those concerns could be raised sensitively 
because of the fear of retribution from an organisation that has been, and remains to 
a large extent, paranoid (CFSP102 – Counter Fraud Specialist, NHS CFSMS) 
 
 
They have no understanding of fraud or the processes and procedures, they let me 
get on with it, which is a bonus, and  is however frustrating at times (CFSP114 – 
Fraud Investigation Team Leader, Local Authority) 
 
Respondents cited ‘resource limitation’ (16.5% of the sample) as the reason for not 
receiving adequate support from senior management. Respondents revealed that they had 
to work to strict budgets with little time for in-depth research. In addition, there was a 
culture of senior management frequently diverting resources to assessment teams as 
opposed to counter fraud work. Less than a quarter of the sample (21.2%) cited ‘apathetic 
attitude’ (10.6%), a ‘target driven culture’ and fraud being a ‘low priority’ (10.6%) for 
senior management: 
 
Too much pressure from above on targets (CFSP 321 – Fraud Investigator, DWP) 
 
I do not feel they are interested and it's just another 'must do' task (CFSP93 – Fraud 
Manager, NHS CFSMS) 
 
They have little understanding or interest of what we do. Sadly, I can't remember 
the last time a senior manager has spoken to me or my colleagues about our work 
or performance etc. (CFSP 135 – Counter Fraud Team Leader, Local Authority)  
 
Figure 4.24 illustrated suggestions from respondents for improving support received from 
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senior management.  
 
Figure 4.24: Suggestions for Improving Management Support 
 
 
By far, the most common suggestion from more than a third of the sample (40.8%) was the 
employment of ‘experienced and committed managers’ with fraud background. The 
employment of experienced managers would have the benefit of supporting counter fraud 
specialists in the field in a wide range of counter fraud related issues. The quotes below 
illustrate some of the responses on the need to employ experienced and committed 
managers to enhancing professionalism: 
 
Appoint managers who have actually performed the role of Counter Fraud 
Specialist. Many do not have the basic experience to comprehend what the work 
involves, not having been at the 'coal face' themselves (CFSP127 – Counter Fraud 
Specialist, NHS CFSMS) 
 
A quarter of the sample (25%) suggested ‘increased resources’ for counter fraud work, 
followed by training senior management (13.2%) in fraud awareness. A breakdown of the 
latter revealed more expression of the latter within the local authority (15.2%), compared 
to NHS CFSMS (13.2%). A minority of respondents however suggested ‘more fraud 
publicity’ (7.9%) and proper recognition of counter fraud staff (7.9%):  
A greater understanding of the intricacies involved in rooting out fraud. Also a 
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fundamental shift in management perceptions that auditors are fraud investigators 
(CFSP 86 – Fraud Manager, Local Authority) 
 
More senior level support, more CFSMS support to those in the field across a broad 
spectrum (not just investigations), (CFSP 48 – Counter Fraud Specialist, NHS 
CFSMS) 
 
More publicity from the Council stating fraud is unacceptable by the Council and 
provide enough staff to do a better job (CFSP156 – Counter Fraud Team Leader, 
Local Authority) 
 
Thus, the emerging perspectives on resourcing and senior management support for 
investigations clearly illustrate gaps on the professionalising counter fraud specialists. This 
calls for future research on measures to improving resourcing and management of counter 
fraud specialists to enable survival in the wider professional and organisational 
environments. Section 4.10 (The next section) however examines responses on the general 
extent of counter fraud specialists’ satisfaction levels with job, salary, promotion 
opportunities, workload, quality of management and training as well as how they perceived 
their own occupation in relation to others.  
 
  4.10. Satisfaction Levels and Perception of Professions 
Job satisfaction is defined as “a pleasurable or positive emotional state, resulting from the 
appraisal of one’s job or job experiences” (Locke, 1976, cited in Gruneberg, 1979, p.3). 
Despite this, there is no one agreed definition (Gruneberg, 1979; Smither, 1994) due to the 
complex nature of the phenomena. The complexity is due to different aspects of the job 
coming together to influence a person’s level of satisfaction with the job. Those included 
aspects such as attitude towards salary, working conditions, career prospects, supervision, 
the work itself and other intrinsic rewards (Arnold et al, 2010). The employee satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with any of those variables has negative or positive impact on attitude to 
work and the profession in general. As highlighted in the previous section (Section 4.9), 
the survey explored six different aspects relating to counter fraud specialists levels of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Those aspects involved the job itself, salary, promotion 
opportunities, workload, quality of management and quality of training.  
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 Job Satisfaction Level  
Firstly, the survey examined the level of satisfaction that counter fraud specialists had 
towards the job itself. 319 out of the 321 respondents answered this question, while the 
remaining two did not. Table 4.14 revealed the extent of satisfaction with the job. It 
identified which that more than half (55.8% of all respondents) indicated ‘satisfied’ with 
the job, compared to ‘very dissatisfied’ minority (1.9%). Only a fifth (19.7%) of the 
sample indicated ‘very satisfied’ with the job. A breakdown of the latter into subgroups 
revealed a variation in the level of job satisfaction, with NHS CFSMS counter fraud 
specialists very satisfied with the job (17.2%) compared to DWP (15.4%) and local 
authority (2.0%). By contrast, respondents expressing ‘very dissatisfied’ with their job was 
highest amongst local authority (20.3%), compared to the NHSCFSMS (1.6%).  
 
Table 4.14: Job Satisfaction Level 
Job satisfaction 
level 
All 
Respondents 
Local 
 Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Very satisfied 63 19.7 4 2.0 11 17.2 4 15.4 
Satisfied 178 55.8 122 60.4 26 40.6 17 65.4 
Neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied 
54 16.9 28 13.9 16 25.0 4 15.4 
Dissatisfied 18 5.6 7 3.5 10 15.6 1 3.8 
Very dissatisfied 6 1.9 41 20.3 1 1.6 0 0.0 
Total 319 100.0 202 100.0 64 100.0 26 100.0 
 
The earlier discussion in the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.3) examined the 
importance of salary to professions.  In addition, Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) revealed disparity 
in remunerations across the counter fraud community with NHS CFSMS best paid. To find 
out more on the extent of satisfaction with salary across the sector, 319 out of the 321 
respondents indicated how they felt with their salaries (Table 4.15). Two respondents did 
not indicate. As shown in Table 4.15, of the 319 that did, over a third of all respondents 
(36.1%) expressed ‘satisfied’ with salary. A percentage minority of 9.4% ‘very satisfied’ 
and just over a fifth (21.6%) ‘Dissatisfied’. Generally, the level of salary satisfaction was 
highest within the NHS with more than half (56.9%) expressing ‘very satisfied or 
satisfied’, when compared with DWP expressing highest levels of salary dissatisfaction 
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(53.8%) across the sector.  
 
Table 4.15: Salary Satisfaction Level 
Salary satisfaction 
level 
All 
Respondents 
Local 
Authority 
NHS 
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Very Satisfied 30 9.4 19 9.5 8 12.3 0 0.0 
Satisfied 115 36.1 74 36.8 29 44.6 2 7.7 
Neither Satisfied 
nor Dissatisfied 
88 27.6 54 26.9 19 29.2 10 38.5 
Dissatisfied 69 21.6 44 21.9 9 13.8 9 34.6 
Very Dissatisfied 17 5.3 10 5.0 0 0.0 5 19.2 
Total 319 100.0 201 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
 
In addition to job and salary satisfaction, promotion opportunities were the third 
satisfaction level asked in the study.  For this question, 318 out of the 321 respondents for 
the survey indicated their responses while the remaining 3 did not. As Table 4.16 shows, 
most respondents for the survey (39.6%) were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with 
promotion opportunities. Breaking down the responses into the subgroups however reveals 
variations with more than three-quarters of respondents within the DWP (76.9%) either 
‘dissatisfied or very dissatisfied’ with promotion opportunities. Despite the poor promotion 
opportunities, it was the organisation with the longest serving counter fraud specialists 
(Chapter 4, Figure 4.2). This probably indicates that there may be other factors for staying 
longer, despite the poor promotion opportunities (Arnold et al, 2010). In contrast, Local 
Authority respondents expressed the highest level of satisfaction with 24.5% and 2.0% 
indicating either ‘satisfied or very satisfied’.  
 
Table 4.16: Promotion Opportunities Satisfaction Level 
Promotion 
opportunities 
satisfaction level 
All 
Respondents 
Local 
Authority 
NHS 
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Very Satisfied 6 1.9 4 2.0 1 1.5 0 0.0 
Satisfied 69 21.7 49 24.5 10 15.4 1 3.8 
Neither Satisfied 
nor Dissatisfied 
126 39.6 82 41.0 32 49.2 5 19.2 
Dissatisfied 86 27.0 48 24.0 15 23.1 15 57.7 
Very Dissatisfied 31 9.7 17 8.5 7 10.8 5 19.2 
Total 318 100.0 200 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
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Next were workload satisfaction and dissatisfaction levels as illustrated in Table 4.17.  
Table 4.17 revealed that, of the 321 respondents in the study, only one did not answer the 
question on workload satisfaction.  Of those that did (320), more than a third (41.0%) 
expressed satisfaction, compared to under a third (30.0%)  who expressed either 
‘dissatisfied or very dissatisfied’ with  their workload levels. Generally, the level of 
workload satisfaction was highest within the DWP (50%) and Local Authority (42.1%). In 
contrast, the highest level of workload dissatisfaction was expressed within the NHS 
CFSMS (34.1%).  
 
Table 4.17: Workload Satisfaction Level 
Workload   
satisfaction level 
All 
Respondents 
Local Authority NHS CFSMS DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Very Satisfied 15 4.7 9 4.5 4 6.2 0 0.0 
Satisfied 116 36.3 76 37.6 17 26.2 13 50.0 
Neither Satisfied nor 
Dissatisfied 
93 29.1 56 27.7 22 33.8 8 30.8 
Dissatisfied 69 21.6 45 22.3 17 26.2 3 11.5 
Very Dissatisfied 27 8.4 16 7.9 5 7.7 2 7.7 
Total 320 100.0 202 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
 
 
Fifthly were the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the quality of management 
Table 4.18. Only one respondent did not answer this question, while majority (320) did. 
Table 4.18   revealed that half of the sample (50.3%) expressed satisfaction with quality of 
management. This was however highest within the local authority (56.4%). Nonetheless, 
only a minority of less than a quarter of the sample (23.1%) expressed dissatisfaction with 
quality of management. Of those expressing dissatisfaction, this was highest within the 
DWP (38.4%), compared to the NHS (29.2%).  
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Table 4.18: Quality of Management Satisfaction Level 
Quality of 
management 
satisfaction level 
All 
Respondents 
Local 
Authority 
NHS 
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Very Satisfied 30 9.4 23 11.4 3 4.6 3 11.5 
Satisfied 131 40.9 91 45.0 24 36.9 7 26.9 
Neither Satisfied nor 
Dissatisfied 
85 26.6 55 27.2 19 29.2 6 23.1 
Dissatisfied 49 15.3 25 12.4 10 15.4 7 26.9 
Very Dissatisfied 25 7.8 8 4.0 9 13.8 3 11.5 
Total 320 100.0 202 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
 
 
Lastly, the survey solicited information from respondents on the level of satisfaction with 
the quality of training (Table 4.19). Only 4 respondents in the study did not indicate their 
responses to this question, while majority did indicate their responses (317). Of those that 
did so, Table 4.19 revealed that over a third (40.7%) expressed ‘satisfied’ with the quality 
of training. By contrast, 13.9% expressed ‘dissatisfied’. A breakdown into subgroups 
revealed a variation in the level of dissatisfaction, with quality of training and highest 
within the NHS CFSMS (29.2%) followed by those within Local Authority (15.4%). This 
clearly highlights the inadequacy of the foundation level training for the role of a counter 
fraud specialist, especially for the NHS CFSMS. 
 
Table 4.19: Quality of Training Satisfaction Level 
Quality of training  
satisfaction level 
All 
Respondents 
Local 
Authority 
NHS 
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Very Satisfied 22 6.9 17 8.4 2 3.1 1 3.8 
Satisfied 129 40.7 94 46.5 17 26.2 12 46.2 
Neither Satisfied 
nor Dissatisfied 
104 32.8 60 29.7 27 41.5 10 38.5 
Dissatisfied 44 13.9 23 11.4 13 20.0 3 11.5 
Very Dissatisfied 18 5.7 8 4.0 6 9.2 0 0.0 
Total 317 100.0 202 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
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 General Perception of Counter Fraud Specialists Occupation   
Another area explored by the study in addition to the levels of satisfaction was the general 
perception of counter fraud occupation as a profession compared to others (Figure 4.25).  
Studies in professionalisation and professions have investigated the perceptions of 
occupations (Greenwood, 1957; Wilensky, 1964; Hall, 1968; Etzioni, 1969; Snizek, 1972). 
Measuring the extent to which counter fraud specialists perceived their own occupation as 
a profession in relation to others involved the use of rating scales (where 0 is not a 
profession and 10 is a complete profession).  The survey revealed polarity of professions 
across the sample, with respondents scoring a number of occupations as more or less of a 
complete profession. Figure 4.25 revealed that at the top end of the scale were a collection 
of well –recognised and undisputed professions, rated highest and more to a complete 
profession. Those included established professions such as General Practitioner and 
Barrister with mean ratings of 9.8 each. On the opposite end of the scale were a collection 
of the least skilled and least prestigious occupations rated closer to not being a profession 
with examples including Security Officer (mean rating 3.8) and Cleaner (2.1).  
 
Figure 4.25: General Perception about Occupations as Compared to Counter Fraud 
Specialists (Mean Rankings) 
 
 
Distributed between the two professional poles (in the middle region) of the scale were a 
collection of occupations including Counter Fraud Specialists (mean rating score = 7.6).  
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Interestingly, counter fraud specialists occupation had a higher mean rating than Probation 
Officer (mean rating =7.5), despite the latter’s existence over a considerable length of time 
than the former. Evaluating the statistical data from Figure 4.25 by comparing counter 
fraud specialists occupation to the well recognised and least recognised occupations reveal 
striking findings. For instance, counter fraud specialists are just over two points away from 
GP and Barrister, while it is just over a point away from Accountants. Compared to the 
least recognised and attractive occupations, it is nearly four points above security officer 
and six points above cleaner.  
 
Clearly, the survey results provide two key emerging perspectives in relation to the 
literature review (Chapter 2 and Table 2.2). Firstly, the findings are similar to that of 
Greenwood (1957;1964) -  whose study concluded that occupations in society distribute 
themselves along a continuum, with the well recognised and established occupations 
located at one end, while the other end of the scale contains the least recognised and skilled 
occupations (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). Using Greenwood’s perspective to compare the 
ranking of counter fraud specialists occupation on the continuum (mean rating scale of 7.6) 
to other occupations situated on the other end of the pole (for example General Practitioner 
with mean ranking of 9.8 and Cleaner with ranking of 2.1), it could be argued that counter 
fraud specialists is one of those occupations situated in the middle of the pole. Given the 
relatively newness of counter fraud specialists occupation when compared to the others 
such as Social Work and Probation, it is fair to argue that counter fraud specialists 
occupation has made some progress towards a profession based on the rankings (see Figure 
4.25), but has not yet reached the status of a complete profession in relation to the well-
recognised professions such as General Practitioner, Barrister, Dentist, Solicitor or even 
Accountant. The second striking issue is the variation in the extent to which respondents in 
the survey (who are counter fraud specialists themselves) generally perceived counter 
fraud occupation as a profession following categorisation of the data by subgroups or 
employers (see Figure 4.26).  
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Figure 4.26: CFS Rating of Own Occupation by Employers 
 
 
For instance, within the local authority, the mean ranking of Counter Fraud Specialists 
occupation as more or less of a complete profession was higher within both the local 
authority and DWP (each with mean score of 7.7)  compared to NHS CFSMS (7.2). 
Chapter 5, Section 5.7 provides detailed perspectives on those differences in perceptions, 
while Chapter 6, provides possible suggestions and recommendations for moving forward 
the occupation to a complete profession.   
 
 4.11.  Summary  
As suggested in the previous chapter (Chapter 3), this chapter has discussed the survey 
results on counter fraud specialists and their profession using the relevant theories of 
professions and professionalisation elaborated in Chapter 2 and Table 2.2. The chapter 
focused on analysing the results of the survey conducted on counter fraud specialists’ 
profession. The results revealed various insights on the personal profile of counter fraud 
specialists together with rationale for applying for entering counter fraud specialists’ 
occupation, salary remunerations, education, training and accreditation, professional 
cultures and association, body of knowledge and code of conduct. As well as this, the study 
explored CPD issues, the extent of involving counter fraud specialists in organisational 
policy development, investigations interference in exercising professional authority, 
management support and resourcing for the role, satisfaction levels and the extent to which 
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counter fraud specialists perceived their own occupation in relation to others. Generally, 
the study revealed wide-ranging gaps and issues for further research in relation to 
professionalising counter fraud specialists. Those issues were identified as follows. 
 
First is the personal profile of respondents such as the highest educational attainment at the 
time of applying for the position raises issues. As was revealed in the survey, more than 
half (56.5%) of the sample had been educated to either 16 or 18 when entering the counter 
fraud occupation. This raises the issue on raising the minimum educational achievement 
for entering counter fraud occupation as professions such as Medicine, Accountancy and 
Law. The second area in relation to the personal profile is the motivations behind the 
Police officers and people with background in the HM Forces (13.7% of the sample) 
entering the counter fraud occupation.  Thirdly is the length of time that respondents had 
worked as a counter fraud specialist, which was longest within the DWP compared to local 
authority and NHS CFSMS (see Table 4.3).  
 
In addition to the personal profile of respondents, another issue worth researching is the 
disparity in salary remuneration across the sector despite performing comparable jobs. For 
instance, the annual average salary range (overtime inclusive) for all respondents (25.2%) 
was £25, 000 - £30,000. More than a third (38.5%) of respondents within the DWP earned 
that amount. For the local authority, 28.9% of respondents fell within this salary range 
compared to the NHS CFSMS with 12.7% only.  The survey also revealed an interesting 
finding on the best reason why respondents applied for the current position as counter 
fraud specialists. Whereas most respondents to this question (25.8% of the sample) 
indicated the top reason as ‘enjoyed doing this type of job’, the least number of 
respondents indicating ‘prestige associated with the occupation’ departs from the cultural 
school theorists perspective of professions as having prestige (Bledstein, 1976).  
 
Training and accreditation is another further area of concern. While a significant number of 
respondents had gained accreditation through the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation 
Board (CFPAB), it was rather surprising to see a number of respondents that held counter 
fraud training qualifications outside CFPAB accredited framework and allowed to practise 
in the counter fraud arena. For instance, almost a quarter (21.6% of the sample) held other 
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counter fraud qualification in the form of BTEC /NVQ Investigations, but was largely 
within the local authority. Linked to this is the number of local authority respondents that 
had been trained by the DWP and the quality of the foundation level training in general. 
While respondents suggested a number of ideas for improvement, the identified issues on 
training and accreditation illustrate some of the weaknesses in social closure strategy for 
professionalising counter fraud specialists.  
 
As well as issues with salary, training and accreditation, the study revealed only a minority 
of counter fraud specialists had the desire  to pursuing Advanced Level (Certified Counter 
Fraud Specialist – CCFS) study in counter fraud unless incentivised illustrates another 
barrier for developing a profession. For those not intending to do so, this was highest for 
the local authority (53.3% - over half of respondents), compared to the NHS CFSMS 
(41.5%) and DWP with 15.4 per cent.  Linked to the lack of desire was the less importance 
counter fraud specialists generally attached to completing relevant University degree or 
Masters to improving standards of performance and career advancement.  Similarly, the 
study found weaknesses in entry barriers to counter fraud occupation and raise further 
questions on the relevance of the current entry qualification before practising as a 
specialist, given the number of respondents with qualifications held outside the CFPAB 
framework, yet allowed practising. Currently, a number of local authorities use NVQ 
/BTEC Investigations as substitute for ACFS. The existence of such cultures undermines 
the professionalisation agenda and the counter fraud profession.  Furthermore, the level at 
which respondents perceived their own occupation (counter fraud specialists’ occupation) 
in relation to others has to be explored. The reason being that the level at which counter 
fraud specialists rated their own occupation in relation to the others was indication that, 
there is more to be done for it to reach the status of those established professions.  
 
Besides identifying issues, the desire to pursue further education, entry barriers and the 
level at which respondents perceived their own occupation in relation to others, the study 
further revealed weakness in counter fraud specialists’ body of knowledge. Reading 
relevant occupational publication plays a crucial role in a profession as this form part in 
keeping professionals abreast with the latest research and developments in the profession. 
Interestingly, the study noted around three quarters (75.7%) of specialists  read relevant 
occupational publications, with less than half  (40.4%) doing so regularly. While this was 
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good, there were around also around a quarter of respondents not doing so. Linked to this 
was the intellectual content of the type of publication read, which were largely fraud 
websites and the fewer number of respondents that read a more academic journals or 
publications. The study also noted the absence of any dedicated academic journal acting as 
symbolic pillar for counter fraud specialists, when compared to the professions such as 
Medicine, Accountancy, Law and even Probation. The absence of dedicated occupational 
publication or academic journal for all counter fraud specialists, sets the debate on whether 
to have a journal dedicated solely for counter fraud specialists 
 
Professional cultures and association is one of the symbolic pillars of professionalising 
occupations (Scott, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). While the study revealed the 
existence of professional association, mainly ICFS, it was rather surprising noting the 
significant number of counter fraud specialists not affiliated to any association. Linked to 
this, were the (50.0%) affiliated to the association but not performing any activities 
relevant it. Similarly, while a significant number (92.1%) affiliated to an association read 
the associations literature, just over half (57.9%) of respondents attended association 
meeting, with under half (49.2%) attending annual conferences. Only a significant minority 
of respondents affiliated to professional association held an office within it. There were 
however variation in the frequency of participation in the professional association 
activities. For the local authority, this was less frequent with a third doing so on a quarterly 
to yearly basis, compared to the NHS CFSMS (20.7%) and DWP with none.  
 
Another area of concern in addition to the professional cultures and association is the 
awareness of the regulative pillar in the form of code of conduct that shape the behaviour 
of accredited counter fraud specialists. While the study noted counter fraud specialists 
attached greater importance to code of conduct (mean score = 8.03 or 8/10), only a 
significant minority of less than 7%  indicated awareness of the accreditation and awarding 
body’s (CFPAB) code of conduct. This raise concerns on the effectiveness of the CFPAB 
as a regulatory body with the powers and ability to shape members behaviour by enforcing 
sanctions. Similarly, it also raises issues on the CFPAB’s ability to communicate with 
agencies signatory to the accreditation board as well as having a new overarching and 
mandatory code of conduct. 
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Similar emerging issue in the study also relates to continuous professional development. 
The survey revealed rather disturbing findings on CPD for counter fraud specialists. Just 
under half (44.5%) of the sample had not undertaken any CDP in the last three years, in 
spite of more importance respondents (mean score for all = 8 or 8/10) attached to 
completing CPD to improving standard of performance. Added to this is the higher number 
of respondents (57.2% of the sample) favouring compulsory CPD in the form of updates 
and refresher training (48.9% of the sample) for counter fraud specialists to remain 
accredited. Furthermore, the study identified under resourced nature of the role with nearly 
two thirds of the sample (64.2%) expressing this concern and impact on performance.  
Added to this was the lack of inadequate support from senior management (31.2% of the 
sample) irrespective of Scampion Report (2000) recommendations.  Besides CPD, 
inadequate management support and under resourcing for the role, the study brings to light 
issues on the professional authority and autonomy of counter fraud professionals relating to 
senior management interferences with investigations together with rationale and occasions 
pressured. Although the number of specialists pressured was not largely significant with 
around a fifth (18.8%) of the sample, it still raises issues needing consideration, especially 
within the local authorities and the DWP where such practices were more common.  
 
Finally, respondents were largely satisfied with their jobs and salary. However, the study 
revealed some concerns relating to highest dissatisfaction levels with the job by local 
authority respondents (20.3%). In contrast, the DWP respondents expressed highest 
dissatisfaction levels with salary (53.8%). In addition, the DWP respondents expressed 
highest dissatisfaction level with promotion opportunities with more than three quarters 
(76.9%) indicating so, despite being the organisation having the longest serving counter 
fraud specialists. Furthermore, respondents generally expressed satisfaction with workload 
(41% of the sample), but the level of dissatisfaction was highest within the NHS CFSMS 
(34.1%). In relation to the quality of management, respondents generally expressed 
satisfaction (56.4% of the sample). However, DWP respondents were highly dissatisfied 
with the quality of management (34.4%).  Linked to this was the quality of training which 
respondents were largely satisfied with, except NHS CFSMS with just over a quarter of 
respondents (29.2%) and LA (15.4%) dissatisfied with the quality of training. As indicated 
in Chapter 3, the emerging themes in this chapter (Chapter 4), together with the theoretical 
and framework for the study provided the basis for the semi-structured interviews with key 
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personnel experienced in the investigation of fraud. The next chapter (Chapter 5) provided 
results of those follow-up (semi-structured) interviews on emerging issues in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 5: INTERVIEW (FOLLOW-UP SURVEY) ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
5.0. Introduction 
Chapter 4 described the emerging results from the survey questionnaire on counter fraud 
specialists’ profession. In addition, Chapter 3 (Section 3.2) outlined the data collection 
methods for the semi-structured interviews. The researcher developed the topic areas for 
the interviews by considering emerging themes discussed Chapter 4, and relationship to 
theories of professions and professionalisation that were explored in the literature review 
(Chapter 2). Chapter 5 (this chapter) therefore aimed to explore the views from 
interviewees by using semi-structured (follow-up) interviews conducted with the selected 
participants. Following this is Chapter 6 (Section 6.2), which draws together evidence from 
the survey (questionnaire and interview) results and discusses them in relation to the 
literature review (Chapter 2 and Table 2.2). The researcher used semi-structured interviews 
for the study because it has the advantage of exploring areas survey questionnaire has 
failed to explore.  However, given the nervousness involved in interviewing, particularly 
research study involving sensitive topics, the researcher used ice-breaking strategy to relax 
both the interviewer and interviewee. This was done by first asking a question on the 
developments enhancing the status of counter fraud specialists, before moving on to the 
main topics.  In relation to developments enhancing the status of counter fraud specialists, 
respondents identified four symbolic elements to illustrate the developments. Those 
involved the: 
 
• Creation of the foundation level entry qualification (PINS) leading to the award of 
ACFS,  
• Accreditation body that awards the certificates (CFPAB),  
• Professional association (ICFS) and the  
• Establishment of academic routes for counter fraud specialists to pursue higher 
education degrees to graduate and postgraduate level, with specialism in counter 
fraud at Universities such as Portsmouth, Teeside and Nottingham Trent.  
 
Respondents also mentioned various media publicity campaigns targeting fraudsters. This 
finding is consistent with Department for Works and Pension, 1998; Button et al 2007a; 
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Button et al 2007b; Frimpong & Baker, 2007. Following this, the researcher started asking 
questions relating to the topic areas in the study, with results discussed and organised 
under the following themes: 
• Remuneration (Salary) disparity and education 
• Training, accreditation and entry barriers 
• Professional cultures and association membership 
• Body of knowledge 
• Professional and ethical code of conduct (Regulating CFS) 
• Continuous professional development 
• Professional Authority and investigations interference 
• Why varying perceptions in CFS profession 
In addition, the study sought views on various dissatisfaction issues and the future of 
counter fraud profession before concluding the chapter.  
 
 5.1. Remuneration (Salary) Disparity and Education 
Various proponents of professionalisation theories have discussed the relevance of high 
financial rewards to professions in return for the services supplied (Simonsen, 1996; Carr-
Saunders, 1966; Wilensky, 1964) as revealed in the literature review (Chapter 2, Table 
2.2). Nonetheless, the survey data (Chapter 4, Section 4.2) revealed disparity in financial 
remuneration for counter fraud specialists.  Several studies have attempted to find out the 
reasons for salary disparity on employees performing the same job or similar roles within 
the same profession. They all concluded that although salary inequity was a difficult 
concept, there were many different factors that come together to influence pay inequity 
within occupational groups, with examples including the job itself, age, education, work 
experience and geographical location (Romanoff et al, 1986; Truman & Baroudi, 1994; 
Income Data Services, 2008; Kyrillidou, 2000). Given this, the semi-structured interviews 
sought views from respondents on the rationale for the existence of salary disparity across 
the sectors (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.6), despite performing similar roles within the same 
profession.  
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Remuneration disparity:  
Listed below and discussed thereafter were the three key themes emerging on the 
differences in salary across the three counter fraud organisations (DWP, LA and NHS): 
• The existence of different pay structures and pension arrangements,  
• Geographical location and;  
• Differences in national policies, guidance, job descriptions and skills for the roles 
across the three counter fraud organisations. 
 
Different pay structures and pension arrangements:  
Different pay structures and pension arrangements existed across the sector. The existence 
of such differences affects annual salary of respondents across the three organisations. For 
instance, interviewees mentioned that whereas the Civil Service Pension Scheme covered 
counter fraud specialists within the DWP that were least paid (Chapter 4, Figure 4.6), it 
was less so for their counterparts within the Local Authority and NHS. Counter fraud 
specialists within the latter two organisations had to pay part on their monthly salary into 
an occupational pension scheme. Therefore, counter fraud specialists within the DWP were 
not financially disadvantaged when compared to their NHS and LA counterparts in the 
end. 
 
Geographical location:  
Geographical location was the second reason mentioned by interviewees, where fraud 
specialists working in London area received London weighting as part of their salary. This 
probably had an influence on the salary of respondents in the survey; given the region with 
the second highest number of respondents (11.3%) in the study was London (Chapter 4, 
Figure 4.3). Similarly, the follow –up interviews also had most respondents (10 out of 13) 
located in the London and South East Region (Chapter 3, Figure 3.5).  Thus, geographical 
location of counter fraud specialists in the study was probably one of the reasons for the 
salary inequity as has been suggested in earlier research studies (Income Data Services, 
2008; Kyrillidou, 2000; Romanoff et al, 1986; Truman & Baroudi, 1994).   
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Different national policies, guidance, job description and skills for the role:  
As well as differences in pension arrangements and geographical factors, the third theme 
that emerged in relation to salary differences was the existence of different national 
policies, guidance, job description and skills required for the role across the DWP, NHS 
and LA. Illustrating the different national policies and guidance across the three 
organisations is the legally binding nature of the Secretary of State’s for Health Directions 
on every NHS Trust in UK to employ a Local Counter Fraud Specialist (LCFS) trained and 
accredited to PINS standard (Button et al, 2007a). Compared to the other organisations 
such as the DWP and LA, Button et al (2007a) argued that “there is no equivalent legal 
requirement, something which explains the different levels of commitment amongst 
CFPAB members to the professionalisation agenda” (p.204).   Linked to this is the 
variation in job description and skills for the role as evidenced in Chapter 1, Table 1.2.   
 
Education:  
In addition to salary disparities, the study explored the views of interviewees’ on counter 
fraud specialists’ education. As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2), educating 
professionals to higher University qualifications enhance professionals’ academic 
knowledge in the specialised field. In addition, it increases the potential for career mobility 
and professional growth (Neal & Morgan, 2000; Mackinnon, 1984). Bledstein (1976) has 
also argued on the relevance of credentials from higher education and how it provided 
professionals with authority and status in the relevant field. However, Chapter 4, Table 4.2 
revealed disparity in educational attainment with a fewer number of counter fraud 
specialists (less than a quarter of the sample – 24.4%) educated to degree or postgraduate 
level. In addition, less than half of the sample (44.6%) in the study had no desire for 
pursuing the Advanced level counter fraud qualification (Chapter 4, Table 4.3). 
Furthermore, counter fraud specialists in the study attached least importance to completing 
University Degree or Masters to improving performance at work (mean score = 4/10).  
 
Listed below and discussed thereafter were the three main themes revealed in the survey on 
counter fraud specialists’ education:  
• Polarity in management attitude and perception of counter fraud specialists, 
• Divergence between “university degree” and “practical training” for the job; as 
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well as  
• University education not forming part of the “job requirement” and 
“Commitments”.  
 
Polarity in management attitude:  “Specialists” vrs “Generalists / Investigators”   
Firstly, the survey revealed polarity in management attitude and perception of counter 
fraud specialists across the three main public sector counter fraud organisations in the 
study. For instance, whereas management within the NHS perceived their anti-fraud staff 
as ‘specialists’ with emphasis on training and education, this was the opposite within the 
DWP. For the anti-fraud staff within the DWP, their management (Jobcentre Plus) 
perceived them as ‘generalists’.  In addition, they had job titles as ‘Investigators’ as 
opposed to ‘Specialists’, despite attending accredited counter fraud training course 
approved by the CFPAB in line with the professionalisation agenda.  Related to the 
polarity in management attitude was the relative ‘newness’ of NHS CFSMS as an 
organisation where management expected more from their anti-fraud staff, as opposed to 
the DWP and LA. Indeed, the documentary analysis of counter fraud specialists’ job 
advertisement (Chapter 1, Table 1.2) revealed marked differences in terms of the minimum 
educational requirements amongst DWP, LA and NHS. For the NHS, the minimum 
educational requirement was ‘A’ Level or Higher, but less so for the DWP and LA. 
Furthermore, the latter two organisations (DWP and LA) had been investigating fraud long 
before the professionalisation agenda in 1998. This probably reflected why survey 
respondents from both DWP and LA had remained longest with their employer as 
compared to the NHS CFSMS (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.2).  Prior to that, fraud 
investigators in both DWP and LA had the ‘Investigator’ job title. The polarity of 
management perception of counter fraud specialists across the DWP, NHS and LA could 
be argued to illustrate problems with shared identity, integration (Durkheim, 1966) and the 
extent to which those organisations had embraced the concept of professionalisation 
(Goode, 1969).  
 
Divergence between “University degree” and “Practical training” for the job:    
In addition to polarity in management attitude, divergence between the skills gained from 
‘University degree’ and ‘practical training’ for the job emerged as the second theme for not 
pursuing education beyond graduate and postgraduate level. Generally, respondents felt 
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that undertaking “university degree” was not the same as acquiring the “daily practical 
training or skills” for the job. They felt that “practical training” provided the necessary 
practical skills needed for the day-to-day job, and those skills are acquired through 
experience. By contrast, interviewees felt that University degree provided the academic 
and theoretical knowledge, which did not equate practical training. Therefore, the daily 
practical training skills and experience needed for the job was more relevant than having 
an academic qualification. As well as this, the survey revealed that, placing more emphasis 
on academic qualification posed the “danger of neglecting a large number of people” with 
the necessary skills to perform the role very well, despite not having a University degree. 
The fallacy with the less desire to pursue further education was that, it appears counter 
fraud specialists have not realised that aspiring professionals within professionalising 
occupations needed both to strengthen the basis of knowledge 
 
The emerging perspectives illustrate the divergence between practical training and 
academic knowledge. While Harris-Jenkins (1970) evolutionary model of 
professionalisation held the view that professions developed by starting as apprenticeship, 
and then supplemented by examination followed by formal training at University (Chapter 
2, Table 2.2; see also discussion in Chapter 2, Section 2.3), the views from counter fraud 
specialists in the survey had failed to support this theory. For counter fraud specialists, it 
was evident in the survey that they preferred holding on to training courses that would 
provide them with the practical (vocational) training skills needed daily in the workplace to 
University education.  
 
“Non-job requirement” and “commitments”  
The third emerging theme on counter fraud specialists’ education related to the view that 
possession of a University degree did not form part of the job requirement for the role. 
Indeed, the results from the documentary analysis on counter fraud specialists job 
description and requirements (Chapter 1, Table 1.2), revealed only NHS CFSMS implied 
this. This probably explained the highest educational achievement in the NHS CFSMS to 
graduate level and beyond (33.4%), compared to the Local Authority (20.5%) and DWP 
(26.9%) as revealed in Chapter 4, Table 4.2.  Interviewees also mentioned personal and 
family commitments as other reasons for not pursuing University education beyond the 
minimum entry requirements for the post of a counter fraud specialist (the minimum entry 
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requirement is currently ACFS level). 
 
While the functionalist theory of profession and professionalisation expressed the need for 
professions to have academic routes to pursue further qualifications in the specialised field 
at University level to enhance career prospects, professional growth and increased body of 
knowledge (Table 2.2, and Chapter 2, Section 2.3), this study has found otherwise. 
Nonetheless, interviewees revealed other views relating to training and accreditation. 
Those are explored in the next section (Section 5.2).   
 
 5.2.  Entry Barriers – Training, Accreditation and Suggestions 
The relevance of training and accreditation was discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3 as part of 
the literature review. Proponents of institutional theory also highlighted how training and 
accreditation provide one of the symbolic pillars for professionalising occupations (Scott, 
2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  While investment in work-related training is a key to 
human capital (Booth & Bryan, 2002), the discussion of the survey questionnaire on 
training and accreditation (Chapter 4, Section 4.3),  revealed weaknesses in those symbolic 
pillars because of some local authorities training anti-fraud staff outside the CFPAB 
framework. The three main themes emerging on entry barriers (training and accreditation) 
were the:  
• Perception of central government initiatives and quality,  
• Differences in policy and management,  
• Lack of standard inspectorate / regulatory body for counter fraud specialists  
In addition, the study also sought views from respondents on mechanisms for improving 
the entry barriers on training and accreditation. This provided a fourth theme with the 
heading “improved training modules leading to the accreditation”. The emerging themes 
on entry barriers (training, accreditation and suggestion) are discussed as follows: 
 
Perception of central government initiative and quality issues 
The first theme related to the negative perception and quality issues associated with most 
central government initiatives. Respondents expressed that generally, there was the 
perception that initiatives often introduced by the central government were considered to 
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be less quality. Interestingly, PINS training was a central government initiative to combat 
the growing fraud.  Given the quality issues associated with central government initiatives, 
some local authorities have not embraced the PINS style of training as they lacked faith in 
it, despite being freely available to them. Therefore, those local authorities would be 
prepared to contract an external agency to train their anti-fraud staff.  Research comparing 
client-based (in-house) or corporate qualifications such as the NVQ/BTEC to open 
qualification programmes found the former to be more superior for employees in many 
respects (Brown, 1999; Simpson et al, 1994). While both programmes had their strengths 
and weaknesses, majority of the research participants (99%) agreed the client-based 
programme was more relevant in context and content than open accredited courses. In 
addition, it provided delegates with the opportunities for team-building, promotion of 
cultural change within the organisation, easier monitoring of performance, application of 
learning, and better support for students and quality learning. A further benefit was the 
ability to ensure training fitted organisational needs. These clearly reflect employers’ 
reluctance to commit to the accredited counter fraud-training programme. 
 
Policy and Management Issues     
As well as mentioning quality issues associated with central government initiatives and a 
culture of not embracing PINS training, policy and management issues emerged as the 
second theme. The latter was attributed to differences in policy across the three 
organisations in the survey.  For instance, while the NHS and DWP had made it a policy 
for training their counter fraud staff in PINS (NHS Professionals Special Health Authority, 
2005; DWP, 2010), this was less so within the local authorities because local Councillors 
manage local authorities differently. Therefore, depending on the political orientation of 
the respective Councillors and their attitude towards fraud against the Council, they would 
prefer a particular training for their anti fraud staff irrespective of CFPAB accreditation. 
This clearly illustrates a further divergence between managerial and professional logics. 
 
Lack of Standard Inspectorate Body/Regulatory Framework  
In addition to central government initiatives and quality, policy and management issues, 
the third theme that emerged from the survey was related to the lack of standard 
inspectorate body / regulatory framework capable of regulating the minimum skills 
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required for entering the counter fraud profession. The absence of such a body had led to a 
situation whereby anyone could set up a business to train counter fraud specialists, without 
necessarily being subjected to checks or regulatory standard.  Currently, there exists the 
CFPAB as the regulatory body to oversee the delivery of training courses, accreditation 
and promoting professional training courses with organisations having common interest in 
the development of professional training courses for counter fraud specialists 
(Rosenbloom, 2010).  Comparing CFPAB role with interviewees comments clearly 
demonstrate CFPAB failure in its role in ‘maintaining social closure’ (Macdonald, 1995), 
which weakens one of the normative pillars of professionalising occupations. 
 
  
Improved training modules leading to initial accreditation 
The  fourth theme that emerged was to improve the existing training modules leading to 
the initial accreditation given the inadequacy of the current foundation level training for 
the role (see Chapter 4, Table 4.4 ), together with the highest dissatisfaction levels with the 
quality of training (see Chapter 4, Table 4.19). Linked to this was the culture of local 
authorities training counter fraud specialists outside the CFPAB framework. The main 
theme that emerged from the follow up survey on resolving the training inadequacy in the 
existing entry qualification was to improve the training modules leading to the initial 
accreditation (currently ACFS), by incorporating more elements of vocational training 
(such as BTEC/NVQ), and rebranding it as CCFS/Diploma in Counter Fraud. The use of 
the latter (CCFS) as the new entry qualification was supported by most interview 
respondents (11 out of 13 favoured this). Only two interviewees preferred maintain the 
existing entry qualification (ACFS). Most interviewees felt that using CCFS as opposed to 
ACFS would have the potential to strengthen the normative pillars of entry into counter 
fraud occupation. Nonetheless, the two respondents that expressed negativity towards the 
potential new entry qualification (CCFS), felt it would not make any difference, given the 
management of local authorities by various Councillors with different political orientation 
and attitude towards anti-fraud work. 
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 5.3. Professional Cultures and Association 
Chapter 1, Section 1.1 provided the background information  on the  UK agencies involved 
in the investigation of fraud and classified counter fraud specialists as one of those 
agencies involved in ‘hybrid-policing’  because of the activities that they perform (Button 
et al, 2007a; Button, 2002, Johnston, 1992). Similarly, Chapter 1 also discussed those 
activities performed by counter fraud specialists and the relevant powers available to them. 
As well as this, the literature review (Chapter 2) also examined professional cultures and 
emphasised how those element provide one of the cultural-cognitive elements of 
professionalising occupations. While the literature to date on professional cultures of law 
enforcement agencies had concentrated on agencies such as the Police and Probation 
officers (Reiner, 2000; Chan, 1997; Newburn, 2007; Ellis & Boden, n.d), there were none 
for Counter Fraud Specialists. For instance, Chan (1997) described police culture as those 
“values, norms, perspectives and craft rules informing police conduct” (p.43). Those 
cultures involved a sense of mission about police work, orientation towards action / 
mission, cynicism or pessimism, constant suspicion of others, social isolation and strong 
solidarity with other police officers, conservatism, racial prejudice, machismo, and 
categorisation of the public into rough and the respectable. Despite attempts to 
professionalise police work, it is argued that the “occupational culture within the police 
condoned such practices” (Chan, 1997, p.44). 
 
The survey results in the previous chapter (Chapter 4, Section 4.4) raised issues on 
professional cultures and association membership of counter fraud specialists. Finding out 
the professional cultures of counter fraud specialists’ occupation revealed differences and 
similarities in professional cultures across the DWP, NHS and LA.  The survey results 
identified seven main themes (three main differences and four similarities) in relation to 
the professional cultures for counter fraud specialists across the three agencies. Those 
themes have been summarised in (Table 5.1), with the respective themes discussed under 
the headings: 
• Cultural differences and  
• Cultural similarities.   
As well as this, the study also revealed three main themes on poor attachment to 
professional association, but the themes on professional cultures illustrating ‘cultural 
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differences’ are discussed first. This is followed by those on ‘cultural similarities’ before 
the three themes on ‘poor attachment to professional association membership’. 
 
Cultural differences:  
“Them” and “Us” culture   
For the differences, the first main theme that emerged was the existence of a “Them” and 
“Us” culture across the NHS counter fraud community, compared to the DWP and the 
Local Authority (see Table 5.1). The existence of this type of culture within the NHS 
counter fraud community was attributed to Health Bodies directly employing very few 
LCFSs’ working for the NHS, while the various NHS Service Providers and Audit 
Consortium such as Bentley Jennison and ParkHill employed a large number. As one NHS 
Counter Fraud Specialist illustrated it: 
 
 
I think CFSMS do not have an overview of what goes on in the field which is an 
issue (Interviewee 1). 
 
The existence of a “Them” and “Us” culture partly reflects the UK government policy on 
contracting out services to the private sector (Dent & Whitehead, 2002). The introduction 
of internal market into the delivery of services across the NHS has brought about 
competition for resources including counter fraud service.  In their study on management 
of knowledge around clinical risks within the UK medical profession, Waring and Currie 
(2009) found a similar culture (“them” and “us”), between Hospital Clinicians and 
Hospital Risk Management Department. While the objective of management introduction 
of risk reporting and learning system was to improve patient safety and service quality, the 
Clinicians by contrast, had reservations about management intentions due to concerns of 
using reported risks as a form of surveillance on their practices. This led to Clinicians 
circumventing the system and developing their own departmental system of knowledge 
sharing with the Hospital management and retained their autonomy.  
 
Clearly, there is the divergence between managerial and professional logics (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Waring & Currie, 2009). Relating the 
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emerging theme on the existence of a “them” and “us” culture within the NHS counter 
fraud community to the literature review (see Chapter 2, Table 2.2 ) depicts that, counter 
fraud specialists have departed from the ‘shared bonds’ and ‘shared identity’ (Carr-
Saunders and Wilson, 1964; Greenwood, 1957) supposed to exist between practitioners. 
The lack of shared bonds and shared identity have also created competition and rivalry 
within the NHS counter fraud community, thereby acting as one of the obstacles to 
professionalisation (Millerson, 1964; Goode, 1960). Given the existence of “them” and 
“us” culture within the NHS counter fraud community and the growing fraud problem 
given the time of austerity measures in the UK public sector, the question that needs asking 
is, has the NHS reached a stage where the NHS CFSMS has to employ all counter fraud 
specialists working for the NHS as opposed to using the services of outside contractors 
with different professional logics? 
 
Table 5.1:  CFS Professional Cultures 
Culture NHS Local Authority DWP 
“Them” and “Us”  √   
Networking, equal treatment and 
opportunity 
 √  
Target driven   √ √ 
Remaining in the fraud environment √ √ √ 
Challenging environment, strong 
personality, intelligence sharing and 
joint working 
√ √ √ 
Frustration, Cynicism and 
Bureaucracy 
√ √ √ 
Insular and poor integration √ √ √ 
 
Strong networking and equality of opportunity 
In addition to the existence of “them” and “us” culture within the NHS counter fraud 
community, the second theme that emerged was the existence of a culture of “strong 
networking and equality of opportunity”  within the local authority counter fraud 
community (see Table 5.1). In addition, the local authorities have a strong policy on 
equality of opportunity. Therefore, there was no need to underestimate people based on 
their gender or racial background because the person may have a good record of 
accomplishing   successful prosecutions. Possible explanations for the development of 
those cultures within the Local Authority included the fact that, the Local Authority has 
had a long history of Local Government Association (LGA) and Local Authority Fraud 
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Investigation Officers Group (LAIOG). The latter, have a strong culture of annual 
conferences to discuss local authority fraud related issues. In addition, the gender balance 
between male (50.3%) and female (49.7%) within the Local Authority, compared to the 
NHS and DWP may explain the equality of opportunity (Chapter 4 Figure 4.1).  
  
Targeted culture  
The third theme on the differences in professional culture of counter fraud specialists 
related to the existence of a “target driven” culture, but was within the DWP and LA only 
(Table 5.1). For example, a DWP interviewee mentioned that management within the 
DWP Jobcentre Plus did not care about how an investigator arrived at the results and all 
that they were interested in was chasing targets.  This clearly echoed fraud investigators 
culture before the professionalisation agenda started (DWP, 1998). Arguably, the drive 
towards targets also reflected government policies on efficiency and cost cutting (Evetts, 
2003; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Davenport & Dellaportas, 2009).  Despite, the target 
driven culture within the DWP and LA, both placed emphasis on professionalism and 
customer orientation when dealing with potential fraudsters.  As highlighted in Chapter 2, 
the extent of reconciling target driven culture with professionalism and customer 
orientation within DWP and Local Authority was however arguable, given the New Public 
Management policies on contracting out services, cost cutting , targets and efficiency drive 
were all market logics ideologies as opposed to service and public protection logics of 
functionalist ideologies of professions. The transformations from service logics to market 
logics create conflict among professionals within bureaucratic organisations (Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Hall, 1968; Davenport & Dellaportas, 
2009).   
 
Cultural similarities:  
Remaining in the fraud environment  
In relation to cultural similarities, it emerged that there was the tendency for counter fraud 
specialists to remain in the “fraud arena” (see Table 5.1), by either remaining within the 
same organisation or seek employment elsewhere but within the fraud environment 
(Chapter 3, Figure 3.6). Of those with the tendency to remain with the same employer, this 
was particular within the DWP where counter fraud specialists were reluctant to leave the 
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fraud arena because they perceived the job role as one of the “better jobs” within the DWP.  
This probably explained why DWP respondents had the longest period of service (10.5 
years) across the sector compared to the local authority (9 years) and NHS CFSMS (6.5 
years) as revealed in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2. By contrast, those with the tendency of seeking 
employment elsewhere, tends to work for the LA or NHS because of better employment 
prospects and experience from previous fraud investigation.  
 
 Challenging environment, intelligence sharing and strong personality 
The second similarity related to the culture of “working in a challenging environment, 
intelligence sharing and joined up working” across the sector (see Table 5.1).  In addition, 
counter fraud specialists had a strong personality (Albrecht et al, 2009; Page & King, 
2008), with the ability to deal with a different kind of people at different levels (Gourley, 
1950) ranging from cleaners to Hospital consultants. The ability to work in challenging 
environments is consistent with Button et al’s (2007b) study, which revealed the 
challenging nature of counter fraud specialists working environments. The analysis of 
documents on counter fraud specialists’ job descriptions (see Chapter 1, Table 1.2) also 
revealed similar evidence on the challenging nature of counter fraud specialists working 
environments. The ability for counter fraud specialists to work in challenging 
environments, have a strong personality and operate in an environment of intelligence 
sharing is akin to Chan (1997) and Reiner (2000) study on the professional cultures of law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
 Cynicism, frustration and bureaucracy 
The interviews also revealed a culture of cynicism, frustration and bureaucratic 
environments as the third emerging theme on the similarities in professional cultures of 
counter fraud specialists across the DWP, NHS and the Local Authority (Table 5.1). 
Respondents attribute the existence of those cultures to poor accountability and 
organisational culture. Respondents cited two main reasons to support their views on 
cynicism, frustration and bureaucracy. Firstly, despite counter fraud specialists going to 
great length to prove the occurrence of fraud, the investigation could fall apart because 
either a manager had perpetuated that or procedures were not in place. It could also be that 
a line manager saw the fraud and did not do anything about it, thus creating frustration and 
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cynicism for anti-fraud specialists on the whole anti-fraud culture ‘mantra’ of countering 
fraud.  
 
Those cultures clearly reflect the tensions between managerial and professional logics and 
the pursuit of diverse interest (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; 
Scott, 2008, Waring & Currie, 2009).  Those factors undermined professionalism of 
counter fraud specialists and the profession itself. Respondents also attributed the second 
area of cynicism to facts obtained from suspected fraudsters. There was a culture of not 
taking the first answer from the interrogation of suspected fraudsters, unless crosschecked. 
The existence of cynicism and the culture of suspicion within the counter fraud community 
echoed those characteristics of police cultures identified by Reiner (2000) and Chan 
(1997). Interviewees attributed the frustration and bureaucracy to organisational culture 
itself such as the NHS, characterised by layers of managers, bureaucracy and autocratic 
management style with poor accountability makes it difficult for counter fraud specialists 
to break those barriers.  In relation to bureaucracy, the study revealed the existence of rules 
and restrictions binding counter fraud professionals working activities, and relying on other 
organisations for intelligence sharing. This was often problematic, particularly when the 
Local Authorities and NHS requested information for the detection and investigation of 
fraud from DWP under Section 29(3) of Data Protection Act. The existence of cynical 
cultures despite the initiatives to professionalise counter fraud specialists undermines the 
professionalisation agenda and professionalism amongst counter fraud specialists. 
 
Insular and poor integration 
The fourth counter fraud specialists professional cultures that emerged was the existence of 
insular culture. Interviewees revealed the existence of a culture of social isolation based on 
the nature of anti-fraud work itself, which normally took place in covert circumstances and 
made the anti-fraud staff rarely seen within the respective organisational departments. In 
addition, everything anti-fraud staff did, particularly those involving investigations 
normally focussed on criminal outcomes thereby making it difficult to integrate into other 
aspects of the business/organisation. Similarly, each investigator had his or her caseload 
and quietly got on with it, until the investigation reaches a final stage where it became 
teamwork.  
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Professional association membership and poor attachment 
Linked to the emerging themes on the differences and similarities on the professional 
cultures of counter fraud specialists, were views from interviewees on poor attachment to 
professional association membership. This was highlighted at the beginning of this section 
(Section 5.3). Although membership of professional association is voluntary in nature 
(Bennett, 1995), the literature review (Chapter 2) revealed that it helps to socialise new 
entrants (Waugaman, 2000) on acceptable behaviours, shared identity and act as a source 
of a single voice (Greenwood, 1957; Millerson, 1964, Scott, 2008, Currie & Suhomlinova, 
2006; Currie, Finn & Martin, 2009). Yet, the survey results in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4) 
identified poor attachment to professional association with just over a third (39.5% of the 
sample) affiliated to an association. Linked to this was the generally less importance 
attached to professional association membership (5.8/10).  Three main themes emerging 
for poor attachment to professional association membership were: 
• Differences in senior management attitude, subscription cost and benefits 
• Lack of common shared identity and Sceptism 
• Cultural and historical factors 
Those themes are discussed as follows: 
 
Differences in senior management attitude, subscription cost and benefits 
Differences in senior management attitude towards counter fraud specialists across the 
DWP, NHS and LA, yet again, emerged as the main barrier (6 out of 13 respondents) to the 
importance that counter fraud specialists placed on professional association membership. 
For instance, respondents mentioned that within the NHS, there was a culture of senior 
management promoting and supporting counter fraud specialists. In addition, they 
perceived their anti-fraud staff as “specialists”. Compared to DWP Jobcentre Plus, this was 
less so because Jobcentre Plus management perceived their anti-fraud professionals as 
Civil Servants working within different aspects of the organsiation. Hence, Jobcentre Plus 
management did not see the need for a profession. Illustrating this view was a quote from a 
Senior Manager from DWP: 
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We should not have a profession because JCP investigators are civil servants. In 
DWP, there are no professions. They become professional in what they do but they 
are not members of a profession (Interviewee 13) 
 
 
The cultural differences and management attitudes probably explains the reason for higher 
number of NHS CFSMS respondents (44.6%) affiliated to professional association 
compared to DWP (19.2%) and LA (39.1%) as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
Additionally, interviewees cited issues such as subscription cost and associated benefits 
and poor publicity particularly within the DWP acted as barriers to association 
membership. This finding is consistent with the survey results on the reasons for non-
membership to professional association (Chapter 4, Table 4.8). Given that membership of 
professional association is voluntary in nature (Bennett, 1995), there is the need for 
existing counter fraud association (ICFS), if possible, to develop policies to encourage 
membership affiliation. 
 
Common shared identity and sceptism 
Linked to differences in management attitude, subscription cost and benefits was the 
problem of “common shared identity and sceptism”. The lack of common shared identity 
was related to the poorly embraced nature of the concept of professionalisation by counter 
fraud specialists. This was due to the mentality held by some counter fraud specialists on 
focussing more on the workload, rather than indulging in the cultural and ritual aspects of 
the profession. Illustrating the latter was the quote below from a Local Authority Counter 
Fraud Specialist:  
 ... What mattered to individual counter fraud specialist was obtaining the initial 
accreditation but nothing to do with professional association. (Interviewee 10). 
 
The expression of “scepticism” also related to perception of the political and disjointed 
nature of existing counter fraud specialists association such as the Institute of Counter 
Fraud Specialists. Respondents felt ICFS was too political and run by people with a 
different agenda.  Added to this was the fact that membership of a professional association 
did not form part of the job requirements for counter fraud specialists. Indeed, the 
documentary analysis of job requirements for counter fraud specialists did not find any 
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evidence of association membership as a requirement for counter specialist (see Chapter 1, 
Table 1.2). As an NHS Senior Manager puts it: 
The existing arrangements are disjointed and people cannot attach themselves to 
what is not there  (Interviewee 4) 
 
Cultural and historical issues 
As well as problems with shared identity and sceptism, “cultural and historical issues” 
emerged as a further theme for the less importance that counter fraud specialists attached to 
professional association membership. Culturally, the concept of professionalisation is 
relatively new to people involved in the investigation of fraud. Until the introduction of the 
initiatives to professionalise anti-fraud work, most people worked as ‘investigators’ as 
opposed to ‘Counter fraud specialists’ (DWP, 1998). While Caplow (1954) have noted that 
changing name was one of the processes associated with professionalising occupations (see 
Chapter 2, Table 2.2), the views from the semi-structured interviews seemed to suggest 
that, in spite of the professionalisation initiatives, there were people who continue to 
perceive themselves primarily as “Investigators as opposed to “Counter Fraud Specialists”. 
Those people have not really embraced the idea that there was something beyond 
investigation. The historical issues by contrast, related to the origin of existing counter 
fraud association –ICFS, which originated from the NHS. Therefore, when non-NHS 
counter fraud specialists looked at the historical origin of ICFS, there was the perception 
that it was aligned to the NHS, which made them reluctant to join. Thus, the least 
importance and affiliation to professional association is caused by multiple factors 
involving differences in management attitude, membership fee and associated benefits, 
sceptism and politics, cultural and historical issues as well as the impact of New Public 
Management policies emphasising market logics (see Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006).  
Combinations of those factors have an impact on developing strong cultural bonds, shared 
identity and associated professional cultures for professionalising counter fraud specialists. 
 
Given the various reasons identified for variations in professional association attachment,   
the survey-explored participants’ views on having a single recognised counter fraud 
association representing all counter fraud professionals.  Seven out of the thirteen 
interviewees commented while the remaining six did not. Of those interviewees that did 
comment, most (5) favoured the idea. Participants favouring the latter expressed that it 
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would have the benefit of uniting counter fraud professionals provided such an association 
had the necessarily infrastructure, proper leadership and representatives from different 
organisations.   
 
Only a minority of respondents (2 interviewees) from DWP expressed negativity towards 
the idea. They mentioned that given the DWP Civil Service culture, it  [DWP] would have 
to gain approval from the Cabinet Office to allow it to join,  otherwise it would be 
dangerous for any department to go on their own. In addition, there were issues with 
current CFS training where certain organisations such as the HMRC were not on board 
with CFS training. Further issues mentioned were the different policies across the local 
authorities coupled with the DWP culture of not embracing the concept of 
professionalisation. One respondent however indicated the existing arrangement with a 
common standard of accreditation for investigator across the three groups of employers 
was credible enough. Therefore, there was no need for a profession. As one interviewee 
summarised it:  
 
 I don’t believe in profession, I believe in professionalism (Interviewee 13) 
 
The views from respondents illustrate that while there was the potential for having a single 
counter fraud specialists association that would contribute to enhancing the 
professionalisation agenda, potential obstacles existed as well (Wilensky, 1964), and those 
barriers needed overcoming. Recommendations for overcoming those barriers are 
discussed in the last chapter (Chapter 6, Section 6.4). 
  
 5.4. Body of Knowledge   
In addition to salary rewards, training, education, accreditation and entry barriers together 
with professional cultures and association issues discussed in the previous section (Chapter 
5, Section 5.1 – 5.3), professionalising occupations need a pool of knowledge that has been 
systematically organised to provide the theoretical base for the occupation (Greenwood, 
1957).  The literature review (Chapter 2 and Table 2.2), also revealed how having a 
dedicated occupational publication formed part of a profession’s body of knowledge. 
Linked to this was the medico-legal and accountancy model (Chapter 2, Table 2.3), which 
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illustrated the existence of those elements for medical, legal and accountancy occupations. 
Yet, for counter fraud specialists, this was however nonexistent as revealed in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 4, Section 4.5). Given this, the semi-structured interview asked research 
participants on their views for having a dedicated occupational publication for counter 
fraud specialists.  The main theme that emerged was that of enhanced image and credibility 
as discussed below:  
 
Enhanced Image and Credibility 
Interestingly, a majority of respondents (10 out of 13) thought that it would be useful 
having dedicated occupational publication for counter fraud specialists. By contrast, two 
respondents felt it was irrelevant given the limited number of counter fraud specialists in 
the field, while one interviewee was unable to provide any comment. Nonetheless, the 
majority that responded felt it would benefit counter fraud specialists in two main areas. 
Firstly, it would act as a source of job advertisement as well as keep counter fraud 
specialists knowledge updated on a number of developments such as changes in the 
Criminal Justice System and legislation, case studies illustrating good practices and 
comments from Judges on investigative practices. Secondly, it would enhance the image 
and credibility of the profession (Bledstein, 1976), as well as provide better insights into 
the world of counter fraud. As one interviewee, a senior fraud manager working for a 
particular local authority explained:  
It is true that Local Authority have their own (HB Direct and Opportunities) and so 
are the NHS and DWP, but there isn’t one solely dedicated to all counter fraud 
specialists. (Interviewee 3) 
 
This extract contributes to providing a clear illustration of one of the weaknesses in those 
cultural symbols of professionalising occupation (Scott, 2008; Millerson, 1964), such as 
counter fraud occupation. Thus, given that most interviewees expressed the potential 
benefits of the dedicated occupation publication, having such publication would contribute 
to developing the body of knowledge available to counter fraud specialists.  The next 
section (Section 5.5) explores the views on regulative pillars (Code of conduct and CPD) 
from interviewees, while the next chapter (Chapter 6, Section 6.2) draws together 
emerging findings from the survey and relates them to the literature review for the study 
(Chapter 2). 
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 5.5. Regulative Pillars - Code of Conduct and CPD 
 
Code of Conduct: 
The literature review (Chapter 2 and Table 2.2) discussed the roles of ethical and 
professional code of conduct together with the importance. It also revealed how proponents 
of institutional and professionalisation theories (Scott, 2008; Millerson, 1964; Friedland & 
Alford, 1991) emphasised the relevance of regulative pillars in shaping members 
behaviour. As well as revealing the extent of importance placed on code of conduct and 
their diversity (Chapter 4, Section 4.6), the study also identified a major weakness in the 
regulative pillars of counter fraud specialists’ occupation involving the fewer number that 
had awareness of the accreditation board's (CFPAB) code of conduct (Chapter 4, Table 
4.10). The study sought the views of interviewees on whether to have a new code of 
conduct for counter fraud specialists,  but interviewees felt it “unnecessary and irrelevant” 
as discussed below: 
 
New code unnecessary and irrelevant 
Most interviewees (7 out of 13) in the study felt that having a new code of conduct for 
counter fraud specialists was unnecessary and irrelevant, because the existing CFPAB code 
of conduct was binding on all accredited counter fraud specialists as indicated in 
Rosenbloom (2010) and CFPAB News (2004). Thus, most interviewees felt the existing 
CFPAB code of conduct was enough to regulate and discipline counter fraud specialists for 
misconduct. Rather, the problem with the minority having an awareness was probably due 
to lack of enforcement. As one interviewee puts it: 
 
I think a national code that people sign up to would be a good idea but how could it 
be enforced?  Until counter fraud specialists have an organisation or a professional 
body which dismisses its members for a breach of the code there is not really a lot 
of point in having a code of conduct (Interviewee 14) 
 
The non – enforcement of regulative code of conduct supposed to shape members within 
an organisation or professional body is one of the major obstacles of professionalisation. 
Indeed, research  studies by Millerson (1964), Nitsch et al (2005) found that while 
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organisations and professional associations may have elaborate codes of conduct, reporting 
and sanctioning violations were rarely enforced, which leads to cynicism, anger and 
frustration among members who witnessed such acts. Nitsch et al (2005) attributed the 
reasons for not  reporting breach of code of conduct to the seriousness of the offence, the 
position of the offender, the degree of certainty that an offence has been committed, the 
likelihood that an action would be taken as well as possibility of retribution from the 
offender. In addition to the reasons for not reporting, Millerson (1964) also suggested that 
“continuous revelations of unethical practice might cause a loss in confidence outside the 
association [or organisation] and even lead to fall in morale within the organisation” 
(p.175).  Therefore, in order for codes of conduct to make a positive contribution to the 
profession, they must be enforced. In addition, the code of conduct has to be 
communicated to counter fraud specialists using reminders such as conferences and 
presentations to drawing members’ attention to their existence.  
 
 
Continuous Professional Development (CPD):  
As well as professional and ethical code of conduct, an emerging perspective of regulating 
professionals is CPD. The latter is now mandatory for professions such as medicine, law 
and accountancy (Chapter 2, Table 2.3). Similarly, the literature review (Chapter 2 and 
Table 2.2) discussed the dynamic nature of knowledge (Millerson, 1964; Evetts, 1999; 
Neal & Morgan, 2000) and how professionals could remain competent in their respective 
fields using CPDs’ to update their skills.  As revealed in the previous chapter (Chapter 4, 
Figure 4.16), counter fraud specialists placed a high importance on continuous professional 
development. Yet, it was evident that nearly half of the sample (45.5%) had not undertaken 
any form of CPD over the last three years (Chapter 4, Figure 4.17). Given this, the follow 
up survey (semi-structured interviews) sought views from interviewees on the introduction 
of compulsory CPD for counter fraud specialists to remain accredited, as other occupations 
had done.  Most interviewees (8 out of 13) who favoured the idea felt it would help them to 
update their skills. In relation to the literature, this finding confirms Neal and Morgan 
(2000) view on the relevance of CPD (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). By contrast, there were a 
minority (4 out of 13) of respondents (mostly from within the DWP) who had reservation 
about compulsory CPD for counter fraud specialists. One interviewee was unable to 
provide any comment. Of those having reservations about compulsory CPD, the main 
theme emerging from their concern related to issues with “human resources issues and 
career ‘drift’ ” as discussed below. 
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Human Resource (HR) issues and career ‘drift’ 
The DWP respondents expressed reservations about the introduction of compulsory CPD 
by citing the following two reasons. Firstly, was the lack of a single career line in counter 
fraud within the DWP, where the organisational culture was such that people moved in and 
out of anti- fraud work. The ‘drift’ in anti-fraud career probably illustrate why their 
management perceived them as ‘generalists’ as opposed to ‘specialists’ (see themes on 
education in Chapter 5, Section 5.1)  The lack of a single career line in counter fraud 
within the DWP probably explains the highest dissatisfaction level with promotion 
opportunities (Chapter 4, Table 4.16).  The lack of a single career line in counter fraud 
work within DWP meant the introduction of compulsory CPD to remain accredited would 
affect those on career break from anti-fraud work. Where this was the case, then having a 
compulsory CPD for counter fraud professionals ought to have consideration for equity, 
fairness and human resource issues, given the negative impact. The policy implications for 
this, together with recommendations are discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 6).  
 
5.6.   Professional Autonomy (Investigations Interference) and 
Prestige  
Besides revealing various perspectives on salary disparity, training and accreditation, body 
of knowledge, professional cultures and regulatory issues, interviewees provided further 
perspectives on interference with professional autonomy. In addition, interview 
respondents provided further insight on why they “enjoyed doing this type of job” 
(countering fraud) as opposed to the “prestige” of the job.  
 
Professional autonomy   
In relation to professional autonomy Chapter 1 discussed the powers available to counter 
fraud specialists for the detection and investigation of fraud. In addition, the literature 
review (Chapter 2 and Table 2.2) also noted how professionals’ derived authority from the 
specific areas of training and academic discipline needed to perform tasks as salaried 
employees. Chapter 4 (Figure 4.20a) revealed around a fifth of counter fraud specialists 
had experienced senior management pressure to end investigations. Further exploration of 
the latter using semi-structured interview revealed the theme “balancing investigation 
resources against cost” as discussed below.  
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Balancing investigative resources, cost and insufficient evidence 
 Generally, management interference in counter fraud investigations is arguably 
interference in professional authority, as interference prevents the professional from 
applying the training skills to the specialised area. Nonetheless, it emerged that 
management interfered because investigations consumed the already limited fraud 
investigation resources of the respective organisation. Where a particular investigation has 
continued for a considerable period of time without any success, it made sense for 
management to balance cost and resources and ask the counter fraud specialist to end the 
case. In addition, management may end cases on the basis of insufficient evidence. 
Arguably, counter fraud specialists may perceive this as interference in professional 
authority, but management may have a different view. Therefore, managerial prerogative 
took priority over professional prerogative... As one senior manager with fraud 
investigation experience indicated: 
 
I think, what happens to anyone who manages large numbers of operational staff is  
to step in at a point and ask where it’s going, particularly on large or complex 
investigations. If investigators were left to their own devices, investigations will 
run and spread and become endless, but it should be noted that these have impact 
on resources and that is where management have to step in (Interviewee HoF1) 
 
 
 
 
The difference in perspectives between professionals and managerial prerogative, coupled 
with budget restrictions leads to conflict resulting from pursuing different logic (Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Scott, 2008). This departs from the 
Weberian approach to professions with emphasis on power, authority and dominance 
(Johnson, 1972). Similarly, it limits the professional freedom in exercising those skills, 
knowledge and autonomy in professional judgement (Greenwood, 1957; Waring & Currie, 
2009). Furthermore, where management end cases because of their complexity as implied 
above, then, it is questionable whether the ideology for the professionalisation initiatives 
was really worth it as it effectively lead to a two-tier system or differential approaches to 
prosecuting fraud - “rich law, poor law” (Cook, 1989).  
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‘Prestige’ vrs ‘Enjoyed doing this type of job’ 
In addition to investigation interference, cultural school theorists such as Bledstein (1976) 
have argued that one of the key elements associated with professions is prestige (Chapter 2, 
Table 2.1). However, the discussion in Chapter 4, Figure 4.5 revealed otherwise, given 
responses on the best reason for applying for counter fraud specialists’ role. As revealed in 
Chapter 4, Figure 4.5, the best reason for applying for the role was ‘enjoyed doing this type 
of job’ (25.8%) as opposed to ‘prestige of the job’ (0.3%). Further exploration of the two 
perspectives using interviews found similar results, with all interviewees expressing the 
lack of prestige associated with counter fraud specialists’ occupation. Thus, confirming the 
earlier results in Chapter 4, Figure 4.5. Arguably, the lack of prestige associated with 
counter fraud specialists profession departs from the view held by Bledstein (1976) that 
profession have prestige. Generally, interviewees felt the occupation lacked prestige 
because it is ‘rarely known outside the counter fraud community’, compared to well-
recognised occupations such as medicine, law and accountancy (Millerson, 1964; 
Greenwood, 1957). As one interviewee summarised it: 
 
It is not a glory job ... it is not  the best job to publicise about ... and we don’t need 
uniform for counter fraud specialists because there is no prestige in having 
someone sitting out there crying their eyes out !  (Interviewee 3). 
 
By contrast, interviewees revealed three key reasons for ‘enjoying this type of job’ – job as 
a counter fraud specialist. Those involved: 
• Protecting the public purse and seeing to societal good 
 
• Being the ‘local bobby’  and opportunity to share ideas, knowledge, skills and 
drawing people’s attention to fraud within the organisation 
 
• The satisfaction from using skills and determination to obtain successful 
prosecution for fraud, despite not having police powers or involvement of the 
police in the case. 
 
Generally, the desire to ‘protect the public purse’ as opposed to the ‘prestige’ of the job, the 
tendency to remain in the fraud arena (Chapter 3, Figure 3.6), could be argued to illustrate 
the altruistic orientation and preference for service logic. Secondly, it also illustrates 
different orientation and motivation towards work. Generally, some people are motivated 
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to work because of the expected extrinsic (such as security, pay and working conditions) 
and intrinsic (such as opportunities for advancement, achievement and recognition) 
variables (Wrzesniewski, 2003). For others, work can be a source of pain, boredom, a 
source of joy, energy and fulfilment or a mixture of those complex elements 
(Wrzesniewski, 2003).  
  
5.7. Perspectives on Counter Fraud Occupation  
As well as the areas discussed in the previous sections, the survey sought views from 
interviewees on the perceptions of counter fraud specialists’ profession. Occupational 
researchers described the perception of occupation as “how people form concepts about the 
occupational world, how they interrelate these concepts, and how they manipulate and 
evaluate them when making vocationally relevant decisions” (Coxon & Jones, 1978, p.3). 
Despite the relevance of occupational research to policy makers, critics however 
questioned the process of combining different kinds of evidence to form an impression 
about an occupation. In addition, occupational images differed, not only at individual level 
but also at group level (Coxon & Jones, 1978, p.193). Nonetheless, the earlier discussions 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.10) identified the general perception of counter fraud professionals 
on their own occupation in relation to others (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.25). To gain more 
insights on the differences in perceptions amongst counter fraud specialists across the 
sectors, a follow up interview was undertaken to explore the rationale for those differences.  
 
 
Generally, it emerged interviewees across the sector had divergent views on the occupation 
as a counter fraud specialist in relation to others such as medicine, law or accountancy.  
Most interviewees (5 out of 9) did not view the occupation of a counter fraud specialist as 
a profession in comparison to medicine, law or accountancy. The remaining four did not 
provide any comment. Of those that responded, only five interviewees perceived the 
occupation of a counter fraud specialist as a profession, while four did not. For simplicity 
and easier understanding, the perspectives from respondents are classified with respect to 
emerging theme(s) and respondent’s hierarchical /structural position occupied within the 
respective sectors as discussed below. This has also been summarised on the next page as 
Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2.  Perspectives on Counter Fraud Occupation 
 Counter Fraud 
Specialists 
Fraud Managers Senior Managers 
DWP     X     X   
NHS       X   
LA       X   
Key :    X   = Not a Profession        
 
   =  Profession 
 
 
 
Counter Fraud Specialists: ‘normative pillars’ vrs ‘shared identity’ 
Out of the three counter fraud specialists interviewed, only two respondents (those within 
the NHS and Local Authority) perceived the occupation as a profession compared to the 
DWP respondent (Table 5.2). For the two that did, they expressed that in spite of the 
variations in the tasks performed by counter fraud specialists, the role required a level of 
training and to meet the minimum entry requirement by the Counter Fraud Professional 
Accreditation Board. This view was consistent with the professionalisation initiatives (see 
DWP, 1998) together with the theoretical framework of professions and professionalisation 
identified by writers such as Carr-Saunders (1966), Wilensky (1964) and Simonsen (1996) 
as well as Neal and Morgan (2000). Those theorists hold the view that one of the 
normative criteria to enter a profession is the existence of minimum entry qualification or 
competency testing that distinguishes the qualified from the unqualified (Chapter 2, Table 
2.2).  By contrast, the interviewee from the DWP did not consider it as a profession; given 
the DWP senior management within JobCentre Plus had negative attitude and commitment 
to profession. In addition,  DWP senior management perceived  their own counter fraud 
specialists as ‘Civil Servants’ and not allowed to use the title ‘counter fraud specialists’ but 
‘investigators’, despite successfully completing the CFPAB foundation training. The 
different perspectives on profession by counter fraud specialists across the sector illustrate 
the lack of shared identity and incompatibility between professional and managerial logics 
(Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, Scott, 2008; Waring & Currie, 
2009).   
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Fraud Managers: ‘poor  recognition’ and ‘shared identity’  
Responses from the fraud managers however, provided a different result to those expressed 
by the two NHS and LA interviewees (Table 5.2).  Surprisingly, none of the three fraud 
managers across the sector did regard the occupation of a counter fraud specialist as a 
profession in relation to medicine, law or accountancy. They felt counter fraud specialists’ 
occupation lacked recognition because of the following three reasons: 
• Firstly, counter fraud specialists begun just over a decade ago (relatively new 
compared to medicine, law and accountancy). Added to the relatively new nature of 
the concept ‘counter fraud specialist’ was the diverse nature of the occupational 
background of people entering the occupation, with examples including Auditors 
and Retired Police Officers (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.4). Those people (such as 
Auditors and Retired Police Officers) who enter counter fraud occupation perceived 
themselves as Auditors or Ex-Police Officers first, rather than being strongly 
identified as counter fraud specialists.  
 
• Secondly,  it had a shorter training period (average of three weeks) with non -
graduate entry requirement in comparison to medical, legal and accountancy 
profession (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).   
 
• Thirdly, there was the perception that the role of countering fraud formed part of 
another role. For instance, Auditors and Accountants may sometimes perform fraud 
investigation and detection activities as part of their role compared to those 
agencies having fraud investigation and detection as their main role (Treasury 
Report, 2012).  
 
As one fraud manager described it:  
 
I don’t regard counter fraud as a profession in relation to Doctors, ...  because most 
counter fraud practitioners have not had a higher level of educational achievement 
compared to Medical Doctors (Interviewee 14).  
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Senior Managers:  
It was interesting to note that the senior managers (all three interviewees) across the sector, 
unlike the fraud managers regarded the job and role of a counter fraud specialist as a 
profession (Table 5.2). The managers felt that it has a minimum entry criteria required by 
the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board. However, they cautioned that counter 
fraud specialists profession had certainly not reached that stage where it equated to the 
Medical, Legal or Accountancy profession. This was because the counter fraud profession 
did not have the necessary infrastructure in place. In addition, it had a shorter period of 
training. Chapter 6, Section 6.2 discussed this finding in relation to the literature (Chapter 
2) and implication for counter fraud specialists’ profession.  
 
 
5.8. CFS Dissatisfaction Levels and Anticipation of Profession 
Lastly, interviewees were asked for their views on the possible reasons for dissatisfaction 
levels with the quality of management, career structure and promotion opportunities for 
counter fraud specialists (see Chapter 4, Table 4.17 and 4.19) as well as interviewees 
overall views on the reality of a counter fraud specialists’ profession in the future.  In 
relation to the dissatisfaction levels with promotion opportunities and career structure, six 
interviewees out of the thirteen commented. The six that did, revealed polarisation in views 
for the career structure and promotion opportunities. While those respondents from the 
NHS CFMS and local authority (3 interviewees), expressed the existence of a vertical 
career structure and promotion opportunities within their organisations, those within the 
DWP Jobcentre Plus (3 interviewees) expressed the virtual lack of it within the DWP 
Jobcentre Plus. The latter attributed the virtual lack of a career structure and promotion 
opportunities for counter fraud specialists within the organisation to the organisational 
culture of: 
• Perceiving anti fraud staff as ‘generalists’ as opposed to ‘specialists’. 
• Appointing ‘Civil Servants’ who did not necessary have fraud background, 
knowledge, experience and understanding of fraud to manage fraud investigation 
teams, despite the Scampion Report (2000) recommendations 
• Chasing targets and fear within the organisation. This affects the quality of 
managing counter fraud specialists, thereby creating tensions and conflicts for 
professionals within the organisation (Hall, 1968; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; 
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Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Currie, Finn & Martin, 2009). 
As one DWP interviewee briefly summarised the quality of management within the DWP: 
I think there is a culture of fear amongst managers. Therefore, many of the 
parameters are bend to achieving targets and chasing the easier cases  
(Interviewee 8). 
 
Thus, a combination of the above factors may probably explain the higher level of 
promotion opportunities dissatisfaction and quality of management within the DWP as 
indicated in the previous chapter (Chapter 4, Table 4.17 and 4.19).  Similarly, while the 
documentary analysis on counter fraud specialists revealed the existence of career 
opportunities for counter fraud specialists within the NHS and Local Authority, this was 
none for the DWP (Chapter 1, Table 1.2). The lack of promotion and career opportunities 
within the DWP may also highlight the reasons for the reluctance to join professional 
association, given that career mobility was one of the reasons why people joined 
associations (Greenwood, 1957; Scott, 2008, Millerson, 1964).  
 
As well as providing perspectives on the dissatisfaction levels, interviewees also expressed 
their views on whether there would be a counter fraud specialists’ profession in the future. 
Generally, most interviewees (7 out of 13) expressed less optimism, compared to a 
minority (6 out of 13) that were more optimistic.  The three main reasons cited in support 
of their views of less optimism were as follows: 
• Firstly, was the feeling that, it was irrelevant to over-complicate the role of a 
counter fraud specialist by justifying it as a proper profession and rewarding it with 
higher pay as well as prestige.   
 
• Secondly, were the issues of inequity in financial rewards (Chapter 4, Figure 4.6), 
the educational attainment of counter fraud specialists across the sector (less than a 
quarter educated to graduate level and above – Chapter 4, Table 4.2). 
 
• Thirdly, the level of academic qualification needed to work for the DWP Jobcentre 
plus in relation to the NHS and LA (Chapter 1, Table 1.2; Button et al, 2007a), 
illustrate a further difficulty for expressing optimism for counter fraud profession 
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Thus, the above reasons clearly illustrate the difficulty in turning idealism to reality. Those 
issues were very difficult to resolve given the differences in organisational culture, 
management attitude towards fraud and perceptions towards counter fraud specialists. 
Interviewees also mentioned the problem of getting all the counter fraud specialists 
together, let alone manage them. As one respondent puts it: 
 
I think that there is always talk of bringing together all fraud investigators across 
government into one body.  I think that is cloud-cuckoo- land because the tasks are  
different  if you brought all investigators under one banner, as a single profession, 
you would find enormous problems in managing their outputs to meet the 
requirement of their employment organisations (Interviewee 13) 
 
The fourth reason cited by interviewees involved the weaknesses in the existing 
professional infrastructure for counter fraud specialists. As one interview participant 
pointed out: 
 
I don’t think the position was convincingly made at the beginning as to why a 
profession was needed – and that is compounded by it not having been already 
there (Interviewee 5a) 
 
Interviewees expressed that resolving the weaknesses would involve setting up those basic 
infrastructures with the legislative authority and ensuring that it was functioning as it 
should. In order to involve the government, there would need to be a parliamentary 
champion to propose private members bills to get the subject on to the political agenda.  If 
this led to government support for the idea and enabling legislation, there would then need 
to be a body set up for implementation.  Therefore, the process of developing support for 
the idea and making this much progress to set up a profession with legislative authority 
would take a number of years.  
 
By contrast,   the interviews also revealed responses from interviewees expressing more 
optimism (6 out of 13).  Generally, those interviewees felt that progress had been made so 
far in terms of the creation of the accreditation board and other infrastructures (Button et 
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al, 2007a; Frimpong & Baker, 2007), but this had lost some momentum and needed 
someone to energise it. Therefore, the potential was there subject to radical changes in the 
whole of the counter fraud set up. This involved getting all the counter fraud agencies 
signatory to the accreditation Board to work together, putting out a message for a 
profession, having a single consistent way of doing things and encouraging counter fraud 
professionals to join professional association (Durkheim, 1966).  
 
In addition, they felt that perhaps, the creation of the National Fraud Strategic Authority 
(now NFA) could assist in the professionalisation debate by bringing some of those issues 
discussed on the counter fraud profession together (Button et al, 2007a; Fraud Review 
Team, 2006b) and promote better working practices within the counter fraud environment. 
In spite of the NFA having the potential to influence the professionalisation agenda, 
interviewees largely expressed cynicism about the role of the NFA given the 2006 Fraud 
Review recommendation and what they were actually doing now even made the 
recommendation open for debate.  As one interviewee summarised the view on NFA:  
 
I think it’s interesting to compare what the government review of fraud says the 
NFSA’s job and priorities should be and what the NFA says it is going to do.  I 
think things have changed and maybe that inevitable.  Some people would say that 
they have changed for the better, I don’t know.  I think that the name change is 
unfortunate  (Interviewee 5a).  
 
Thus, generally, the existing weaknesses in the institutional framework (normative, 
regulative and socio-cognitive pillars) discussed earlier, together with internal dynamics as 
well as various organisational politics on professionalising counter fraud specialists, 
present challenges for the future.  
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5.9. Chapter Summary  
Chapter 4 revealed the initial findings of the survey questionnaire on counter fraud 
specialists. Chapter 5 examined the follow-up interview results with a selected number of 
counter fraud professionals on key themes outlined at the beginning of this chapter 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.0). The application of mixed-methods (multi-strategy) approaches 
identified earlier (Chapter 3) enabled the researcher to gain holistic knowledge, 
perspectives and voices from different institutional actors (Counter fraud specialists, Fraud 
Managers and Senior Managers) on the extent of counter fraud specialists profession and 
professionalisation. As revealed in the study, the follow-up survey in Chapter 5 identified a 
number of important themes with implications for policy makers on professionalising 
counter fraud specialists. Generally, the study revealed a number of developments that 
have emerged to enhance the status of counter fraud specialists in response to the 
professionalization agenda (Chapter 5, Section 5.0). Those developments provided 
evidence to support the emerging symbols of professionalisation that were discussed in the 
literature review (Chapter 2). In spite of developments, the study revealed weaknesses too. 
 
Nonetheless, the chapter revealed various themes on the rationale for differential 
remuneration for counter fraud professionals across the DWP, NHS and Local Authority, 
despite those professionals performing similar or comparable roles within the same 
occupation. As well as this, it also revealed themes on differential educational attainment 
for counter fraud professionals in the study and reluctance to pursue graduate and 
postgraduate education in the field (Chapter 5, Section 5.1). This was followed by themes 
on entry barriers relating to training and accreditation that had acted as problem for 
strengthening ‘social closure’ (Scott, 2008; Macdonald, 1995; Greenwood, 1957; Currie, 
Finn & Martin, 2009) into counter fraud occupation and suggestions for improvements. 
Nonetheless, the study revealed mixed views on using CCFS as the new entry 
qualification, given the management of local authorities by elected Councillors with 
different political orientation and attitude towards fraud (Chapter 5, Section 5.2).  
 
Linked to the themes on differential remuneration, educational attainment and entry 
barriers on training and accreditation was the strong support for increasing the body of 
knowledge in the field of counter fraud, by creating a dedicated occupational publication 
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for counter fraud specialists. This would have an additional benefit of increasing the 
‘image and credibility’ (Thorntorn & Ocasio, 2008; Scott, 2008) of the profession (Chapter 
5, Section 5.4). Given professional cultures and association formed essential elements of 
professions and professionalising occupations (Chapter 2), the semi-structured interviews 
revealed seven main themes on counter fraud specialists culture (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1). 
Some of the ‘traits’ of counter fraud specialists cultures revealed in Chapter 5, Table 5.1, 
had resemblance to that of the police (see Gourley, 1950; Chan, 1997; Hall, 1968)  
professional cultures. As well as this, the chapter revealed three main themes to illustrate 
counter fraud specialists poor attachment to professional associations (see Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3).   
 
In addition to the cultural-cognitive symbols, professions and professionalising 
occupations have regulating code of conduct. The study revealed that while a minority of 
counter fraud specialists had an awareness of the professional accreditation board’s 
(CFPAB) code of conduct, most interviewees felt it unnecessary to introduce a new code, 
given the inability of the CFPAB to enforce sanction or discipline counter fraud specialists 
from the existing code (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).  Furthermore, while (Chapter 4, Table 4.11 
revealed strong support for the introduction of compulsory CPD to remain accredited, the 
interview data (Chapter 5, Section 5.5) also found similar support (8 out of 13 interviewees 
supported it). Only a minority of interviewees were less supportive as they found it 
incompatible with their organisational culture because it raised issues for consideration on 
those organisations whose counter fraud specialists ‘drifted’ in and out of fraud work.   
One of the striking themes emerging for the study was the opposing views between counter 
fraud specialist and managers on investigations interference. For managers, the main 
reason for ending investigations was consideration of cost benefits analysis (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.6). Thus, from management perspective, it did not constitute interference in the 
professional authority or autonomy of the counter fraud professionals. By contrast, counter 
fraud specialists felt this constituted interference in exercising their professional authority. 
 
It was also evident in the study that counter fraud specialists occupation lacked prestige 
despite counter fraud specialists expressing the ‘altruistic orientation ‘ of ‘protecting public 
money’ as the main reason for applying for the position. As well as this, it emerged from 
the study that counter fraud professionals had different perceptions of the occupation as a 
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profession (see Chapter 5, Table 5.2) , but most perceived it as a ‘semi’, ‘emerging’ or 
‘marginal’ profession because it had not reached the stage of a complete profession, given 
the weaknesses in the institutional framework supporting the professionalisation initiatives 
or transformation process. It was also evident that, unless the existing institutional 
frameworks were strengthened, most interviewees had less optimism for seeing a counter 
fraud profession. The next chapter (Chapter 6) discusses and draws together the emerging 
themes from the study and how those related to the literature review (Chapter 2), together 
with their wider implications on counter fraud specialists profession. As well as this, the 
chapter discusses the study’s contribution to knowledge and recommendations.  
 
 
 
.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Recommendations and Future Research 
 
6.0. Introduction 
The previous chapters explored and examined the outcomes of the survey questionnaire 
(Chapter 4) and the semi-structured (follow-up) interviews (Chapter 5).  This chapter 
(Chapter 6) aimed to discuss and draw together the emerging themes from the study. It 
begins by providing an overview of the study as a whole (Section 6.1). Following this are 
key themes emerging from the study and how they relate to the literature (Section 6.2). As 
well as this, it also examines their wider implications for counter fraud specialists 
profession and professionalisation (Section 6.2.1). It then discusses the study’s 
contribution to knowledge (Section 6.3). Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of 
the study and provides recommendations and areas for future research (Section 6.4). 
 
6.1.  Overview of the study 
This thesis aimed to examine and explore the extent of professionalising counter fraud 
specialists in the UK Public Sector (DWP, NHS & Local Authority). Therefore, this 
project excluded counter fraud specialists or anti-fraud specialists working in the UK 
private sector as highlighted earlier (see Chapter 1). Fraud is a growing problem in the UK 
which affects society as a whole, and much more than would be assumed by anyone 
suggesting it to be a victimless crime (Fraud Review, 2006a; 2006b). Addressing those 
costs to society and the economy as a whole involved the need to transform those UK 
public sector organisations involved in countering fraud through professionalisation. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the initiatives to professionalise anti-fraud work arose from 
Parliamentarians concern for the growing fraud problem, the questionable investigative 
practices together with the lack of appropriate mechanism for evaluating the training for 
fraud investigators.  
 
Added to this were the growing concern for cases of miscarriages of justice within the 
criminal justice system, and the need for better training for investigators in obtaining 
evidence (Smith, 1985; Cook, 1991; DSS, 1998; Scampion Report, 2000; Prenzler & King, 
2002). As well as this, there have been developments in the UK public sector with 
   
Page 
223 
 
  
emphasis on accountability, the need to spend public money wisely and safeguarding it 
against fraud (Treasury Report, 2012; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Prowle, 2010). 
Furthermore, the UK public sector is going through a period of austerity measures which 
exposes public money to high vulnerability of fraud. Linked to this, is the lack of 
expectation for internal auditors to have anti-fraud “expertise equivalent to a person whose 
primary role is the detection and investigation of fraud” (Treasury Report, 2012, p.7).  
 
In the context of this study, people with such roles are counter fraud specialists. Yet, the 
literature review on fraud and professionalisation evidences failure to address the extent of 
professionalisation on counter fraud specialists’ profession. The handful of literature 
existing on the subject has not supported their studies with detailed interviews from the 
counter fraud professionals themselves.  In line with the research aims and objectives 
(Chapter 1, Section 1.3), this research has contributed to knowledge in the area because the 
literature on fraud and professionalisation on counter fraud specialists have failed to 
address this. Therefore, this study was the first major academic research providing both 
quantitative and qualitative study on counter fraud specialists’ profession and the extent of 
professionalisation. 
 
The study began by introducing a general overview to the study and the recent Coalition 
government policies on fraud (Chapter 1). As well as this, the Chapter (Chapter 1) also 
explored the investigatory architecture for fraud and classified counter fraud specialists 
under the umbrella of agencies involved in ‘hybrid policing’, in spite of counter fraud 
specialists not having available constabulary powers of arrest (Button et al, 2002; 2007b; 
Johnston, 1992).  Linked to this was a brief outline on the activities performed by counter 
fraud specialists together with the relevant legislative tools and strategies for fighting 
fraud. As well as providing the general overview, the study also attempted to review the 
literature in the area of professions and professionalisation. The literature revealed the 
fragmented nature of the theoretical framework for the determinants of professions and 
professionalisation (Chapter 2), thereafter providing a classification forming key attributes 
of a profession and professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). This classification was used 
for the study to explore the extent of counter fraud specialists profession and 
professionalisation. Thus, the study attempted to use functionalists/”traits” theory of 
professions and professionalisation to inform the aims and objectives of the research study.  
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Those theories were used because of their history as outline in the classical literature (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2) as benchmarks for assessing professions and professionalisation. 
Even recently, it has been applied to study foster care profession and professionalisation 
within a local authority in England (De Lona Martin, 2006).  The study adopted a more 
interpretative approach to gain knowledge on the extent of professionalising counter fraud 
specialists. The research tools for the study consisted of mixed methods (Chapter 3). 
Chapter 4 revealed the results from the survey questionnaire on counter fraud specialists, 
while Chapter 5 discussed the emerging themes from the follow up (semi-structured) 
interview.  Although the professionalisation agenda began just over a decade ago, 
emerging themes from the study as whole provided evidence from counter fraud 
practitioners to support developments in the field. Nonetheless, the strength of the quality 
of developments remained arguable given identified weaknesses and perceptions from 
counter fraud professionals in the study. The next section (Section 6.2) discussed the key 
emerging themes from the study, how they related to existing research studies, theories and 
their wider implications on counter fraud specialists profession and professionalisation.  
 
6.2. Key Findings  
The overall study revealed wide ranging perspectives on professionalising counter fraud 
specialists.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the initiatives to professionalise anti-fraud work 
started over a decade ago in response to various critical reports, notably the DSS(1998) 
‘Green Paper’; Scampion Report (2000) on ‘organised benefit fraud’ and Lord Grabiner 
Report (2000) on the ‘Informal economy’. Yet the literature on fraud and 
professionalisation on counter fraud specialists have failed to address the extent of progress 
in relation to the professionalisation initiatives. This study therefore adds to the body of 
knowledge in the area. The key findings emerging from the survey and links to the 
literature review (Chapter 2, Table 2.2) have been summarised as follows: 
 
Higher Salary Remuneration:    
Chapter 5, Section 5.1 provided emerging themes on professions and higher salary 
remuneration. It was noted in the literature review (Chapter 2, Section 2.3 and Table 2.2) 
that members of a profession received higher remuneration for their services. However, 
comparing the survey results (Chapter 5, Section 5.1) to the theory of study (Chapter 2, 
   
Page 
225 
 
  
Table 2.2), this study has found otherwise. For instance, the study revealed the existence of 
inequity in salary for counter fraud specialists across the DWP, NHS and LA in spite of 
performing the same job or equivalent roles within the same occupation with common 
training and accreditation standard. The inequity in salary was due to the multiple factors 
outlined in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.  Thus, this study has revealed that it was not all counter 
fraud specialists who received higher salary remuneration as compared to the theory of 
study (Chapter 2, Table 2.2).  Therefore, this study has failed to meet the 
professionalisation criteria in respect of salary remuneration elaborated in Chapter 2. This 
is considered a weakness in the professionalisation agenda with implications discussed in 
Section 6.2.1.   
 
Education: 
Linked to the higher salary remuneration was counter fraud specialists education. Chapter 
5, Section 5.1 also revealed further emerging themes for the study on counter fraud 
specialists’ education. While the literature review (see Chapter 2, Table 2.2) expressed the 
need for professions to have academic routes to pursue further qualifications in the 
specialised field at University level to enhance career prospects, professional growth and 
increased body of knowledge, this study has found otherwise. Thus, in this study, 
comparing the survey results on counter fraud specialists education (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.1), to the literature review (see Chapter 2, Table 2.2) revealed weaknesses in counter 
fraud specialists education, given their less desire to take advantage of academic routes to 
further qualifications in the field. Therefore, this study has failed to meet the 
professionalisation criteria in respect of education as elaborated in Chapter 2. The current 
study failed to meet the professionalisation criteria on education due to factors such as 
‘polarity in management attitude – “generalists” vrs “specialists”’, ‘non-job requirement’ 
and ‘preference for practical skills’ as opposed to ‘theoretical academic knowledge’ (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.1). This has implications for developing a strong body of knowledge 
as well as achieving the desired status of a complete profession (Section 6.2.1).  
 
Entry Barriers – Training and Accreditation:  
Generally, while it was evident from the results in the survey questionnaire that at least, 
there existed training and accreditation for counter fraud specialists profession (see 
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Chapter 4, Figure 4.9), comparing the emerging results in the survey on training and 
accreditation (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2), to the literature on professions and 
professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2), provided a clear evidence of a departure from 
the theory of profession and professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). While the 
professionalisation criteria outlined in the literature review (Chapter 2, Table 2.2) 
advocated the existence of entry barriers into a profession as well as regulatory body, this 
study has failed to meet the professionalisation requirements in respect of entry barriers as 
elaborated in Chapter 2. Thus, the study found evidence of weaknesses existing in those 
entry barriers (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2). Given the weaknesses in those barriers, the 
question that needed asking is that, has counter fraud specialists occupation reached a stage 
of re-assessing the CFPAB’s ‘fitness for purpose’? Answering this question required the 
need for debate and future research (Section 6.4). In addition, the implications of those 
weaknesses on barriers of entry are discussed as part of ‘normative perspective’ in Section 
6.2.1. 
 
Professional cultures and association:   
Chapter 5, Section 5.3 revealed key results from the survey on counter fraud specialists 
professional cultures and membership association. In relation to professional cultures, it 
was evident from the survey results that, counter fraud specialists occupation has 
developed a number of professional cultures (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3 and Table 5.1), 
similar to those found in law enforcement agencies such as the Police (see Chan, 1997; 
Reiner, 2000). While the study revealed the emergence of professional association, 
comparing evidence from the survey results (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4 and Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3) to the literature review (see Chapter 2, Table 2.2) found evidence of 
weaknesses in respect of issues with professional cultures and association. Therefore, this 
study has failed to meet professionalisation criteria in respect of professional cultures and 
association as elaborated in Chapter 2, given reasons cited for poor membership affiliation 
and participation in cultural activities (Chapter 5, Table 5.1). Evidently, the emerging 
themes clearly illustrate further weaknesses in the counter fraud specialists profession and 
professionalisation. The implications of those weaknesses are discussed as part of the 
‘cultural – cognitive perspectives’ on professions and professionalising occupations (see 
Section 6.2.1.), with recommendations provided in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.  
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Body of knowledge  
Chapter 2 discussed the relevance of a body of knowledge to professions and 
professionalising occupations, while the survey results (see Chapter 5, Section 5.0) 
revealed the existence of some of the infrastructure for developing a body of knowledge in 
the form of graduate and postgraduate degree courses. Also evident in the survey was the 
high importance counter fraud specialists placed on reading relevant occupational 
publication in the field (Chapter 4, Figure 4.14). Yet, it also raised concern about the 
academic and intellectual quality of publications read by most counter fraud specialists 
(Chapter 4, Figure 4.13), the least desire to pursuing Advanced Level counter fraud 
qualification (Chapter 4, Table 4.3) together with the least importance on completing 
relevant higher academic qualifications to graduate and postgraduate level (Chapter 4, 
Figure 4.8).  Linked to this was the lack of any occupational publication dedicated to 
counter fraud specialists, despite having strong desire for it (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4). 
Comparing the emerging survey results on counter fraud specialists body of knowledge to 
the literature review (Chapter 2, Table 2.2), found otherwise. Evidently, this study has 
failed to meet professionalisation criteria in respect of a body of knowledge as elaborated 
in the literature review (Chapter 2). This was due to the identified weaknesses in the survey 
on the body of knowledge, currently existing for counter fraud specialists. Section 6.2.1 
discussed the implications on the weaknesses in counter fraud specialists body of 
knowledge as part of the ‘normative perspective’, with recommendations provided in 
Section 6.4. 
 
Regulative code of conduct  
The literature review in Chapter 2 discussed the relevance of code of conduct as one of the 
symbolic elements of a profession and professionalising occupations. The survey results 
(see Chapter 4, Figure 4.15 and Chapter 5, Section 5.5) established evidence on the 
existence of a code of conduct for counter fraud specialists. However, the study raised 
issues of concern such as the non-enforcement of the existing code as well as fewer 
numbers that had awareness of the code of conduct of the counter fraud certificate 
awarding body (CFPAB), is arguably another weakness in professionalising counter fraud. 
Thus, while the study revealed the existence of code of conduct, the extent to which the 
awarding body’s code of conduct was enforced, with sanctions applied for breach and 
communicated to the relevant organisations signatory to the CFPAB was less evident in the 
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study (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5). Thus, the fewer numbers that had awareness coupled 
with the issue of non-enforcement of the code for breach, illustrate a further failure of the 
study to meet the professionalisation criteria in respect of a regulative code of conduct as 
elaborated in Chapter 2. Therefore, the extent to which the CFPAB applied sanctions and 
communicated to the relevant organisations and counter fraud specialists is a subject for 
future research (see Section 6.4). Nonetheless, the lack of awareness of the CFPAB code of 
conduct and implications for developing a profession are discussed as part of the 
‘regulative perspective’ in Section 6.2.1.   
 
 
 
CPD    
In addition to Chapter 5, Section 5.5 revealing survey results on code of conduct; it also 
revealed CPD issues on counter fraud specialists. The literature review discussed the 
necessity of continuous professional development for professions and professionalising 
occupations (Chapter 2, Table 2.5). The study revealed the high importance counter fraud 
specialists placed on CPD (see, Chapter 4, Figure 4.16 and Chapter 5, Section 5.5).In spite 
of this, the study found evidence that over a third of counter fraud specialists have not had 
any form of CPD in the last three years (Chapter 4, Figure 4.17), yet allowed to practise 
without any sanctions from the certificate awarding body (CFPAB). Given the regular 
changes in legislation in counter fraud arena and the criminal justice system, there is the 
need for anti-fraud specialists to maintain skills update. Nonetheless, this study has failed 
to find evidence that counter fraud meets what the literature says is a hallmark of a 
profession in respect of CPD as elaborated in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. The 
wider implications of CPD on professionalising counter fraud specialists are discussed in 
Section 6.2.1.  
 
 
Professional authority and Prestige 
Chapter 5, Section 5.6 also identified findings on professional authority of counter fraud 
specialists. Generally, the study found evidence of limitations in the extent to which 
counter fraud specialists exercised professional authority. Those constraints were attributed 
to management interference in investigations (Chapter 5, Section 5.6) and incompatibility 
between managerial and professional logics (see Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Currie & 
Suhomlinova, 2006; Hall, 1968). Linked to this was the lack of ‘prestige’ associated with 
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counter fraud specialists occupation because it was ‘rarely known’ outside the counter 
fraud community (Chapter 5, Section 5.6). While the theoretical framework elaborated in 
Chapter 2 suggested that professional authority and prestige are part of the essential ‘traits’ 
of a profession, the emerging findings from the study found otherwise. Therefore, this 
study has failed to find evidence that counter fraud meets what the literature says is a 
hallmark of a profession.  
  
 
Generally, this research study revealed some developments in professionalising the counter 
fraud specialists and even beyond as illustrated in Table 6.1. Nonetheless, there are areas 
of weaknesses that need to be strengthened given the key findings from the study.  Table 
6.1 provide a summary of those proposed government initiatives to professionalise counter 
fraud specialists in relation to emerging findings in the study and related comments. 
 
Table 6.1:  Developments in Professionalisation Initiatives since 1998 
Professionalisation agenda – Six 
Developments Proposed 
Survey Findings on 
Developments 
Comments 
Creation of common syllabus  with 
common Skill Standards 
Yes N/A 
Common core  foundation level 
training in PINS and progressing to 
more Advanced Level  and refresher 
courses  
Yes Some agencies still training anti-
fraud staff outside CFPAB 
Framework. CFS Reluctance to 
Pursue Higher Education at 
University Level 
Common accreditation by CFPAB Yes But some agencies still training anti-
fraud staff outside CFPAB 
Framework 
Development of common Principles 
of  Good Practice (Ethical Code of 
Conduct ) 
Yes But Issues with Enforcing Sanctions 
on Breach 
Common approach to tackling fraud  
across public and private sector 
Yes Issues with Information exchange in 
relation to Data Protection Act  S 29 
(3).  
Continuous professional 
development 
Yes Issues with CPD and regulatory body 
N/A Professional association – 
Institute of Counter Fraud 
Specialists (ICFS) 
Issues with membership size - 
reluctance to Join due to 
organisational, political and cultural 
issues 
N/A Media Publicity promoting anti-
fraud work and professional 
approach to investigation 
(Professionalism) 
N/A 
 
For instance, in spite of professional association not considered part of those initiatives, 
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counter fraud specialists have at least, attempted to organise themselves by creating their 
own professional association, mainly ICFS (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.12). Similar 
developments also involved a culture of intelligence sharing in relation to the detection and 
investigation of fraud crime. However, this was identified as problematic and challenging 
because organisations such as the DWP were reluctant to exchange information requested 
under Section 29 (3) of the Data Protection Act.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this section of 
the Data Protection Act (Section 29 (3)) is an exemption clause allowing law enforcement 
agencies including counter fraud specialists to share information with the relevant agencies 
for the detection, investigation and prosecution of crime including fraud. As well as this, 
there are increasing media publicity campaigns promoting anti-fraud work such as ‘BBC 
on the Fiddle’ series and DWP ‘Targeting Fraud’ publicity campaigns (Chapter 5, Section 
5.0). Yet, critics such as Grover (2005) and Cook (2006) argued that those anti-fraud 
campaigns are just myths and publicity stunt as most welfare fraud is undetected. In 
addition,  Connor (2007) also emphasised how the UK government uses such campaigns as 
symbols and material practices to shape public perception of welfare fraud, rather than 
emphasising the amount of welfare fund lost through counter fraud specialists’ errors and 
measures of reforming the system (Connor, 2007).   
 
6.2.1. Implications of the Findings  
The implications of the findings arising from the overall study are considered in four broad 
thematic headings (normative, regulative, cultural-cognitive pillars and others) as 
discussed below:     
 
Normative implications 
Chapter 2 discussed the relevance of normative elements such as higher salary rewards, 
entry criteria (training and accreditation) as well as education to professionalising 
occupations. Evidence from the study (see Section 6.2; see also Table 6.1) however, 
illustrate those findings only partially supported the theoretical framework (functionalist 
theory) of professions and professionalisation. The reason for this was due to the study’s 
failure to meet the professionalisation criteria in respect of salary inequity, entry criteria 
and education as discussed in Chapter 2. Clearly, the emerging findings in the study on the 
normative elements illustrate a deviation from the theoretical framework of 
professionalising occupations. This has wider implications on professionalising counter 
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fraud specialists.   
 
Those challenges are fourfold. Firstly is the ability to achieving ‘social closure’ (Goode, 
1960; Macdonald, 1985; Collins, 1990), with regards to weaknesses in the entry criteria 
and the lack of the CFPAB to enforce sanctions and monitor compliance. Linked to this is 
the Local Authorities preference for training providing ‘practical skills for the job’ rather 
than ‘academic knowledge’. While critics would argue professionalising occupations need 
to blend academic or theoretical knowledge and practical training skills (see Chapter 2, 
Table 2.2), this study have revealed otherwise. Therefore, the preference for training with 
more ‘practical skills’ for the job without developing the theoretical knowledge have the 
danger of creating a  ‘semi-profession’ (see Etzioni, 1969; Verhoef et al, 2006), as opposed 
to developing a counter fraud profession with a better social closure and stronger 
institutional framework. Thirdly, counter fraud specialists reluctance together with the least 
importance placed on pursuing higher education to degree level and beyond, coupled with 
the lack of dedicated occupational publication read have negative impacts on increasing the  
body of knowledge and experts in the specialised field. Fourthly, the disparities in financial 
rewards as revealed in the study have potential implications on attracting well educated 
workforce, motivation, performance (see Nash 1972) and the extent of perceiving counter 
fraud occupation in relation to others. The recommendations for those implications have 
been outlined in Section 6.3. 
 
Cultural-cognitive implications 
Another important implications emerging from the study in addition to the earlier 
discussion relate to professional cultures and association. Sociologically, developing 
formal professional associations contribute to creating a new form of social integration in 
the workplace (Durkheim, 1966). The theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 
elaborated the importance of professional cultures and association to professionalising 
occupations, despite the DSS (1998) professionalisation initiatives not including 
professional association as part of those proposals. In spite of this, the study revealed 
evidence that professional association for counter fraud specialists has emerged (see 
discussion in Section 6.2), but with weak membership affiliation and participation in the 
socio-cultural activities as a result of various organisational, political and cultural reasons 
(see Table 6.1; also Chapter 4, Table 4.8; Chapter 5, Section 5.3).  
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Clearly, the existence of those cultures has wider implications on professionalising counter 
fraud specialists because they act as barriers preventing counter fraud specialists to unite 
and gain more powerful and influential voice in government policies as well as decision 
making. Similarly, the existence of professional cultures involving ‘cynicism’, ‘them and 
us’,  ‘target driven’, ‘bureaucracy and weak social and organisation integration’ amongst 
others (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1) have broader implications on professionalisation.  Those 
cultures create problems of socialisation (Waugaman, 2000), integration and collective 
identity as well as shared values and norms (Durkheim, 1966; Scott, 2008; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999; Greenwood, 1957; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Waring & Currie, 2009) 
for the broader counter fraud professionalisation. Section 6.3 outlines recommendations for 
those implications.  
 
 
Regulative implications 
As well as the normative and cultural-cognitive implications, the study revealed further 
findings regulative elements such as code of conduct and continuous professional 
developments (see Section 6.2) which have with wider implications on professionalising 
occupations, given their failure in meeting the professionalisation criteria elaborated in the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 2. Illustrating those implications were the extent to which 
counter fraud specialists felt accountable for their actions and behaviour, given the fewer 
number that had awareness of the CFPAB’s code of conduct (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.15). 
Arguably, introducing a new code of conduct would have been an ideal given the 
challenging environments and sensitive nature of counter fraud activities (see Chapter 1), 
coupled with dealing with knowledgeable, litigious and increasingly questionable clients 
(Evetts, 2003) in an environment with limited resources. Interestingly, evidence from the 
survey revealed less support for introducing new code of conduct as respondents felt the 
existing CFPAB code was adequate if properly enforced (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5). 
Clearly, the emerging findings on code of conduct have implications on communication, 
accountability, non-enforcement of sanctions for violation or lack of appropriate reporting 
mechanism as indicated in research studies by Millerson (1964),  Valentine and Barnett 
(2003).  
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As noted in Chapter 1 and the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, organisational 
environments are increasingly becoming dynamic because of the various pressures exerted 
on them such as the dynamic nature of knowledge, skills and the need for mechanisms to 
respond to those changes in the form of CPD. While professions such as Medicine, Law 
and Accountancy have mandatory CPD on yearly basis to remain accredited (see Chapter 
2, Table 2.3), it was evident in the study that CPD for counter fraud specialists was patchy 
with no mandatory period despite exposure of the area to regular changes in legislation 
(see Section 6.2). The shortfalls in the CPD have the following wider implications on 
professionalisation. Firstly, it calls for the need to have a debate on introducing 
compulsory CPD for counter fraud specialists, possibly with a suitable regulatory body to 
oversee compliance, given the ineffectiveness as well as the ambiguity in CFPAB role and 
the lack of a clear mechanism for enforcing sanctions. However, the study revealed 
potential problematic areas associated with introducing mandatory CPD such as gaining 
consensus with the relevant agencies, given different organisational cultures and 
management styles particularly within the DWP where anti-fraud staff ‘drifted’ in and out 
of anti-fraud work (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).   
 
A further implication thought to be quite dangerous is the perception that making CPD 
compulsory leads to the loss of management control as counter fraud professionals become 
answerable to an outside body as opposed to their employers – thus a departure from the 
Weberian approach which emphasised on control and supervision as opposed to 
accountability (Dingwall, 1983; Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1977; Currie, Finn & Martin, 
2009). Similarly, the differences in policies and management of local authorities by 
Councillors and elected members with different political agenda creates another hurdle, 
given their culture of not doing anything unless it formed part of Audit Commission’s 
yearly Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) inspection. Interestingly, the new coalition 
government (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.12) has disbanded the Uses of Resource Assessment 
and Comprehensive Area Assessment16 (CAA) inspection and has proposed to disband the 
Audit Commission by 2013 as part of the cost efficiency drive and localisation (Kaffash, 
                                                            
16
 It provides an independent assessment of how well people are being served by their 
local public services including councils, health bodies, police forces and fire and rescue 
services, working in partnership to tackle the challenges facing their communities. 
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2010, para 1-3). Therefore, there is the potential for the combination of factors discussed to 
creating obstacles, conflicts and derisions for professionalisation (Birkett & Evans, 2005; 
Goode, 1960), unless debated.  
 
6.2.2.  Perspectives on Profession 
The previous section (Chapter 6, Section 6.2) highlighted the survey results on the general 
perception of counter fraud occupation. As well as revealing important findings on the 
normative, cultural-cognitive and regulative implications, the study also generated 
interesting findings on the extent to which counter fraud professionals perceived their own 
occupation in relation to others.  The literature review in Chapter 2 also provided broader 
perspectives on classification of occupations and the extent to which occupations in society 
distributed themselves along a continuum. Broadly, the study revealed that counter fraud 
occupation has made some progress but has not reached the stage of a complete profession 
(see Chapter 4, Figure 4.25 and Chapter 5, Table 5.2). Similarly, given the level at which 
respondents ranked counter fraud occupation in comparison to others (see Chapter 4, 
Figure 5.25), counter fraud occupation could be classified as a semi-profession (Etzioni, 
1969) or what Wilensky (1964) described as “marginal or emerging” profession, when 
compared to the literature review in Chapter 2. Generally, the study revealed that counter 
fraud professionals did not perceive counter fraud occupation as a profession that could be 
equated to the established professions such as Medicine, Law and Accountancy (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.7). The difference being that counter fraud occupation had a short 
training period (about 4 weeks), lacked recognition, common shared identity as well as 
some of the necessary infrastructure of a profession when compared to the established 
profession. Indeed, the established professions such as Medicine, Law and Accountancy 
have the necessary infrastructures in place as well as longer training period, required 
degree entry and a period of apprenticeship (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).  
 
Another striking finding emerging from the study was the extent to which ones structure 
within society or position within an organisation shaped one’s perception and reality of a 
profession. As revealed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.7), whereas the fraud managers did not 
perceive the occupation of a counter fraud specialist as a profession, the senior managers 
did (Chapter 5, Table 5.2).  As well as this, the study also revealed counter fraud specialists 
occupation lacked prestige because it is rarely known outside the counter fraud 
community. Thus, generally, the implications of the findings on counter fraud specialists’ 
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profession illustrate the need to develop policies that would enhance the status of counter 
fraud specialists as well as strengthen the existing institutional framework or pillars for 
professionalising occupations.  Furthermore, it does illustrate that in spite of the logics 
pursued by the government as part of the professionalisation initiatives in changing the 
negative images associated with counter fraud occupation (DSS, 1998), the study revealed 
that those stereotypical negative images still exist. This calls for the need to revisit the 
professionalisation initiatives.  
 
In addition to findings on counter fraud specialists’ perception of their own occupation and 
prestige, the study revealed other issues in relation to resource limitations, quality of 
management and general promotion opportunities and career structure within counter fraud 
agencies in the study.  Chapter 5, Section 5.8 revealed that while career structure existed 
for counter fraud specialists within the NHS and local authority, this was less so for anti-
fraud staff that had remained within the DWP for their entire career. In relation to resource 
limitations and interference in investigations, it was evident in the survey results that 
management needed to ‘balance investigative resources against cost’ (see Chapter 5, 
Section 5.6). This finding on resource limitation is consistent with previous studies on 
policing and anti-fraud resourcing (Frimpong & Baker, 2007; Ganon & Doig, 2010; Fraud 
Review, 2006b). Thus, generally, the existence of those organisational cultures and 
structural problems within the DWP, as well as issues with broader resourcing for the role 
due to the increasing managerial emphasis on rationalisation, market logics and associated 
tensions with professionals (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; 
Davenport & Dellaportas, 2009), has wider implications on developing a highly skilled 
anti-fraud profession capable of tackling the increasing fraud problem to the UK economy 
and society as a whole.  
 
 6.3. Contribution to knowledge 
Using various research tools to examine the social world, the researcher was able to get 
closer to reality. As indicated in Chapter 1, this study sought to answer the following two 
research questions with the main question: “Is counter fraud specialism a profession or not 
?”, while the second question was “ If we want to develop a profession of counter fraud 
specialists, how do we do it?”  Thus, the latter question related to how to develop a 
profession of counter fraud specialists. The main contribution of this study is that, I have 
attempted to show how to develop a profession for counter fraud specialists in the UK 
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public sector. The literature on fraud and professionalisation on counter fraud specialists 
have failed to address this and this is my contribution to knowledge. This study has 
therefore extended knowledge on the UK public sector counter fraud specialists profession 
and professionalisation. It has identified weaknesses in the counter fraud specialist’s 
professionalisation initiatives and outlined recommendations for institutional framework to 
enhance the initiatives.  As well as this, the study has provided areas for future research. 
As such, the study has contributed to the body of knowledge in the area and raised issues to 
inform policy and debate on counter fraud specialists profession and professionalisation.  
The main contribution to knowledge in the study has been classified under three main 
themes and discussed under the following headings: Profession, Professionalisation and 
Application of the Research.  
 
 Profession 
The research has also extended the knowledge on the perception of professions in relation 
to counter fraud specialists. Although studies have been conducted on counter fraud 
specialists notably (Button et al, 2007a; 2007b; Frimpong & Baker, 2007), this research is 
the first of its kind to use a combination of empirical data and interviews with counter 
fraud specialist professionals to explore counter fraud profession and professionalisation 
and the way forward (see Recommendations in Chapter 6, Section 6.4). In addition, the 
study is the first of its kind to apply sociological models of professions and 
professionalisation to study counter fraud specialists. The semi-structured interviews with 
counter fraud specialists professionals across the sector has shown that generally, most 
counter fraud professionals do not regard counter fraud occupation to have equal standing 
as the established professions such as Medicine, Law or Accountancy (see Chapter 4, 
Table 4.2). Hence, the probable reasons for ranking counter fraud profession differently in 
comparison to other professions indicated in the table (Chapter 4, Table 4.25). 
 
Despite most counter fraud professionals having altruistic motive and commitment to 
“protecting the public purse” or taxpayers’ money from fraudsters (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.6 and Chapter 6, Section 6.2),  the study has demonstrated the less prestigious nature of 
counter fraud specialists’ profession. This is due to the shorter training period, less 
autonomy and the ability for some people to practice despite possessing unaccredited 
qualifications outside the CFPAB framework. Comparing those ‘traits’ to established and 
well -recognised professions illustrate that counter fraud specialists occupation bore some 
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of those “semi-professions” occupational ‘traits’ (Goode, 1969; Etzioni, 1969).  The 
empirical analysis has also confirmed the “polarity” of professions (Greenwood, 1957). 
From the analysis, counter fraud specialists profession could be categorised as “Marginal 
Profession” (Wilensky, 1964), given respondents general perception (Chapter 4, Figure 
4.25). 
 
 Professionalisation 
As indicated in Wilensky (1964), occupations attempting to professionalise pass through a 
series of stages before attaining the status of a complete profession. In addition, the order 
of occurrence of those stages depends on the particular society and culture.  This study has 
provided evidence to support some of the stages passed through by counter fraud 
specialists’ occupation as part of the professionalisation process (Chapter 6, Table 6.1). 
Similarly, the study also provides insights on the conceptual framework necessary for 
institutional transformation and links with various interest pursued by the respective 
individual actors in the environment (Chapter 2, Figure 2.3). Despite the perspectives 
offered by functionalist theorists, the thesis has revealed the government initiatives to 
professionalise counter fraud specialists occupation (see DSS, 1998) falls short of 
functionalist theories of professions and professionalisation (Chapter 2, Table 2.2). In 
addition, comparing the achievements on the stages of professionalisation of established 
professions such as those in Chapter 2, Table 2.3 to counter fraud specialists revealed 
weaknesses in some of the necessary infrastructures for professionalising the occupation. 
The contribution to knowledge of the findings is that measures have to be put in place to 
develop the necessary professionalisation infrastructure for moving counter fraud 
specialists to the desired status.  
 
 Application of the Research 
One of the key strengths of this study has been the application of the functionalist theories 
of professions to study counter fraud specialists profession using mixed methods approach 
(Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). The findings from the study have provided insights into the 
essential professional infrastructures for occupations attempting to professionalise.  
Although theories of professions have limitations, the emerging models from the study of 
counter fraud specialists (Table 6.1) could act as a roadmap for policy makers involved in 
professionalisation issues. Furthermore, those models (Chapter 6, Table 6.1) could be 
replicated for other occupations within and outside UK that are attempting to 
   
Page 
238 
 
  
professionalise subject to cultural adaptation of those institutions.  
 
 6.4. Limitations of the Study, Recommendations and Future 
Research 
The study encountered three main limitations involving the study approach and data 
limitations.  The study approach and sources of information yielded a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative data providing valuable insights into counter fraud specialists 
profession and professionalisation as discussed in the thesis. Notwithstanding these, the 
study approach including sources of data has the following limitations:  
 
• Firstly, the DWP declined to give consent for using the CFPAB database, which 
had the potential for the researcher to reach more than the 11,000 trained and 
accredited counter fraud specialists. This affected the sample size for the study. 
Research shows that a study on counter fraud specialists (see Button et al, 2007a) 
encountered a similar problem from the CFPAB. 
 
• Secondly, part of the supposed research methodology for the study involved 
examining minutes of the CFPAB as part of the document analysis. Although, the 
researcher asked for archived copies of the CFPAB minutes under the Freedom of 
Information Act, the Chair of the CFPAB declined to give permission for release of 
this the information. Despite reminding the Chair of the CFPAB a number of times, 
those requests were still ignored. This meant that the researcher had to rely on open 
source information.  Similarly, withdrawal of three interview tapes from the study 
due to poor transcription quality (2 interview tapes) as well as withdrawal of 
consent for participation in the study by an interview participant,  had limitation on 
the interview findings. In terms of the survey questionnaire, the researcher 
overcame it using a number of gatekeepers and contacts.  
 
• The third limitation involved the concentration of the study on the three major UK 
public sector organisations (DWP, NHS, and LA) involved in countering public 
sector fraud, rather than including those within the private sector and other public 
sectors in UK. Therefore, the results in this study could not be generalised, as it did 
not cover all UK public sector organisations involved in countering fraud.  In 
addition, there exist a wide range of knowledgeable and experienced people out 
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there in the field of counter fraud, but given the time and resource constraints on 
the project, it was not possible for the researcher to interview everyone. 
Nonetheless, the researcher was able to operate within the available resources and 
time to generate the emerging findings in this study to contribute to knowledge on 
counter fraud specialists profession and professionalisation. Therefore, it has 
provided future research opportunity on replicating theories of profession and 
professionalisation for private sector counter fraud specialists. 
 
• Fourthly, while the author acknowledges that besides the three key public sector 
organisations focussed on the study (NHS, DWP and LA), there exists counter 
fraud specialists in other public sector agencies including the HMRC (see Chapter 
1, Figure 1.5), resource constraints and time constraints on the project made it 
impossible for the author to include counter fraud specialists working in those 
organisations as part of the study. Therefore, research on counter fraud specialists 
working for those organisations such as the HMRC has been recommended as part 
of the areas for future research in Chapter 6.  
 
In spite of encountering limitations and challenges, the findings from the study has 
provided the first academic and major study on counter fraud specialists involving the 
combination of survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews with counter fraud 
professionals to examine their profession and extent of professionalisation. This is what the 
literature on fraud and professionalisation on counter fraud specialists had failed to 
address, despite developments in the UK public sector accountability and the need to 
protect the public purse against fraud. Surprisingly, policy-makers had not realised the 
need to revisit the professionalisation agenda, given the time of austerity measures in the 
UK public sector, the high degree of vulnerability of public money to fraud risks and 
various motivations to commit fraud (weak internal controls, financial pressure and various 
rationalisation techniques) as discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
 Recommendations  
Based on the emerging issues in the study, the author has proposed the following ten 
recommendations as follows:  
1. There is the need to develop policies to resolve inequity in financial rewards. 
Equity theorists argued that people doing a comparable job deserve equal pay 
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(Romanoff et al, 1986; Truman & Baroudi, 1994). In the context of this study, the 
government publication and the associated recommendations for professionalising 
counter fraud specialists falls short on equity.  Therefore, there should be a debate 
on having a single spine salary for public sector counter fraud specialist 
professionals. This would help resolve the differential annual salary, given that 
counter fraud specialist professionals across the sector undertake common 
foundation training accredited by the CFPAB and perform similar tasks of 
protecting the public purse. 
 
2. Strengthen the social closure strategy on counter fraud specialists’ profession by 
means of re-evaluation of the initial minimum entry qualification training and 
accreditation. Possible options involve amalgamating some of the elements of the 
BTEC (NVQ) including mode of delivery into the current PINS training to make it 
more practical. This would have the benefits of increasing confidence in the PINS 
qualification, while acting as a disincentive to those local authorities training their 
anti-fraud staff outside the CFPAB framework. A further option is to downgrade 
the CCFS qualification and combine it with both the ACFS and some core NVQ 
modules and use it as the new minimum entry qualification into counter fraud 
profession. 
 
3. Attaining effective social closure however depends on the existence of a proper and 
recognised regulatory body with the powers to award accreditation and have a 
standard process for de-accrediting as well as disciplining counter fraud specialists. 
Nonetheless, the position of CFPAB in relation to the latter was less clear. This 
study therefore recommends the need to re-assess the CFPAB role and its 
regulatory powers including fitness for purpose. The establishment of the National 
Fraud Authority (now NFA), also creates a further opportunity that could be used to 
enhance the social closure for counter fraud specialists. Indeed, the 2006 fraud 
review recommended the NFSA (now NFA) to establish a nationwide system for 
accrediting fraud investigators based on CFPAB training and certification 
programme (Fraud Review Team, 200b, pp. 152-156).  
 
 
4. The less importance counter fraud specialists professionals attached to pursuing 
higher education to a University degree or masters level, coupled with the 
associated resource and support implications means that employing organisations 
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need to work in conjunction with higher educational institutions or training centres 
to develop more practical training or vocational courses for counter fraud 
specialists, as opposed to graduate and postgraduate courses. However, the main 
danger of emphasising less on the latter is that, it affects the development of 
counter fraud specialists body of knowledge (knowledgebase) 
 
5. Organisations employing counter fraud specialist professionals should develop 
strategies to enhance the image and status of counter fraud specialists. Perhaps, 
more emphasis should be placed on increasing professionalism given identified 
investigative cultures still prevalent within the counter fraud community.  
 
6. Explore the opportunities, strategies and potential for creating a dedicated 
occupational publication /magazine for “cementing” the identity of counter fraud 
specialists as well as increase the body of knowledge as done by other professions.  
 
7. The need to engage senior managers within  counter fraud  specialists employing 
organisations and the CFPAB on the relevance of creating a unified and more 
recognised counter fraud specialists professional association.  Doing so would 
enhance the profession and do away with existing conflicts and internal politics. 
Furthermore, strategies should be developed to promote and encourage association 
membership, increase membership affiliation, participation in related association 
activities, meeting attendance, retention rates and relationship building (Gruen et al, 
2000).  
 
8. The CFPAB and relevant stakeholders need to strengthen their partnership work by 
communicating and educating counter fraud specialists on their professional code 
of conduct and consequences for breach. In addition, the CFPAB should ensure that 
systems are in place for the relevant stakeholders including professional standards 
units to report counter fraud specialists misconduct to the accreditation board as 
done in the established and most emerging professions.  
 
9. There should be a debate about mandatory CPDs and refresher courses for counter 
fraud specialists. Perhaps, once the relevant regulatory body has been examined, 
such a body should work in partnership with the relevant stakeholders to oversee 
CPD. In addition, anti-fraud work should be properly resourced by employing 
managers with the relevant experience to lead fraud teams. As well as this, counter 
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fraud policy makers need to consider human resource implications on the 
introduction of  compulsory CPD in those counter fraud agencies such as DWP, 
whose anti-fraud staff  ‘drift’ in and out of anti-fraud work.  
 
 
10. Management should put measures in place to develop organisational cultures 
allowing professionals to exercise their authority. Perhaps, there should be a 
mechanism in place across public sector fraud investigation organisations to report 
management interference in investigations. In addition, managers should reflect on 
their management styles and encourage the involvement of anti-fraud professionals 
at different levels of the organisation in policy related issues affecting their 
profession.  
 
 Future Research  
This thesis has attempted to apply functionalists /’traits’ theories of profession and 
professionalisation to examine and explore the UK public sector counter fraud specialists 
profession. The application of the concepts and methodology has revealed a number of 
striking findings as discussed. Furthermore, it also provided insights into counter fraud 
specialists profession and recommendations to policy-makers. Nonetheless, the study also 
identified areas for further research including: 
• Replicate the study for private sector counter fraud specialists. 
 
• Explore the regulation of counter fraud specialists in both the UK public and 
private sector including the opportunities for a single regulatory body. 
 
• Motivational factors encouraging DWP counter fraud specialists to stay longest 
with their employers despite high dissatisfaction levels with promotion 
opportunities and salary remuneration.  
 
• Explore the arrangements in place between the relevant counter fraud agencies and 
the CFPAB for dealing with counter fraud specialists who breach the accreditation 
board’s code of conduct or their employers’ code of conduct.  
 
• Explore private sector approaches to countering fraud  
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• Undertaking comparative study on fraud resourcing between the DWP and HMRC 
on counter fraud related activities and tax evasion 
 
• Framework for developing courses that provide the relevant practical skills needed 
by counter fraud specialists.  
 
• Explore the potential for standardising or raising the minimum educational 
achievement needed to enter counter fraud occupation as done in accountancy, 
legal and medical professions. 
 
• Study should be conducted on the overall assessment of the effectiveness of counter 
fraud activities to the UK public sector as a result of the professionalisation agenda 
(see Chapter 1)  
• The need for future research to attempt to obtain views about counter fraud 
specialists from other stakeholders. 
 
• The need to undertake quantitative study or research to assess the effectiveness of 
counter fraud activities across UK public sector agencies involved in countering 
fraud since the introduction of the professionalisation agenda. At the moment, the 
only agency that had undertaken quantitative study to measure the effectiveness of 
counter fraud activities had been the NHS CFSMS (see discussion in Chapter 1, 
page 6). 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1A. Letter of consent attached to survey questionnaire  
 
 
  
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
University of Portsmouth 
Ravelin House 
Ravelin Park 
       Museum Road 
       Portsmouth 
       PO1 2QQ 
 
       T: +44 (0)23 9284 3933 
       F: +44 (0)23 9284 3939 
  
12/05/2007 
 
Dear Counter Fraud Specialists 
 
I am writing to seek your help in a research project on counter fraud profession as part of 
my PhD. I am currently working as a research assistant in counter fraud at the Institute of 
Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth, and have been studying towards a PhD 
on counter fraud profession. I am also an Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist and a 
member of the Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists (ICFS).  For this stage of the research, 
I am sending the attached questions to organisations in the public sector which may 
employ investigative counter fraud staff. As you may be aware, there is very little research 
on the subject of counter fraud profession and this project is aimed at widening the base of 
knowledge in this area. In addition, any information provided will be kept anonymous.  
 
I do understand that you have considerable demands on your time but hope that you might 
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be able to help me in this research by answering the questions attached and returning it by 
the 31st June 2007 to Kwabena Frimpong, Research Assistant, St Georges Building, 5th 
Floor, Room 5.03, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 2HY marking the 
envelope, ‘Counter Fraud Profession Research’, or by E-Mail to 
kwabena.frimpong@port.ac.uk.  I hope this research will also provide information for 
reforms that help enhance the professionalisation of counter fraud profession and when 
complete would be happy to send you copies of my findings. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Kwabena Frimpong 
 
 
       
 
Appendix 1A2 :  Invitation to Participate in Interviews (Follow-Up Study) 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
University of Portsmouth 
Ravelin House 
Ravelin Park 
      Museum Road 
      Portsmouth 
      PO1 2QQ 
 
      T: +44 (0)23 9284 3933 
      F: +44 (0)23 9284 3939 
 
 
 
20/02/2009 
 
Dear Mr XX 
Invitation to Participate in CFS Semi-Structured Interviews 
I am writing to seek your help in a research project on counter fraud profession.  I am a 
research staff as well as a PhD student at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, 
University of Portsmouth, and have researched on counter fraud strategies in both the UK 
public and private sectors.  I recently completed a survey on the counter fraud profession 
and distributed a total of 1403 questionnaires with 321 returned, giving a response rate of 
22.9%. The initial analysis produced a number of interesting findings and gaps. The next 
stage of the project is to undertake semi-structured interviews lasting between 60 – 90 
minutes and wondered if you will be willing to help. I hope that findings from this project 
will provide information for reforms and help to enhance the counter fraud profession.  
   
Page 
271 
 
  
 
If this is acceptable to you, perhaps you could either contact me on 02392 843978 or at 
kwabena.frimpong@port.ac.uk and we can arrange a mutually convenient date. I look 
forward to hearing from you. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Kwabena Frimpong 
 
 
 
 
(Insert Appendix 1A2B Here)  Consent Form 
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Appendix 1A3: 
 
  
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
University of Portsmouth 
Ravelin House 
Ravelin Park 
       Museum Road 
       Portsmouth 
       PO1 2QQ 
 
       T: +44 (0)23 9284 3933 
       F: +44 (0)23 9284 3939 
 
 
06 June 2007 
 
Dear Counter Fraud Specialists 
 
Reminder: Survey Questionnaire 
 
You may recall that I wrote to you on the 17th May 2007 about research project on counter 
fraud profession being undertaking as part of my PhD. In that letter I gave some 
information about the research and asked if you would be willing to complete a short 
questionnaire. (The original letter and questionnaire are attached).  
 
I am writing again in the hope that I can encourage the participation of those who have not 
completed one (Please disregard this letter/mail if you have already done so). I do 
understand that you have considerable demands on your time but hope that you might be 
able to help me in this research by answering the questions on the attached questionnaire 
and returning to me by the 29th June 2007.  
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Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Kwabena Frimpong 
 
 
Appendix 1B :  Counter Fraud Specialist Profession Survey Questionnaire 
Section 1: Background / General Data 
 
1 Sex  Male   Female 
 
1.2 Age 18 – 24   25 – 34   35 – 44 
 
 45 – 54   55 – 64   65+ 
 
1.3 Ethnic origin:  
   
   White  Black  Mixed  Indian 
   
   Pakistani  Bangladeshi   Chinese   
 
 Other, please state            
 
1.4 Please state the main town or city where you work:        
      
1.5 Please state your current job title:       
 
1.6 What type of organisation are you employed by? 
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 DWP     Local Authority (LA)   NHS CFSMS  
 
 Other NHS body         Other – Please specify:       
 
1.7 Please select your annual average salary range including any over time from the list 
below: 
 
 Less than £15,000   £15,001-£20,000   £20,001-£25,000 
   
 £25,001-£30,000    £30,001-£35,000  £35,001-£40,000 
 
 Over £40,001 
 
Section 2: Qualification 
 
2.1 What was your highest level of educational achievement at the time of applying for 
your current position? 
 
 Educated to 16   Educated to 18    HNC/HND or Equivalent 
Graduate    Postgraduate  
 
 
2.2 Which of the following qualification(s) do you possess? (Please tick) 
 
 Accredited Fraud Investigator  
 Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist 
 Accredited Counter Fraud Officer   
 Certified Counter Fraud Specialist 
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 Accredited Counter Fraud Manager  
 Graduate Counter Fraud Specialist 
 Association of Certified Fraud Examiner  
 
2.3 Could you please list any other counter fraud related qualifications that you 
possess? 
       
2.4 How long have you worked as a counter fraud specialist?       
 
2.5  Could you briefly outline – if applicable- the occupations you have undertaken 
 before becoming a Counter Fraud Specialist? 
       
 
Section 3: Training and Skills  
 
3.1 Which organisation provided your Foundation Level Training (the training that 
leads to ACFS, e.g. PINS)? 
      
 
 
 
3.2 Did the Foundation Level Training (PINS) adequately prepare you for your role as 
a counter fraud specialist? 
 
 Yes  No   Don’t Know 
 
3.3 If you answered ‘No’ please state why 
       
3.4 In what ways do you feel the Foundation Level training could be improved? 
       
3.5 Are there any other skills that you think should have been included in the 
Foundation Level training? 
       
3.6 Do you intend to study for the Advanced Level – Advanced PINS (CertHE in 
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Counter Fraud and Criminal Justice Studies) counter fraud specialist qualification? 
3.7  
 Yes     No   Don’t know  
 Done it already   Currently studying for it 
(a). If you have completed the Advanced Level, please go to Q.4.1.  
 If you answered ‘Yes’ to question 3.6, please state the reason (s) for your 
answer: 
       
(b). If your answer to question 3.6 was ‘No’, please explain why you don’t 
intend to study for the Advanced Level counter fraud specialist 
qualification. 
       
 
3.8 Are there any incentives that would encourage you to study for the Advanced Level 
counter fraud specialist qualification? 
 
  Yes  No     Don’t know  Done it already 
(a) If you answered ‘Yes’ what are they? 
       
Section 4: Professionalism 
 
4.1 On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is not a profession to 10 is a complete profession 
 could you rate the following occupations?  Please tick. 
 
 Not a 
Profession 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
A 
Profession 
Barrister Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Dentist Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Teacher Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Social 
Worker 
Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Probation 
Officer 
Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Accountant Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
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GP Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Cleaner Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Nurse Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Police 
Officer 
Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Solicitor Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
University 
Lecturer 
Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Security 
Officer 
Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
Counter 
Fraud 
Specialist 
Not a 
Profession 
           A 
Profession 
 
4.2 Do you think it should be compulsory to hold a relevant qualification before        
 you can practice as a counter fraud specialist?  
  Yes    No   Don’t Know 
4.3 If you answered ‘Yes’ could you identify which award you think should be 
 used?  
   ACFS/Equivalent    CCFS   GCFS 
   Other (Please specify):       
4.4 Could you briefly explain the rationale for your answer to question 4.2  and 
 4.3? 
       
4.5 Do you belong to any professional association(s) relevant to your occupation? 
   Yes  No   Don’t Know 
 
(a) If you answered YES, please state the name(s) of the association(s) 
       
 
(b) If you answered ‘NO’ to question 4.5, please state the reasons why and then 
go on to question 4.6 
       
 
4.6 If you are a member of relevant professional association could you describe the 
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activities you undertake? 
       
4.7. If you are a member of relevant professional association do you  
  (a)  Read association literature?   Yes    No 
  (b) Attend association meetings?            Yes    No  
  (c) Attend the annual conference?  Yes    No 
  (d) Hold office in the association?  Yes    No 
  (e) Other (Please specify :       
4.8. How often do you participate in activities related to the above professional 
association? (Please tick  the appropriate answer) 
  
   Never  Yearly  Monthly  Weekly  Daily  
4.9 On a scale of 1 to 10 where 10 is very important and 0 is not very important at 
 all could you indicate how important you think it is to be a member of a  relevant 
professional association? 
 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
Not Very 
Important 
           Very 
Important 
  
4.10 Do you regularly read journals/magazines/websites relevant to your occupation?  
     Yes   No 
 
4.11 If you answered YES, please list the titles of the journals/magazine/websites 
 that you regularly read 
       
 
4.12 How often do you read the journals /magazines/websites relevant to your 
occupation? (Please circle the appropriate answer) 
  
   Never  Daily  Weekly  Monthly  Yearly 
 
4.13 On a scale of 0 to 10 where 10 is very important and 0 is not very important at all, 
could you indicate how important you think it is to read relevant 
journals/magazines/websites relevant to your occupation? 
   
Page 
279 
 
  
 
 
4.14 On a Scale of 0-10 where 0 is not very important and 10 is very important how 
 important do you think it is for a Counter Fraud Specialist to complete a  relevant 
University degree or Masters to improve their standard of  performance?  
  
 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
Not Very 
Important 
           Very 
Important 
 
 
   
4.15 If you are currently enrolled on a University Course please state the name of 
 the University and Course 
       
 
4.16 On a Scale of 0-10 where 0 is not very important and 10 is very important how 
important do you think it is for a Counter Fraud Specialist to complete continuous 
professional development (CPD) to improve their standard of performance?  
 
 
 
 
4.17 Do you think it should be compulsory to undertake CPD to remain accredited 
 as a Counter Fraud Specialist? 
 
   Yes  No   Don’t Know 
 
 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
Not Very 
Important 
           Very 
Important 
 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
Not Very 
Important 
           Very 
Important 
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4.18 If you answered ‘Yes’ could you briefly outline what form the CPD should 
 take and how regularly it should be assessed?  
       
 
4.19 Could you describe the CPD you have undertaken in the last three years.  
      
 
4.20 Are you aware of any professional codes of conduct that govern your work as  a 
Counter Fraud Specialist?  
 
 Yes   No   Don’t Know 
 
4.20 If ‘Yes’ could you name the code that governs your activities?  
      
 
4.21 On a Scale of 0-10 where 0 is not very important and 10 is very important how 
 important do you think it is for there to be a mandatory code of conduct that 
 governs the activities of Counter Fraud Specialists?   
 
  
  
4.22 Which of the following statements best describe why you applied for your 
 current position? (Please select one) 
 
 Job pays well …………........................................................   
 Promotion opportunities ……...............................................   
 I was unemployed and it was the best job I could find ……   
 This job is a second to secure extra money ………………    
 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
Not Very 
Important 
           Very 
Important 
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 Good working opportunities ………………………………   
 Work is stimulating ………………………………………...  
 I wanted to apply my experience and knowledge from the Forces  
 For the prestige of the job …………………………………….  
 I enjoy doing this type of job ………………………………..  
 Job security ………………………………………………….  
 Other (Please specify):        
   
Section 5: Resource and Support 
 
5.1 Do you feel you are properly resourced to undertake counter fraud work? 
  Yes   No   Don’t Know 
5.2 If you answered ‘No’ please explain why. 
      
5.3 Do you feel you receive an adequate level of support from your senior managers in 
your role as a counter fraud specialist? 
   
   Yes  No   Don’t Know 
5.4 If you answered ‘No’ please say why. 
      
5.5 How could the level of support you receive be improved? 
       
5.6 Have you ever felt pressured by your senior managers to end an investigation into 
suspected fraud or corruption before reaching a satisfactory conclusion? 
 
    Yes  No   Don’t Know 
 
5.7 If ‘Yes, on how many occasions?       
 
5.8 Why did you think you were pressured to end the investigation (s)? 
       
5.9 Does 50% or more of your job involve the formulation or development of  counter 
fraud policy? 
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      Yes  No 
 
 
Section 6: Level of Satisfaction / Dissatisfaction  
 
Could you please express your level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the following? 
Where 1 = Very satisfied, 2 = Satisfied, 3 = Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 
4=Dissatisfied and 5 = Very dissatisfied. (Please tick the appropriate answers in the table) 
   
  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Very 
satisfied 
Satisfied Neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Very 
dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 
Your Job      
Your Salary      
Promotion 
Opportunities 
     
Your Workload      
Quality of 
Management 
     
Quality of 
Training 
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
Sex of respondents 
Sex All Respondents Local Authority NHS CFSMS DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Male 167 54.0 98 50.3 40 63.5 14 56.0 
Female 142 46.0 97 49.7 23 36.5 11 44.0 
Total 309 100.0 195 100.0 63 100.0 25 100.0 
 
 
Age range of respondents 
Age  All Respondents Local Authority NHS CFSMS DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
18-24 7 2.2 4 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
25-34 56 17.8 38 19.1 10 15.6 2 7.7 
35-44 127 40.3 77 38.7 24 37.5 13 50.0 
45-54 96 30.5 58 29.1 25 39.1 10 38.5 
55-54 29 9.2 22 11.1 5 7.8 1 3.8 
Total 315 100.0 199 100.0 64 100.0 26 100.0 
 
 
Ethnicity of respondents 
Ethnicity All 
Respondents 
Local 
Authority 
NHS CFSMS DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
White 313 97.8 197 97.5 65 100.0 25 96.2 
Mixed 1 0.3 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Indian 1 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.8 
Black 5 1.6 4 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 320 100.0 202 100.0 65 100.0 26 100.0 
 
Length of time as ACFO 
Time as 
ACFS 
(Years) 
All Respondents 
(Years) 
Local Authority 
(Years) 
NHS CFSMS 
(Years) 
DWP 
(Years) 
 N N N N 
Mean 8.92 9.50 7.88 10.04 
Median 8.00 9.00 6.50 10.50 
Mode 10.00 10.00 8.00 12.00 
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Annual average salary range (overtime inclusive) 
Annual salary 
range 
All  
Respondents 
Local 
 Authority 
NHS  
CFSMS 
DWP 
 N % N % N % N % 
Under £15,000 3 0.9 1 0.5 1 1.6 1 3.8 
£15,001-£20,000 23 7.3 17 8.5 0 0.0 2 7.7 
£20,001-£25,000 80 25.2 57 28.4 6 9.5 9 34.6 
£25,001-£30,000 80 25.2 58 28.9 8 12.7 10 38.5 
£30,001-£35,000 67 21.1 45 22.4 17 27.0 3 11.5 
£35,001-£40,000 29 9.1 10 5.0 14 22.2 1 3.8 
Over £40,001 35 11.0 13 6.5 17 27.0 0 0.0 
Total 317 100.0 201 100.0 63 100.0 26 100.0 
 
